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Geanie W. Margavio 
SOUTHWEST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY 
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE: 
THE CULMINATION OF THREE 
DECADES OF CONFLICTING 
REGULATION, DEREGULATION, 
AND RE-REGULATION 
Abstract: The role of the public accounting profession in the savings 
and loan debacle of the 1980s has recently been the subject of Con-
gressional inquiry and extensive litigation by government agencies, 
and by angry stockholders and bondholders. These efforts suggest a 
broad misunderstanding by the public of the causes of the disaster. 
this paper illustrates that the difficulties which precipitated the crisis 
were a result of the historical development of the regulatory environ-
ment of the savings and loan industry. Examining this regulatory 
environment helps in understanding the current problems and crises 
of savings and loans as well as the situation in which the accounting 
profession now finds itself. 
The paper illustrates that the manner in which the industry was 
regulated, including piecemeal and often conflicting legislation, 
locked the industry into long-term mortgage commitments and then 
urged diversification from these commitments. The paper illustrates 
that, over the years, industry responses to this legislation created a 
net worth crisis. The extent of the crisis was obscured by accounting 
principles developed by regulators, and which ran contrary to GAAP. 
Finally, the paper discusses recent legislation designed to correct the 
regulatory and accounting inconsistencies, and the anticipated effect 
of this legislation on the future of the savings and loan industry. 
The end of the 1980s decade was marred by the financial 
collapse of many savings and loan institutions. Current esti-
mates of federal expenditures necessary to bail out the savings 
and loan industry from its financial debacle generally exceed 
$100 billion and some estimates range as high as $300 billion 
[Adams, 1990, p. 17; Pilzer, 1989, p. 233]. When interest costs 
on 30 to 40 year debt used to finance the federal bailout are 
included, cost estimates rise steeply to between $500 billion and 
$1 trillion [Carlton, 1992]. The "true" cost of the bailout will not 
be known for years to come, until all of the failing institutions 
have been shut down, merged, and sold off; until the Resolution 
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Trust Corporation liquidates its holdings; and until all of the tax 
breaks and special portfolio performance guarantees granted to 
acquiring institutions have expired. Meanwhile, the American 
public is still asking: how the fiasco came about; who should be 
blamed for it; and how the clean up should be financed. 
These are questions of particular concern for accountants 
for the following reason. While the responsibility for the wide-
spread failure in the industry has not yet been fully determined, 
the role of the public accounting profession as well as the ac-
counting standards, principles, procedures, and rules for sav-
ings and loan financial reporting have been called into question. 
Auditors of failed savings and loans have been shouldering part 
of the blame for the fiasco and some of the financial responsi-
bility for the clean up, as a result of various lawsuits by federal 
agencies.1 In addition, auditors have been subjected to various 
class action lawsuits brought by investors in failed savings and 
loans.2 These lawsuits, whether justified or not, reflect a myopic 
perspective of how the debacle occurred. The thrift debacle was 
not simply the result of audit irregularities, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board forbearance in closing troubled institutions, or 
fraud and mismanagement by thrift industry executives. Al-
though each of these factors contributed substantially to the 
crisis, the problem was also fundamentally rooted in the histori-
cal regulation of the industry. 
This paper discusses, from a historical perspective, the 
regulatory environment of the savings and loan industry. Exam-
ining this regulatory history helps in understanding the current 
1By April 1986, 38 investigations had been launched by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and $3,319,000 had been turned over to the FDIC 
by various auditors [U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986]. The Resolution 
Trust Corporation (the agency designated to dispose of the assets of failed sav-
ings and loans) has recently filed suits against the following CPA firms for their 
roles in failed savings institutions: KPMG Peat Marwick, $154 million; Deloitte 
and Touche, $444 million; Pannell Kerr Forster, $41 million [Pickering, 1992]. 
Ernst and Young agreed to a total comprehensive settlement of $400 million. 
This agreement was reached with the federal thrift regulations to resolve all 
"current and potential claims" against the firm for its role in audits of failed 
depository institutions [Eldridge, 1992]. 
2Recently Ernst and Young agreed to pay a total of $63 million to settle a 
class action lawsuit related to failed Lincoln Savings and Loan [Stevens, 1992, p. 
A3]. In addition to this settlement, Ernst and Young agreed to pay the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation $41 million [Public Accounting Report, 1992]. Arthur 
Andersen has also paid a total of $30 million to bondholders of Lincoln Savings 
and Loan [Public Accounting Report, 1992]. 
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problems and crises of savings and loans as well as the situation 
in which the accounting profession now finds itself. The paper 
illustrates how changes in regulations and conflicting regulatory 
intentions laid the framework for the savings and loan debacle. 
Finally, this paper calls for greater coordination of Congres-
sional goals for savings and loans, and the financial services 
industry, as the only way to achieve a lasting resolution to thrift 
industry problems. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: The Early Years; Post Depression Years Through the 
1960s; The 1970s: Disintermediation and Consumerism; The 
1980s: Deregulation, Expansion, Crisis, Re-regulation; and What 
will the 1990s Bring? 
THE EARLY YEARS 
The first savings and loan institution was organized in 
1831. Its primary purpose was to finance home ownership for 
association members. At this time, commercial banks were not 
filling this need because they perceived their role as financing 
the capitalization of industry [Ewalt, 1962, p . 372]. With the 
growing industrialization of the nation and the need for housing 
for urban residents, savings and loans spread across the country 
to serve savers and home mortgage borrowers. The spread of 
the thrift industry spurred a tremendous growth in residential 
construction across the nation. This construction boom became 
a leading factor in the prosperity of the 1920s [Keith, 1973]. 
Throughout this developmental period from 1831 into the 
1920s, the institutions were chartered by states and were regu-
lated by laws which varied greatly between states. Many states 
had no requirement for the establishment of reserves against 
losses on loans; consequently, some institutions paid out essen-
tially all profits in dividends to shareholders. In addition, mort-
gage repayment arrangements frequently failed to provide for 
methodical reduction of the principal balance of loans. Mort-
gage financing arrangements too frequently involved first, sec-
ond, and third mortgages financed over periods of 10 to 15 
years. This was not a great problem while real estate prices were 
stabilized or rising with the economic boom in the stock mar-
ket. However, in 1929, the stock market crashed and real estate 
prices plummeted. 
Early in the 1930s, institutions found themselves with delin-
quent loans, foreclosures, and a bulk of repossessed real estate 
assets. With so much repossessed property for sale, even at re-
13
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1993, Vol. 20, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1993
4 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993 
duced prices, little property was changing hands because of a 
lack of public confidence in the real estate market and the bank-
ing industry. Furthermore, with assets that were illiquid and 
having paid out most of the profits in prior years as dividends, 
the savings and loans were in deep financial difficulty. As part 
of legislation to restore financial vitality and public confidence 
in the banking system, Congress enacted several laws aimed at 
promoting stability in the housing market and the savings and 
loan industry. Among these laws were the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act (1932), the Home Owner's Loan Act (1933), and the 
National Housing Act (1934). Some of the major provisions of 
these laws were as follows. 
First, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act established the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System operated by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The intent of the Act was to 
help hard pressed homeowners who could not get mortgage 
funding from banks to receive financing from a FHLB member. 
Thus, the purpose of the Board and the system was primarily to 
advance funds to Federal savings and loans so that they could 
advance the funds to homeowners. Secondarily, the Board regu-
lated those institutions participating in the funds advancement. 
This latter purpose was largely implemented in two ways. First, 
the Board took an active role in evaluating proposed laws to 
determine their effect on the financial well-being of the indus-
try, and then lobbied Congress on the thrifts' behalf. Second, 
the Board assured "that regulated institutions adhered to writ-
ten laws and regulations" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 109]. This 
function was a very legalistic one, which did not necessarily 
coincide with determining the financial soundness of individual 
institutions. While these provisions of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act served to stabilize the mortgage market by making 
funds available on a regular basis, emergency funding was made 
available by the Home Owners Loan Act. 
The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 provided emergency 
mortgage funding to distressed home-owners by offering them 
long-term mortgage loans (15 year periods), with fixed interest 
rates capped at 5% initially. This Act further provided that Fed-
eral savings and loans could only lend their funds for home 
mortgages and combinations of home and business property 
mortgages; and these loans could only be made within 50 miles 
of the association's home office. Finally, the Act specifically ex-
empted Federal savings and loans from federal taxation and 
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from taxation by any state. This offered the institutions tax pro-
tection for the purpose of rebuilding their reserves. 
The third major act, The National Housing Act, established 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to 
insure depositors at the savings associations. It also established 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure savings as-
sociations against losses on mortgages and home improvement 
loans and to regulate amortization of those loans. Additionally, 
the Act established the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA or Fannie Mae) to create a secondary market for mort-
gages.3 Finally, the Act provided that each institution establish a 
reserve of 5% of deposits. Institutions were given 10 years to 
meet this goal. These three laws marked the first Federal in-
volvement in the housing industry, and reflect the national rec-
ognition of the important role of savings and loans in home 
ownership. This depression-era legislation set the framework for 
the system of federally chartered savings and loans. 
THE POST-DEPRESSION YEARS THROUGH THE 1960s 
Under this regulatory framework, the savings and loan in-
dustry returned to prosperity in the late 1930s. From then until 
the late 1960s, the institutions experienced increasing profit 
margins. This prosperity was the result of several factors includ-
ing the following. First, World War II promoted high long-term 
mortgage rates and low short-term interest payments to deposi-
tors , with rates remaining relatively stable throughout the 
1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. Second, a tremendous post-war 
prosperity was experienced across the nation. Third, the middle 
class enlarged, and society began moving to the suburbs . 
Fourth, real estate prices escalated; and, fifth, the Federal gov-
ernment established a continuing concern for housing develop-
ment [Ewalt, 1962, pp. 255-341]. This Federal concern for hous-
ing fueled savings and loan prosperity during the Post-Depres-
sion years; however, it also established the framework for the 
difficulties the industry would encounter in the 1970s, and ulti-
mately the 1980s, for the reasons detailed below. 
3Provisions of these Acts are summarized in U.S. Congress, Evolution of 
[the] Role of the Federal Government in Housing and Community Development, 
1975. 
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Increasing Role of Federal Government in Setting Mortgage Terms 
During the post-depression years, the availability of the sec-
ondary mortgage market (through Fannie Mae) enabled institu-
tions with excess cash to participate in the prosperous mortgage 
lending in booming housing markets. However, in order for in-
stitutions to sell mortgages through Fannie Mae, the mortgages 
had to meet FHA criteria. These criteria related most notably to 
the length of the loan repayment period, the percentage of ap-
praised value eligible for loan financing (referred to as loan-to-
value ratios), and interest rate caps on the loans. Initial repay-
ment periods were 15 to 20 years, with loan-to-value ratios of 
80%. These values were changed almost annually through the 
1940s and 1950s in various Housing Acts. One of these Acts, the 
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill of Rights), 
established a program of government regulated, government in-
sured loans especially for veterans. Provisions of these loans 
were similar to FHA loan provisions. The loans were adminis-
tered by the Veterans Administration (VA) and eventually be-
came known as VA loans. 
The VA and FHA loan terms at times had repayment peri-
ods extended to 40 years, and at times loan to value ratios were 
as high as 97% [Mason, 1982, p. 64], The government rationale 
for supporting such generous mortgage terms continued to be 
that "housing is a segment of the economy demanding special 
treatment to assure a flow of credit which it would not ordi-
narily attract" [Ewalt, 1962, p. 262]. This government philoso-
phy was effective in attracting capital to the mortgage market, 
primarily in the form of a growth in mortgage bankers. The 
mortgage bankers aggressively marketed FHA and VA insured 
loans with long maturities and low interest rates. They then sold 
these loans to Fannie Mae. This fierce competition from the 
mortgage bankers forced the savings and loans to make FHA 
and VA qualified loans, or, alternatively, to make conventional 
loans which closely paralleled the long repayment periods, low 
interest rates and generous loan to value ratios of the FHA 
loans. Thus, the FHA loan terms became the industry standard, 
and savings and loans began to lock themselves into 20, 30, and 
40 year loan commitments. 
Fuelled by generous FHA and VA loan terms, and FSLIC 
insurance guarantees, housing starts in the 1950s and 1960s 
reached record levels; and the savings and loan industry contin-
ued to prosper. This prosperity led to the creation of new sav-
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ings and loan institutions, and these associations were given up 
to 20 years to meet the 5% reserve requirement established in 
the National Housing Act. During this period of increasing pros-
perity for savings and loans, the institutions found their assets 
expanding in geometric proportions. At the same time, commer-
cial banks were experiencing only modest growth [Woerheide, 
1984, p. 5]. The commercial banking industry attributed the 
savings and loan prosperity to favorable tax treatment because, 
during the World War II and Post-War Era, savings and loan 
associations were not subject to federal income taxation. The 
tax policy at that time (consistent with the regulatory policy) 
was that these institutions served a vital role in financing the 
development of residential housing, an important national goal 
[Biederman and Tuccillo, 1976, p. 5]. In addition, since savings 
and loans were traditionally mutually owned, they were viewed 
as tax conduits for the depositors/owners. This preferential tax 
treatment, not available to commercial banks, was a continual 
irritant to the commercial banking industry which voiced com-
plaints about this unfair tax treatment afforded savings and 
loans. 
The Revenue Act of 1951 
Commercial banking arguments centered around the fact 
that savings and loans were in direct competition with commer-
cial banks for savings deposits; and that if savings and loans 
were to be allowed to compete with banks for deposits, they 
should be subject to equal taxation [U.S. Congress, 1951, p. 
783]. In response to these and other persuasive arguments ad-
vanced by commercial banks, the Revenue Act of 1951 amended 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to treat savings and loans as 
regular corporations.4 This Act set the framework for savings 
and loan taxation. It was significant because it signalled a shift 
in tax policy which lost some of its focus on protecting saving 
and loans because of their commitment to housing finance, and 
4Several exceptions to this general rule of taxing savings and loans as regu-
lar corporations have developed over the years. Major exceptions include: the 
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction (discussed at length in the text 
of this paper), ordinary loss treatment from the sale of corporate and govern-
ment securities, deduction for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt bonds (pre-
Tax Reform Act of 1986) and a longer net operating loss carryback period (pre-
Tax Reform Act of 1986). These exceptions, as well as several less significant 
ones, are explained more fully by Halperin [1971] and by Clark [1975]. 
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moved towards the concept of tax equality among thrifts and 
banks competing for consumer deposits. This shift marked a 
divergence in tax policy and FHLBB regulatory policy. Although 
the tax policy shift at this time was major, the actual tax impact 
was negligible for the following reason. 
The Revenue Act of 1951, in addition to subjecting savings 
and loans to taxation for the first time, provided them a choice 
of methods for determining their allowance for bad debts. This 
allowance then determined the bad debt deduction for tax pur-
poses. Like other corporations, savings and loans could choose 
to set up their allowance based on actual bad debt experience, 
averaged over a specified period of years. In lieu of this experi-
ence method, they could choose the percentage of taxable in-
come bad debt deduction.5 This method enabled the institutions 
to write off as much as 100% of their taxable income to a re-
serve for bad debts. The balance of this reserve, together with 
earned surplus and undivided profits, was limited to 12% of 
total deposits. This limitation was, as a practical matter, seldom 
a binding constraint [U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 3514]. Thus, while 
savings and loans were nominally taxable entities, few paid any 
income tax until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962. 
The Revenue Act of 1962 
In 1962, Congress again devoted its attention to the issue of 
savings and loan taxation. This reconsideration was initiated by 
President Kennedy's demand for a review of the taxes of "pri-
vate savings and lending institutions [that] are accorded tax de-
ductible reserve provisions which substantially reduce or elimi-
nate their Federal income tax liability" [U.S. Congress, 1961, p. 
2]. As a result of the ensuing Congressional review, the Revenue 
Act of 1962 reduced the percentage of taxable income bad debt 
deduction rate to 60% of taxable income. Subsequent to this 
change, effective tax rates of savings and loans rose (see Exhibit 
5Savings and loans could also choose a method known as the "3-percent 
method" which allowed them to set up a reserve at three percent of eligible 
loans (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). This method became 
known in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) as the percentage of eligible 
loans method. This method underwent few changes from 1954 to 1986 when it 
was struck from the law in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For this reason, and 
since most of the controversy over bad debt deductions for savings and loans 
focused on the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction, this method is 
not discussed further in this paper. 
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1). The Act also added a restriction that savings and loans using 
this deduction were required to hold at least 72% of their assets 
in "qualified assets." Qualified assets included residential real 
property loans; loans secured by members' deposits or by 
church facilities; cash and U.S. government obligations; and 
property used in conduct of the institution's business [Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) section 7701(a)(19)(C)]. This was the first 
explicit linking in the tax law between the percentage of taxable 
income bad debt deduction and an institution's investment in 
mortgages. It also placed the tax law in the position of dictating 
specific investments allowable for savings and loans. This intro-
duced a conflict in allowable investments for tax and regulatory 
purposes. 
At this time, savings and loans had little choice but to ac-
cept their tax increase because the regulatory rules which speci-
fied permitted savings and loan investments were even more 
stringent than the 72% investment in qualified assets required 
for tax purposes.6 While the tax law did not specify how the 
remaining 28% of assets had to be invested, regulatory rules 
limited investments exclusively to: (1) residential mortgage 
loans on one to four-family home types, (2) loans secured by 
members' deposits, (3) cash, (4) government securities, (5) prop-
erty used in conduct of the institution's business, (6) residential 
property improvement loans (limited to 15% of total assets), or 
(7) loans on the security of improved real estate other than one 
to four-family home types (limited to 20% of total assets) [12 
CFR 545.11]. Thus, for all practical purposes, regulatory invest-
ments, other than cash, government bonds, business property, 
and loans secured by members' deposits, were committed to 
residential mortgages and improvements to residential property. 
Effectively only 20% of an institution's assets could be invested 
in anything other than residential property and related loans. 
Because of these constraints, savings and loans had to maintain 
approximately 80% of their assets invested in qualified assets to 
meet regulatory requirements. 
6Savings and loans could have expanded their investment in tax free govern-
ment bonds in order to avoid incurring a greater tax burden. Baer [1983] illus-
trates the potential benefits of this strategy. Hendershott and Koch [1980], how-
ever, present contradictory evidence showing that relative before tax returns on 
taxable and non-taxable investments would have to be in excess of their historic 
relationship to make this strategy worthwhile. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Aggregate Effective Tax Rates of 
Savings and Loan Associations, 1960-1988 
(Dollars in Millions)a 
Year Net Income Taxes Effective 





















































































































aInformation obtained from U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p. 50] 
and U.S. Congress [1983, p. 286]. 
b
 Industry-wide effective tax rates for these years are meaningless because they 
reflect a growing disparity in income between profitable and unprofitable insti-
tutions. 
Such an investment level was not a hardship for the institu-
tions during this time period because, as discussed previously, 
profit margins were relatively stable, demand was relatively 
stable, and real estate prices were rising. This was the last time 
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the industry experienced such stability. In the years following 
1961, further conflicts developed between allowable assets for 
tax and regulatory purposes, thereby sending the industry a 
mixed message on the role it was expected to play in home 
financing. Tax burdens on the industry increased; and Regula-
tion Q was imposed by regulators. The regulatory rationale for 
the implementation of Regulation Q is explained in the follow-
ing section. 
Regulation Q Imposed 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, inflation became a serious 
problem. Fuelled by the Vietnam War, which the government 
tried to finance without a major tax increase, inflation rates 
became higher and more variable than in the past [Carron, 
1982, p. 5]. The rampant inflation exerted upward pressure on 
market interest rates, which were also being driven upwards by 
competition among savings and loans in the western and east-
ern portions of the country, and between banks and savings and 
loans. 
By 1966, interest rates reached a 100 year high [Bowden 
and Holbert, 1984, p. 28]. The Federal government became con-
cerned about savings and loans' ability to pay these high interest 
rates to depositors. Since their portfolios were tied up in long-
term, fixed-rate residential mortgages, savings and loans were 
unable to make rapid adjustments in their revenue base to offset 
the rising cost of short-term borrowing (deposits). Thus, the 
industry was trapped by fixed-yield, long-term investments fi-
nanced by short-term borrowing at volatile interest rates. To 
protect the savings and loan industry, in 1966 the Federal gov-
ernment imposed Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings on savings 
and loans. This was viewed as a viable means of keeping down 
savings and loans' cost of funds and protecting the industry 
from competitive forces. Subsequent to imposition of Regula-
tion Q, market rates dropped and some observers believed that 
savings and loans were out of trouble. This belief may have 
been at least partially responsible for the imposition of addi-
tional taxes on savings and loans in the Revenue Act of 1969. 
The Revenue Act of 1969 
The Revenue Act of 1969 increased savings and loan taxes 
by reducing the percentage of taxable income limit for the bad 
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debt deduction. During the hearings which preceded this act, 
the savings and loan industry requested that the definition of 
qualified assets be expanded to encompass new regulatory pow-
ers.7 Regulators had expanded savings and loan allowable assets 
to include certain education loans (up to five percent of total 
assets), housing for the aging (up to five percent of total assets), 
loans on improved real estate other than residential property, 
and loans for the acquisition and development of land (raised 
from 15% to 20% of total assets) [12 CFR 545.6-545.8]. How-
ever, the industry was unable to pursue these investments be-
cause of the stringent asset restrictions of Section 7701(a)(19) of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the tax law and operating regu-
lations were in conflict. 
As a partial response to industry pleas, the 1969 Act ex-
panded qualified assets to include: loans secured by commercial 
property in certain u rban renewal areas; loans secured by 
school, health, or welfare facilities; and student loans. However, 
the qualified assets percentage was increased to 82%, and a 
sliding scale implemented for investment levels from 82% to 
60%. For every one percent of an institution's portfolio which 
fell below 82%, the bad debt deduction was reduced by three-
fourths of one percent. Once the institution's portfolio fell to 
less than 60% investment in qualified assets, it could no longer 
use the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction. 
This marked the widest divergence yet in tax and regulatory 
policy. While regulators were becoming more lenient in allow-
ing institutions some limited diversification out of residential 
mortgages (up to 30% of the portfolio), the tax law was impos-
ing a tax penalty for diversification in excess of 18%. In addition 
to this constraint, the Act reduced the deduction rate from 60% 
to 40%, phased in over a 10 year period. Thus, even those insti-
tutions not diversifying experienced a tax increase.8 This tax 
increase contributed to a severe financial crunch which gripped 
the industry in the 1970s. 
7See testimony of William J. Hallahan, Consultant on Monetary Policy and 
Economic Affairs, National League of Insured Savings Associations [U.S. Con-
gress, 1969, p. 3524]. 
8See Exhibit 1 for a summary of Savings and Loans effective tax rates fol-
lowing the 1969 Act. 
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THE 1970s: DISINTERMEDIATION, CONSUMERISM AND 
NET WORTH CRISIS 
During the 1970s, a growing rate of inflation was experi-
enced across the country. This was attributed in part to the 
Federal government trying to finance the Vietnam War without 
any major tax increase, and to the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 100% increase in oil prices. In an 
effort to curb the growing inflation problem, the Federal Re-
serve Bank increased its discount rate and its reserve require-
ments to record levels. It also implemented a new monetary 
control policy which focused on regulation of the total reserves 
of the banking system instead of regulation of short-term inter-
est rates. Subsequent to announcement of this policy, short-
term market interest rates rose rapidly. This precipitated finan-
cial chaos in the savings and loan industry. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, savings and loans were 
prevented by Regulation Q from passing these high short-term 
market interest rates on to their depositors. This situation moti-
vated depositors to withdraw funds from savings and loans in 
order to invest in alternative, higher yielding investment ve-
hicles (particularly money market mutual funds) offered by un-
regulated intermediaries. This disintermediation forced savings 
and loans to enter the market as short-term borrowers, paying 
very high interest rates on borrowed funds. Meanwhile, their 
income-generating portfolios were tied up in long-term, low in-
terest bearing, fixed-rate mortgages. This latter problem was 
largely the result of years of savings and loan responses to the 
trend in mortgage lending established by the FHA and VA, and 
the portfolio restrictions established by Congress. 
The institutions fought back against these regulations by 
circumventing them to the extent possible. Since investment op-
portunities were still largely limited to mortgages by FHLBB 
regulations, and by tax regulation, the savings and loans began 
to enhance their services. The industry expanded operations 
into costly branch networks (Exhibit 2) and other customer 
amenities, thus causing operating costs to rise. Savings and 
loans expected that these enhanced services would lure back 
customer deposits. To further lure depositors, they began offer-
ing Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal (NOW accounts) which 
were in substance interest-bearing checking accounts. This 
strategy further increased operating costs and resulted in a se-
vere profit squeeze for the industry. 
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EXHIBIT 2 























































































aSource: U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p . 56]. 
This profit squeeze was the beginning of the savings and 
loan debacle of the 1980s. As profits plunged, the net worth, or 
capital position, of the industry eroded making reserve require-
ments ever more difficult to maintain. This situation prompted 
the industry to pressure the Bank Board into extending its dead-
line to meet the 5% reserve requirements. In 1972, the Board 
responded by authorizing institutions to compute their reserves 
as a percentage of savings deposits averaged over a five-year 
period. As the earnings positions of the institutions continued to 
weaken, the industry trade organization, the U.S. League of Sav-
ings Institutions, petitioned Congress to reduce the reserve re-
quirements. Congress eventually did this in the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation Act of 1980. 
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THE 1980s: DEREGULATION, EXPANSION, 
CRISIS, RE-REGULATION 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 was the first in a series of ill 
conceived regulation attempting to repair the regulatory in-
duced damage done to the savings and loan industry in the 
1970s. The regulation of the 1980s was ill conceived for several 
reasons. First, deregulation of savings and loan liabilities (free-
ing interest rates on interest bearing deposits) preceded deregu-
lation of investments, thus exacerbating an already volatile 
earnings situation. Secondly, regulators authorized the use of 
several accounting methods which obscured the true financial 
condition of the industry. Finally, a lack of communication and 
coordination among various government regulators created a 
regulatory environment of uncertainty and confusion about the 
role the institutions were to play as financial intermediaries. 
Details of how this confusion developed follows in the discus-
sion of the regulatory events that occurred during the 1980s. 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain Act 
The first of the regulatory changes in the 1980s, DIDMCA, 
authorized a phase out of Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings, 
thus allowing savings and loans to increase rates paid on depos-
its (liabilities). In addition, the law legitimized NOW accounts 
nationwide. Both of these provisions caused an increase in the 
institutions' cost of funds. Furthermore, the Act gave the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board the authority to vary reserves (or 
capital) requirements for individual institutions between 3% 
and 6% of deposits. The Act also granted savings and loans 
some limited freedom to diversify asset holdings including the 
ability to invest up to 3% of assets in service corporations (i.e., 
subsidiary corporations allowed to participate in a wide range 
of business activities). These asset diversification powers were 
further expanded in 1982. 
The 1982 Act, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
Act, allowed savings and loans to invest up to 30% of their as-
sets in consumer loans and corporate debt, up to 40% in non-
residential real estate, and up to 10% in commercial loans. In 
addition to these new investment powers, the Garn-St. Germain 
Act eliminated loan to value ratios on all loans (thus permitting 
100% financing of real estate projects); and, for the first time, 
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permitted adjustable rate mortgages. Regulators believed that, 
collectively, these 1980 and 1982 changes would enable savings 
and loans to diversify some of their long-term lending and 
short-term borrowing financial structure and better weather 
changing economic conditions in the future. 
This expectation may have proved true had the DIDMCA 
and Garn-St. Germain asset reforms been enacted a decade ear-
lier, before the devastating interest rate spread losses in the 
1970s. As it happened, upon entering the 1980s, savings and 
loan profits were at a historical low (Exhibit 1), and institutions 
may have lacked the capital to acquire investment expertise in 
many of the areas newly opened to them. Furthermore, reserves 
for some institutions were below the 3% minimum mandated by 
Congress in DIDMCA [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 31]. Garn-St. 
Germain provided a solution to problem in the form of net 
worth certificates. 
Beginning in September, 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Act 
allowed a pseudo-capital infusion for under capitalized institu-
tions in the form of net worth certificates which the institutions 
purchased from the FSLIC. These certificates served to increase 
an institution's assets and equity for regulatory purposes, and 
basically provided for a semi-annual cash infusion to the insti-
tution by the FSLIC until such time as the institution returned 
to profitability.9 These net worth certificates were not treated as 
capital by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).10 
This became the first in a series of GAAP versus RAP (regulatory 
accounting principles) differences which obfuscated analysis of 
the financial condition of savings and loans. Other such differ-
ences were deferral of loan losses and appraised equity capital, 
discussed below. 
9Net worth certificates were recorded as Notes Receivable-FSLIC and Capi-
tal. Under the arrangement the FSLIC paid interest on these notes semiannually 
to the institution "at rates equal to the yield on FHLBB obligations plus 25 basis 
points" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3]. The institution would 
then reimburse the FSLIC at the same rate of interest, "but interest is not due 
until the institution returns to profitability" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988, 
Section 19.3.2]. 
10Per GAAP, the net worth certificates were treated as an off balance sheet 
item which was to be disclosed in footnotes, although interest accruals were 
made [Peat, Marwick, Main and Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3]. 
26
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
Margavio: The Savings and Loan Debacle 17 
GAAP versus RAP 
In order to buy time for institutions to restructure their 
portfolios in response to the new investment opportunities of 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the FHLBB developed a series 
of optional accounting rules designed to bolster the appearance 
of net worth. The most prominent of these became the ap-
praised equity capital provisions, and deferral of losses on the 
sale of loans.11 Appraised equity capital arose from institutions 
recording the increase in the market value of the office build-
ings which they owned and occupied. During the 1970s, some 
institutions began to build net worth by selling their buildings, 
recording the gain, and leasing the facility back from the new 
owners. From November, 1982, to December, 1986 the FHLBB 
permitted all institutions to "book" this gain in market value, 
without actually selling the premises, calling it "appraised eq-
uity capital." This non-consummated transaction was not recog-
nized by GAAP. 
In contrast to this GAAP violation, a second FHLBB regula-
tion challenged GAAP by deferring recognition of transactions 
that were consummated. This new provision allowed the defer-
ral of losses on the sale of loans. By contrast, GAAP required 
recognition of these losses. However, in order to encourage in-
stitutions to sell off low interest bearing loans, the Bank Board 
allowed any such losses to be deferred and amortized over what 
remained of the original life of the loan. This regulation was in 
effect from October, 1981 to October, 1984. These two primary 
regulatory accounting techniques constituted the most blatant 
departures from GAAP; however, other differences also devel-
oped. 
Other GAAP versus RAP differences developed because of 
aggressive interpretation of existing GAAP rules, special institu-
tion specific decisions made by the Bank Board, and a delay in 
the issuance of authoritative accounting literature by the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Some of these in-
cluded the following. First, RAP allowed recognition of gains 
and losses on "wash sales" of securities sold and reacquired 
within a short period of time, while GAAP did not allow such 
recognition. Second, RAP allowed recognition of current in-
come from loan origination and commitment fees up to 2% of 
11Several less significant differences in GAAP and RAP which existed at this 
time are summarized in McEachern, 1986. 
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loan value, while GAAP required recognition of these fees as an 
adjustment to yield over the life of the loan using the interest 
method of amortization.12 Third, RAP allowed use of real estate 
appraisals to satisfy GAAP requirements of net present value 
computations for valuation of real estate collateral on acquisi-
tion, development and construction loans. Fourth, for certain 
mergers of troubled institutions, the FHLBB allowed goodwill 
to be amortized over an extended period of time, while GAAP 
allowed such extensions only when a substantial amount of li-
abilities acquired were long-term in nature. In addition, for cer-
tain mergers including FSLIC cash assistance, RAP treated this 
as a contribution to capital, while GAAP generally treated this 
as a deferred revenue or discount on the assets for which the 
allowance was granted.13 
Many of these GAAP verses RAP discrepancies were vehe-
mently opposed by the accounting profession because of the 
potential for creating misleading financial statements. Several 
comment letters to this effect were written by the AICPA and 
the FASB to the FHLBB, the Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, the 
SEC, and various individual Congressmen.14 Some of the com-
ment letters were written as early as January, 1981 when the 
RAP rules were only at the proposal stage. Each letter detailed 
differences between the RAP treatment and the GAAP treatment 
(or proposed GAAP treatment), indicating the potential for dis-
tortion of an institution's capital position. The profession feared 
such distortions would then mask the true financial condition of 
the savings and loan industry. 
These concerns from the accounting profession went largely 
unheeded, as evidenced by regulators' decision to allow RAP for 
reporting purposes. Furthermore, regulators allowed each insti-
tution to choose which set of accounting rules, GAAP or RAP, to 
follow in preparing its financial statements to be filed with the 
Bank Board. Not surprisingly, those institutions adopting RAP 
12This GAAP treatment was not promulgated until issuance of Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 19, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and 
Costs associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of 
Leases, in December, 1986. 
13Details of these four GAAP verses RAP differences are described in 
McEachern [1986, p. S-48, S-49] and Peat Marwick Main and Co. [1988, Chap-
ter 30.2 and 21]. 
14An extensive list of these communications is presented in Chenok, 1989, 
pp. 150 and 154. 
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were generally found to be the ones with lower capital ratios 
[Hill and Ingram, 1989]. Since institutions with low capital ra-
tios were in danger of violating minimum net worth require-
ments, they could have been forced to merge or liquidate. For 
such institutions, the adoption of RAP served to postpone inter-
vention by the FHLBB. This forbearance by the FHLBB has 
been cited as one of the factors contributing to the savings and 
loan debacle of the 1980s.15 
Forbearance by the FHLBB should not, however, have been 
surprising, since the Board had behaved similarly in the crisis 
of the 1970s (as discussed previously) by manipulating capital 
standards. In doing this, the Board was conforming to its origi-
nal legislative purpose established in the 1930s: to assure the 
uninterrupted flow of funds to the savings and loan industry. 
This original legislative intention assumed the primary purpose 
of savings and loans to be the supply of funds for residential 
mortgages. A broadening of the scope of the industry was, how-
ever, introduced in the new investment vehicles provided by 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain legislation. The role of the 
FHLBB following these changes was not updated. This was only 
one of several conflicts in Congressional intent. Another conflict 
was manifest in the tax law. 
Tax Reforms in the 1980s 
The specific tax law provisions related to savings and loans 
remained virtually unchanged following DIDMCA and Garn-St. 
Germain. Despite the investment flexibility permitted under 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the tax law still required sav-
ings and loans to maintain between 82% and 60% of their assets 
in qualified form (primarily residential mortgages). While still 
demanding this large commitment to residential mortgages, and 
even as industry profits sagged, tax changes made in 1982 and 
1984 served to increase the tax burden placed upon the institu-
tions. The tax changes increased the tax burden on savings and 
loans by reducing the percentage of taxable income bad debt 
deduction from 40% to 32% of taxable income.16 This deduction 
was further reduced to 8% in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
15Pilzer, P., 1989; Pizzo, S., Flicker, M. and Muolo, P., 1989; and Adams, J., 
1990 each discuss this problem at length. 
l6The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 added section 291, 
which provided that the deduction for certain preference items, including the 
bad debt reserves of savings and loans (to the extent they exceeded reserves 
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made two major changes to 
the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction. First, the 
Act eliminated the sliding scale between 82% and 60% invest-
ment in qualified assets. This effectively reduced the minimum 
required investment to 60%. This change brought tax qualified 
assets into closer alignment with regulatory allowed assets for 
the first t ime since 1969. The second change reduced the deduc-
tion percentage from 32% to 8% of taxable income. Prior to the 
passage of this provision, Congress had contemplated the com-
plete elimination of this deduction [U.S. Congress, 1983]. Thus, 
the savings and loan institutions became aware that they were 
losing their tax protection for performing their service to the 
mortgage market. At the same time, they were allowed more 
flexibility in structuring their portfolios. The message from Con-
gress was consistent at this point: diversify and become fully 
taxable financial intermediaries. Some institutions acted quickly 
to diversify. 
Expansion and Crisis 
Some savings and loans began using new investment pow-
ers granted to diversify out of residential mortgages.17 However, 
by the time these powers were granted in the 1980s, the indus-
try had a severe net worth problem. The Bank Board, anxious to 
encourage an influx of new capital into the industry, dropped a 
long standing requirement that institutions have a minimum of 
400 shareholders, with no one shareholder owning more than 
25% of the savings and loan. After this policy change, institu-
tions were eligible for 100% ownership by a single individual 
[Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 94]. This attracted a new type of 
owner/manager to the savings and loan business: mortgage bro-
computed under the experience method), be reduced by 15% of the otherwise 
allowable deduction. At the same time, the amount considered a preference for 
the minimum tax computation was reduced to 71.6% of excess reserves [IRC 
section 57(b)(1) and (2)]. Assuming that the entire percentage of taxable income 
bad debt deduction addition to the reserve was in excess of the experience 
method, the applicable rate for the deduction was reduced to 34%. Next, the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 reduced this deduction rate to 32% by increasing 
the IRC section 291 rate to 20% and also reducing the amount included in the 
minimum tax base to 59.833% of the excess. This reduced the bad debt deduc-
tion to 32% of taxable income. 
17For a summary of empirical research documenting this diversification and 
its effects on profits, see Margavio, 1990. 
30
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
Margavio: The Savings and Loan Debacle 21 
kers and land developers who saw the opportunity to capture a 
source of financing for their investments and projects. "In both 
cases, an association charter now provided them [the new own-
ers] with a lower cost and more certain source of funds than 
commercial bank borrowings" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 95]. 
In addit ion, the borrowings were federally insured by the 
FSLIC. 
Federal insurance of depositor accounts by the FSLIC was 
the root of a risky investment strategy undertaken by many in-
stitutions that were desperate to build their net worth. If the big 
risks paid off, then the institution and its shareholders would 
benefit, but if risky investments did not pay off, the FSLIC 
would share in the loss of a collapse of the association. Some 
institutions invested extensively in junk bonds, and others in-
creased interest rate hedging transactions to a level of gambling 
on the direction of future interest rates.18 Institutions began in-
vesting heavily in ADC (acquisition, development, and construc-
tion) loans to fund the commercial and residential real estate 
development activity of the new owner.19 
In order to attract funds to finance this activity, some insti-
tutions began offering interest rate premiums to depositors. 
This attracted a substantial amount of deposits from brokers 
outside of the institution's geographic area. Savings and loans 
were limited to obtaining 5% of deposits from this source. How-
ever, in March 1982, the restriction was removed by the Bank 
Board and billions of dollars flowed out of money market funds 
and into thrifts [Strunk and Case, p. 91, 92]. Institutions using 
brokered deposits began to grow at a phenomenal pace, further 
fuelling real estate development activity.20 
Some thrifts became so extensively involved in funding real 
estate development activities of certain developers that the insti-
tutions became, in substance, equity partners. This was particu-
larly true in the case of ADC loans. Accounting rules during this 
t ime allowed such loans to be classified as loans rather than 
direct investments, obscuring the true relationship between the 
18Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 5, "The Gamblers," pp. 
123-135; and in chapter 6, "The Man With the Lucky Coin," pp. 136-149. 
19Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 4, "The Cowboys," pp. 80-
122. 
20Many institutions were growing at rates faster than 25% per year [Pilzer, 
1989, p. 174]. 
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institution and the developer.21 In addition, many fraudulent ap-
praisals were obtained to value the collateral land. In the early 
1980, this problem was not discovered because real estate prices 
continued to rise. This spurred another problem. Some institu-
tions became careless in granting credit to applicants under the 
assumption that if the loan went bad, increasing property values 
would cover the losses. Problems with these strategies surfaced 
in the Southwest beginning in late 1985 and early 1986 when a 
drop in oil prices caused a major economic recession. This was 
followed by a substantial decline in real estate prices; a problem 
which spread nationwide with the spread of the recession. In 
addi t ion, by 1985 many markets began to show signs of 
overbuilding as office vacancies rose.22 This condition was ag-
gravated by 1986 tax changes which eliminated many tax ben-
efits for real estate ownership.23 Consequently, the number of 
failing institutions began to rise (Exhibit 3). 
Both the FHLBB and the FSLIC were aware of the problem. 
They were, however, prevented from acting quickly to close the 
institutions because of a severely outdated regulatory structure 
and purpose. The historical purpose of the FHLBB examiners 
was to check for compliance with government regulations. This 
required little training since substantial regulatory changes were 
not often made. Consequently, examiner positions were filled by 
low level civil service employees. Examiners merely reported 
their findings to the Washington Office of the FHLBB; the ex-
aminers could not require establishment of reserves for loan 
losses, and had no other enforcement powers. Enforcement 
powers rested with the supervisory branch of the Federal Home 
21Subsequent to the publicizing of some of the thrift industry problems, the 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA issued (in February, 
1986) a "Notice to Practitioners - ADC arrangements." This notice clarified strin-
gent rules which must be met for classification of ADC loans as loans. Those 
arrangements not meeting the rules were required to be shown as equity invest-
ments. [Peat Mar-wick Main and Co., 1988, Chapter 6]. 
22The overbuilding was largely a result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 which gave special tax breaks for investing in real estate. Investors seeking 
tax deductions formed highly leveraged tax shelter partnerships which overbuilt 
the real estate market. The leverage used in these real estate partnerships came 
in part from the savings and loan industry. 
23These tax changes include passive investment loss limitations for invest-
ments in real estate; change in depreciation computations; at risk rules applied 
to real estate investment; investment interest limitations; and capital gains 
changes. 
32
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
Margavio: The Savings and Loan Debacle 23 
EXHIBIT 3 
Failures of FSLIC-Insured Institutionsa 
Year Number Assets 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
1980 11 $ 1,457.6 
1981 28 11,553.4 
1982 74 20,202.9 
1983 55 19,741.8 
1984 27 6,000.4 
1985 49 18,441.3 
1986 85 31,620.5 
1987 71 20,918.1 
aSource: Strunk and Case, 1988, pp. 8, 9. 
Loan Bank which consisted of the president and a small staff at 
the regional FHLB level. This structure created delays in com-
munications of problems and further delay in corrective action. 
Once communicat ion difficulties were overcome and a 
problem institution identified, the first step in taking action was 
for the regional FHLB to obtain a "consent decree." In this 
agreement, the thrift management would voluntarily discon-
tinue specified transactions. If this failed, "cease and desist" or-
ders and management removal requests were sought. These 
could only be issued by the Washington Office. They were diffi-
cult to obtain because they could be challenged in court, and 
required additional evidence of wrongdoing. Despite these 
shortcomings, the system worked until the deregulation of the 
1980s added complexities to the business. 
With the proliferation of new investments allowed in the 
1980s, rapid market changes in the late 1970s, and the expan-
sion of branch networks, the FHLBB examination staff was 
overextended and undertrained as to potential problems. Ex-
aminations of the institutions took more time and were con-
ducted less frequently as problems mounted. Then the stories of 
the famous failures surfaced.24 The FHLBB petitioned Congress 
24The Empire Savings and Loan of Mesquite, Texas scandal become public 
information in 1983 when the owners became the subjects of an extensive FBI 
investigation for fraud, conspiracy and racketeering in various land flip deals 
[Pilzer, 1989, p . 115]. American Savings of Stockton, California received public 
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to tighten the regulatory reins to give the FHLBB power to act 
more quickly in "cease and desist" cases, and to provide funds 
to the FSLIC so that it could absorb projected losses from clos-
ing problem institutions. 
Re-regulation 
Congress responded with the Competitive Equality Banking 
Act (CEBA) of 1987, the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery 
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 
1991. These Acts provided a much needed infusion of funds 
(approximately $177 billion) to the FSLIC; and established the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, a temporary entity, to dispose of 
the assets of failed institutions. The Acts also changed the sav-
ings and loan regulatory structure by abolishing the FHLBB 
system. The FHLBB supervisory and examination functions 
were turned over to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) [Sav-
ings Institutions, 1989, p. 32]. Responsibilities of the OTS were 
designed with greater emphasis on assessing the financial vi-
ability and asset quality of institutions. Thus, responsibilities 
more closely paralleled those of the Office of Controller of the 
Currency, the banking industry supervisory agency. The OTS 
was also given greater autonomy in requiring operating changes 
for, and ultimately, shutting down institutions judged to have 
too many risky investments. 
In order for the OTS to perform this function effectively, 
objective measures of riskiness had to be established. A system 
of risk determination was structured for both individual assets, 
and for an institution's entire portfolio of assets. This system 
recognizes a strong connection between the quality of an 
institution's assets, individually and collectively, and how that 
quality improves or deteriorates the institution's capital posi-
attention in 1984 when regulators forced out the CEO for betting wrong on 
interest rate swings and masking bad real estate loans [Pilzer, 1989, p. 216-219]. 
Vernon Savings and Loan of Dallas, Texas entered receivership in 1987 when 
96% of its real estate loans were deemed worthless [Adams, 1990, p. 47]. Lin-
coln Savings and Loan of Irvine, California became a much publicized scandal 
in 1987 when news of its fraudulent real estate deals and ties to the "Keating 
Five" were revealed [Adams, 1990, p. 252]. Columbia Savings and Loan of 
Beverly Hills, California, and Franklin Savings Association of Ottawa, Kansas 
were exposed in 1988 for their huge portfolios of junk bonds and their relation-
ship with Michael Milken [Pilzer, 1989, p. 136-149]. 
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tion. Definitions of risk are, therefore, cast in terms of mini-
m u m capital standards required to sustain the institution's in-
vestment in certain types of assets. The definitions and capital 
requirements were borrowed largely from the three tier capital 
standards system used by the Office of Controller of the Cur-
rency. A brief overview of the composition of these tiers is pre-
sented below. 
Tier one, core capital (or leverage capital), is defined as the 
sum of common stockholders' equity and noncumulative pre-
ferred stockholders' equity; plus identifiable intangibles (exclud-
ing goodwill and limited to 25% of total core capital); plus pur-
chased mortgage servicing rights. Savings and loans must main-
tain this core capital at a level of 3% of total assets. In addition, 
a second tier, defined as tangible capital, must be maintained at 
a level of 1.5% of total assets. Tangible capital is defined as core 
capital (tier one) minus all intangible assets. Finally, tier three, 
known as risk-based capital standards, requires institutions to 
maintain reserves of 6% of risk-weighted assets and to increase 
this percentage for interest rate fluctuations that adversely af-
fect earnings [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 32; 12CFR Ch.V Part 
567]. Each major category of assets is given a risk weighting 
factor which is multiplied by the dollar amount of assets in that 
category.25 These risk factors are changed as market conditions 
dictate. There is a gradual phase in period until January 1, 1993 
for the risk-based standards. As the standards are designed, sav-
ings and loans must meet the minimum capital criteria in each 
of the three tiers. 
These standards are monitored by the OTS as savings and 
loans file the required quarterly financial statements. Effective 
January 1, 1994, these statements must be stated on a GAAP 
basis [Bush and Morrall, 1989, p. 30]. In addition to this return 
to GAAP accounting, the independent auditor now has a greater 
role in assessing institutional safety and soundness in the fol-
lowing ways.26 First, institutions with over $150 million in assets 
are required to obtain annual audits. Second, in addition to 
traditional GAAP and GAAS (generally accepted auditing stan-
25For example, Goodwill is generally given a 200% risk weight, thereby re-
quiring a 12% reserve. Mortgage backed securities are given a 20% risk weight, 
thereby requiring a 3% reserve. Cash and federal government backed securities 
have a 0% weight, thus requiring no reserves. 
26These provisions are summarized in Journal of Accountancy, March, 1992, 
p. 17. 
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dards) responsibilities, the audit report must comply with any 
additional disclosures that regulations require. For example, a 
separate report must be prepared attesting to management as-
sertions that the institution is in compliance with regulations 
related to safety and soundness. Third, outside auditors must 
agree to provide workpapers to regulators upon request, and 
must notify the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
if the auditor's services terminate. Finally, the FDIC may require 
that an institution's quarterly financial statements be subject to 
CPA review procedures. This authority of the FDIC stems from 
its new responsibility as the insuring agency for savings and loans. 
In a massive reorganization of the insurance system, FSLIC 
merged into the FDIC, the insuring agency for commercial 
banks. This facilitated coordination of insurance goals, rates, 
and supervision philosophy between the thrift and banking in-
dustries. By shifting the insuring of savings and loans and by 
the creation of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Congress imple-
mented a policy of regulatory equality for savings and loans and 
commercial banks. 
As the recent restructuring of savings and loans suggests, 
the banking industry has been successful in its long time urging 
of parity between the banking and thrift industries. Since 1951, 
the Commercial banking industry lobbied for tax equality be-
tween banks and savings institutions.27 These arguments were 
reiterated in hearings related to changes implemented in the 
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. Bankers perceived these 1986 changes to be 
a move towards tax equality. In addition, arguments in the tax 
hearings acknowledged that the deregulation Acts of 1980 and 
1982 (DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain) were perceived by both 
industries to be regulatory moves towards establishing invest-
ment equalities. Thus, a trend had developed towards increasing 
equality between banks and savings and loans. The regulatory 
equalities implemented in CEBA, FIRREA, and FDICIA could be 
viewed as the culmination of this equality movement, with one 
27Banks perceived the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction to 
be the single greatest advantage afforded by the tax law to savings and loans 
over commercial banks. In virtually every major tax hearing that opened discus-
sion of this deduction (see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1951, 1961, 1969, and 1986 and U.S. Congress, Senate, 1983), the bank-
ing industry lobbied for its elimination in order to allow more equitable compe-
tition between the two industries. 
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major exception which now subjects savings and loans to invest-
ment restrictions not required of banks. 
The recent legislation implemented a new qualified thrift 
lender (QTL) test which restricts savings and loans to investing 
70% of their portfolio assets in qualified assets. The definition 
of qualified assets is limited to mortgages and home equity 
loans, mortgage backed securities, and construction loans. Up 
to 15% of these qualified assets can include: investments in ser-
vice corporations; loans to churches, schools, nursing homes 
and hospitals; and consumer and education loans (limited to 5% 
of portfolio assets) [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 33]. Portfolio 
assets are defined as total tangible assets reduced by fixed assets 
and liquid assets. These definitions impose limitations on the 
investment freedom of savings and loans which are even more 
severe than the pre-1980 limitations. These restrictions have 
been criticized by the industry as being almost vindictive [Wil-
son, 1990, p. 22]. 
This QTL test constituted a very significant change in the 
three most recent laws which is contrary to the trend towards 
equality among competing financial institutions. It serves to 
force savings and loans to specialize in mortgages by restricting 
other investment activity. At the same time, FHLB membership 
was opened up to banks and credit unions; and commercial 
banks obtained the authority to acquire savings institutions. 
These latter regulatory changes further expanded the operating 
capabilities of banks and credit unions by giving them greater 
access to housing funds. These financial intermediaries can now 
compete with savings and loans for mortgages, and obtain opti-
mally diversified portfolios. However, savings and loans are now 
statutorily prohibited from diversifying extensively. This situa-
tion may lead to a devaluation in the savings and loan charter in 
the future. 
WHAT WILL THE 1990s BRING? 
This devaluation has been predicted by some experts 
[McLean, 1991; Jacobe, 1990; Savings Institutions, 1990]. They 
argue that as a result of the 1980s debacle, savings and loans 
have a bad image problem to overcome. A viable way of over-
coming this problem may be simply to change over from a sav-
ings and loan charter to a savings bank or commercial bank 
charter. Such a trend has already been observed in California 
savings and loans [Savings Institutions, 1990, p . 31] and institu-
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tions formed after 1988 [Savings Institutions, 1990, p. 5]. This 
leads some commentators to predict the demise of the tradi-
tional savings and loan institution. 
The function of the traditional savings and loan, making 
mortgage loans and holding them to maturity, is perhaps out-
dated. This conclusion rests primarily on the burgeoning sec-
ondary mortgage market which was developed and promoted by 
government sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae. This 
agency (and others like it) buys mortgages and repackages them 
into mortgage backed securities which are sold on the open 
market with varying maturities. Such securities are popular 
with investors because of a perceived federal guarantee. This 
has created an adequate supply of capital to the housing market 
despite the savings and loan crisis (see comments by Alfred A. 
Dellibova, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in Mortgage Bank-
ing, 1991, p. 31). It has also served to integrate housing financ-
ing into the nation's overall capital market. 
This development of the real estate loan marketplace may 
eventually usurp the traditional function of the savings and loan 
industry. However, some industry observers still see the need 
for a strong consumer-oriented banking industry which would 
include mortgage financing and some other types of consumer 
financing. In addition, as the economy improves and investors 
seek investment opportunities with higher returns, they may re-
treat from the mortgage backed security market. The savings 
and loan industry then may acquire a new function in the capi-
tal market, that of buying and holding to maturity mortgage 
backed securities. 
A type of specialization strategy similar to this has been 
observed by some empiricists [Kaplan, 1988; Rudolph, 1988]. 
However, its effect on profitability has not been demonstrated 
consistently. Ultimately, carving out a market niche of some 
kind may be the key to continued viability of savings and loans, 
as well as other financial intermediaries. Thus, all financial in-
termediaries could focus on their managerial strengths in struc-
turing a strategy anywhere from specializing in housing finance, 
to consumer lending, to becoming a completely "diversified fi-
nancial supermarket" [McLean, 1991]. Such specialization deci-
sions would then rest with management instead of Congress, 
and the industry as a whole could be more responsive to market 
changes. This flexibility could be effected by regulatory changes 
allowing a universal charter for financial intermediaries. This 
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development, with corresponding adjustments in the tax law, 
would be an appropriate culmination to the 1980s piecemeal 
trend toward equality. It would also assist Congress in synchro-
nizing its goals for the financial services industry. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Congress has made major progress in the 
1980s in equalizing the regulatory structure of the financial ser-
vices industry. The savings and loan industry benefited from 
these changes by becoming better able to respond to changing 
market conditions. Many of these changes were, however, over-
due corrections of poor legislation in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s. Those regulations (specifically the imposition of Regula-
tion Q, tax and regulatory portfolio restrictions, and overly gen-
erous loan-to-value ratios and mortgage terms) set the stage for 
the crisis the industry encountered in the late 1970s. The 
disintermediation crisis of the 1970s led to a severe net worth 
problem from which the industry was not given the opportunity 
to recover until DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986. This net worth problem was a driving force in 
many of the irregularities that developed in the industry during 
the 1980s. Better timing and coordination of the diversification 
opportunities afforded by DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, combined with the FIRREA structural 
changes have reduced these irregularities. Attention to these 
past policy changes, however, is only useful in understanding 
the problems of today and for examining needed future policy 
changes. 
In planning for the future, Congress must recognize that 
market conditions have integrated the housing finance function 
into the overall capital market structure. Therefore, designing a 
future for the savings and loan industry must involve a process 
of setting policy goals for the entire financial services industry. 
Legislation in the 1980s moved in the direction of equalizing 
opportunities for the thrift and banking sectors of the financial 
services industry. However, it stopped short of full equalization 
and a definitive policy statement. Once an integrated policy goal 
is established, legislators can then structure tax considerations, 
supervisory functions and other regulations to achieve these 
goals, while at the same time allowing the institutions the flex-
ibility to respond to ever changing market conditions. 
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Abstract: A Kuhnian perspective is used to explain the transition in 
financial reporting theory from an "economic income perspective" to 
an "informational perspective" (a transition that Beaver refers to as a 
"revolution"), and to examine the subsequent development of the lat-
ter. The demise of the economic income perspective (represented by 
the normative a priorists) is attributed to the lack of a paradigm 
which could serve to identify research problems and provide method-
ological guidance. The success of the informational paradigm, on the 
other hand, is attributed to the fact that it was, in essence, a sub-
paradigm of the broader and well-established market economics 
paradigm. The study concludes, however, with a discussion of two 
types of persistent anomalous findings (the first with respect to the 
EMH and the second with respect to the CAPM) that have the poten-
tial to generate a crisis for the informational paradigm. 
The 1960s was a decade of turmoil in financial accounting 
theory and research. Post-1960s financial accounting research is 
radically different in method, theoretical content, and philo-
sophical thrust than pre-1960s research. Wells [1976] has sug-
gested that the turmoil signified the beginning of a Kuhnian 
revolution. Beaver [19891 characterizes the outcome as "an ac-
counting revolution"; a revolution whereby an "economic in-
come" approach was replaced by an "informational perspective" 
[Beaver, p. 18]. Although there is no indication that Beaver is 
using the term revolution in a Kuhnian sense, the implication is 
that the changes were internally generated, an overthrow that 
was initiated by developments in accounting theory. This paper 
offers a significantly different interpretation. A Kuhnian per-
spective is employed to argue that the new view of financial 
reporting theory described by Beaver can be seen as a "normal 
science" expansion of the economics paradigm. 
This approach holds the potential of a new explanation for 
the failure of the normative a priori research movement and the 
success of the new informational research movement. The 
Kuhnian perspective also provides a unique vehicle for analyz-
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ing the potential significance of challenges to the validity of the 
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) which have long served as cornerstones for the 
informational perspective. First, however, it will be useful to 
locate the present study within the context of existing Kuhnian 
analyses in the accounting literature. 
KUHNIAN ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING THOUGHT 
Cushing [1989] has provided an excellent review of 
Kuhnian references in the accounting literature and there is no 
need to repeat that process. This section, accordingly, shall be 
limited to locating the present study with respect to the more 
prominent and comprehensive applications of Kuhnian ideas 
that can, in turn, be related to the accounting debates of the 
1960s and 1970s 
In the mid-1970s, there were suggestions that accounting 
was in the midst of a Kuhnian crisis characterized by paradigm 
debate [Wells, 1976; The AAA's Statement on Accounting Theory 
and Theory Acceptance, 1977]. Peasnell [1981] and Laughlin 
[1981] challenged the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to account-
ing. Kuhn's theory, according to Peasnell, applies only to sci-
ences, and since accounting is not a science, Kuhnian analysis 
of accounting thought is inappropriate. Cushing, on the other 
hand, presents a case for the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to 
intellectual disciplines other than the sciences. His analysis is 
more elaborate than previous studies and provides useful back-
ground for the present study. 
With respect to accounting, Cushing argues that since the 
traditional concerns of accounting (making sense of the eco-
nomic performance of business enterprises) share significant 
common ground with the concerns of science (making sense of 
reality), "Kuhn's theories may be pertinent to an understanding 
of the his tor ical evolut ion of the account ing discipl ine" 
[Cushing, p. 11]. He maintains that "the double-entry bookkeep-
ing model has the features of an accounting paradigm, as that 
term is used by Kuhn, and that the historical evolution of ac-
counting from approximately the Sixteenth century until about 
1960 resembles the normal science of Kuhn's theory" [p. 20]. 
The advent of governmental regulation of accounting prac-
tice and reporting in the Twentieth century led to a search for 
uniform account ing principles and resulted, according to 
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Cushing, in the first stage of crisis for the double-entry para-
digm. "The combination of government regulation and the com-
mitment to uniformity has led to a buildup of unresolved ac-
counting issues that perhaps more closely resemble the anoma-
lies of Kuhn's theory" [Cushing, p. 23]. 
A second stage of accounting's crisis was triggered, Cushing 
suggests, when the search for a scientific foundation for finan-
cial accounting theory — a search which reached its most fer-
vent pitch in the 1960s — produced instead a widespread con-
viction that "accounting was inherently arbitrary" [Cushing, p. 
27]. The sense of crisis was further deepened by the growing 
conviction that even if a scientific theory of financial accounting 
could be found, it could never be implemented because of the 
extent to which the rule-making process had been politicized. 
"In essence, the further development of accounting thought 
along traditional lines was now irreconcilable with the ideals of 
science that accounting scholars had fervently embraced" 
[Cushing, p. 27]. Many academic accountants responded to this 
situation, Cushing argues, not by abandoning science, but by 
abandoning accounting. "Accounting scholars have committed 
themselves to science, but having come to realize that account-
ing has no scientifically valid paradigm to provide a basis for 
scientific research, have chosen to practice other sciences that 
do have such paradigms" [Cushing, p. 29]. 
This author agrees with Cushing that the 1960s ushered in 
a wholesale concern with scientific accounting research, but at-
tributes this concern more to outside social, political, and tech-
nological factors than to crisis in a Kuhnian-type paradigm. 
Similarly, this author tends to share Peasnell's skepticism about 
the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to traditional (pre-1960s) ac-
counting thought, but views the alternative proposals for scien-
tific accounting practice which were put forth by the so-called 
normative a priori theorists of the 1960s as manifestations of 
pre-paradigm struggle. There is also agreement with Cushing's 
view that, since the 1960s, there has been a wholesale abandon-
ment (by academic accountants) of the traditional concerns of 
accounting and a corresponding wholesale acceptance of other 
disciplines (especially economics) which are considered to be 
scientific. 
In short, the 1960s marked the beginning of the applicabil-
ity of Kuhn's ideas to accounting thought in correspondence 
with the development of widespread concern about being scien-
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tific. In the context of Kuhn's ideas, the 1960s academic ac-
counting literature was dominated by the search for a para-
digm. 
THE "SCIENTIFIC TURN" AND 
THE SEARCH FOR A PARADIGM 
On all fronts, the 1960s were, in the words of Dyckman and 
Zeff, "a pivotal decade" for accounting research: "In the litera-
ture of accounting research, the 1960s was the Decade of Awak-
ening" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 233]. A unique congruence of 
social, political and technological developments had produced a 
shared commitment to the pursuit of scientific research in ac-
counting. By the mid-1970s, however, it was obvious that the 
"decade of awakening" had produced nothing remotely resem-
bling a consensus view of financial accounting and reporting 
theory. In fact, a study commissioned by the American Account-
ing Association concluded that, "a multiplicity of theories has 
been — and continues to be — proposed" [AAA, 1977, p. 1]. The 
AAA committee further characterized the current theoretical de-
bate as "virtually endless argumentation and inability to resolve 
issues that are raised" [AAA, 1977, p. 1]. In Kuhnian terms, the 
committee suggested that accounting theorists were involved in 
paradigm competition [p. 43]. 
The AAA's study, published under the title Statement on Ac-
counting Theory and Theory Acceptance (SATTA), classified the 
diverse perspectives on accounting theory into three categories: 
"classical approaches to theory development" [p. 5]; "the deci-
sion usefulness approach" [p. 10]; and "information economics" 
[p. 21]. SATTA's classification scheme, however, is deficient on 
two counts. In the first place, it does not differentiate the pre-
1960s theorists from the science-oriented theorists of the 1960s. 
Secondly, it lumps empirical capital markets researchers such 
as Gonedes, Beaver, Ball and Brown together with normative, 
apriorists such as Chambers and Sterling in the "decision useful-
ness" category. As Peasnell points out, this categorization is at 
odds with other classifications in the accounting literature. He 
(Peasnell) charges that "the committee's classification seems to 
border at times on the artificial" [p. 70]. This charge is further 
borne out by the fact that Beaver, in 1981, presented very co-
gently the interrelationship of information economics theory 
and empirical capital markets research: schools of thought 
which the AAA committee had treated as separate "paradigms". 
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This brings up another problem with the AAA's SATTA; a 
problem with respect to the committee's use of Kuhnian termi-
nology. SATTA included an argument that, "[t]here are a num-
ber of people offering different paradigms" [p. 45], thus suggest-
ing that Kuhn's description of paradigm competition was appli-
cable to the (then) current state of accounting theory. As 
Peasnell has pointed out, however, this is indicative of a misun-
derstanding of Kuhn's theory. A given way of looking at the 
world, including theoretical orientation, becomes paradigmatic 
after it has found a certain level of acceptance. Theories may be 
offered by individual theorists, but paradigms are not put forth 
by individuals. The perspective suggested by an individual may 
eventually become paradigmatic, but it is not paradigmatic at 
the time it is put forth. Such considerations led Peasnell to pose 
the following question: "Do the variety of accounting theory ap-
proaches identified by the committee really constitute compet-
ing paradigms (or pre-paradigm 'schools of thought', for that 
matter)?" [p. 69]. The present study argues that, with respect to 
the various normative apriorists, the 1960s and early 1970s can-
not be appropriately characterized by Kuhn's notion of para-
digm competition. 
Kuhn [1970b] points out that the discourse of philosophy, 
as well as many of the social sciences, is characterized by 
"claims, counter-claims, and debates over fundamentals" [p. 6]. 
According to Kuhn, debate over fundamentals was also charac-
teristic of many fields that subsequently developed into sci-
ences: 
. . . there are many fields — I shall call them proto-
sciences — in which practice does generate testable 
conclusions but which nonetheless resemble philoso-
phy and the arts rather than the established sciences in 
their developmental patterns. I think, for example, of 
fields like chemistry and electricity before the mid-eigh-
teenth century, of the study of heredity and phylogeny 
before the mid-nineteenth, or of many of the social sci-
ences today. In these fields . . . incessant criticism and 
continual striving for a fresh start are primary forces 
. . . [Kuhn, 1970c, p. 244] 
It is the contention here that the debates among the normative 
apriorists of the 1960s and early 1970s can be much more aptly 
characterized as pre-paradigm debate [Kuhn, 1970a, p . 160], or 
alternatively as proto-science debate, than as paradigm competi-
tion. 
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With respect to the situation faced by the information eco-
nomics and the capital market researchers, however, the AAA 
committee erred in a different direction. After noting that, in 
the absence of an accepted body of thought, each theorist must 
"provide his own foundation for the field" [AAA, 1977, p. 43], 
the committee asserts that, "Theorizing from efficient markets 
research has proceeded in a similar vein" [p. 43]. With respect 
to the informational perspective (information economics and 
capital markets research), the contrary was actually the case. 
Instead, accounting theorists in the informational perspective 
were, in fact, "jumping onto the bandwagon" of a very solidly 
established paradigm — the economics paradigm. 
Thus, with respect to Kuhnian thought, accounting in the 
1960s and early 1970s was the site of two distinct, yet interact-
ing, Kuhnian processes. From the perspective of the traditional 
concerns of accounting, i.e., concern with the measurement of 
economic performance of business enterprises, the efforts of 
theorists such as Chambers, Edwards and Bell, Mattessich, and 
Sterling (so-called normative apriorists are viewed as pre—para-
digm debate. The normative apriorists were attempting to estab-
lish a solid scientific foundation for the pursuit of the tradi-
tional concerns of accounting. 
At the same time, another Kuhnian process was in opera-
tion. From the perspective of economics (a discipline which can 
be considered to be appropriately characterized as a full-fledged 
scientific paradigm), the "normal science" process appropriately 
includes attempts to expand the explanatory power of the para-
digm. During the 1960s theoretical developments such as the 
EMH and the CAPM held the promise of extending the explana-
tory power of the basic economics paradigm to encompass first 
business finance, and subsequently, financial accounting, while 
developments in information economics served to locate the 
emerging new perspective on financial reporting theory within 
the broader theoretical framework of economic thought. 
In sum, accounting in the 1960s and early 1970s is viewed 
as the site of competition between the normative apriorists (who 
were engaged in pre-paradigm debate with each other) and the 
proponents of the newly formed financial economics paradigm 
(an economics sub-paradigm which was engaged in normal sci-
ence expansionary efforts). The remainder of this paper pre-
sents: a Kuhnian interpretation of competition between the nor-
mative apriorists and proponents of the financial economics 
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paradigm; an overview of the subsequent normal science-type 
development of the "informational perspective" of financial re-
porting theory; and an exploration (in terms of Kuhnian crisis 
theory) of the significance of challenges to the EMH and the 
CAPM. 
THE FAILURE OF THE NORMATIVE 
A PRIORI RESEARCH MOVEMENT 
It has been noted that the decade of the 1960s witnessed 
tremendous pressures for "scientific" accounting research. But 
the 1960s also saw a major increase in the pressure for more 
research. The American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Busi-
ness (the primary accrediting organization for academic schools 
of business in the U.S.) instituted the doctorate as the terminal 
degree for academic accountants in 1967 and began placing 
greater and greater emphasis on research productivity in the 
accreditation process. This emphasis, together with the social 
and political pressures noted earlier, resulted in a major push 
for more accounting research that was also scientific. 
However, research never happens in isolation from a net-
work of beliefs, attitudes and theories. This was one of the most 
salient features of Kuhn's exposition of normal scientific prac-
tice: ". . . in the absence of at least some implicit body of inter-
twined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selec-
tion, evaluation, and criticism . . . it must be supplied, perhaps 
by a current metaphysic, by another science, or by personal and 
historical accident" [Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 16-17]. From a Kuhnian 
perspective the body of intertwined theoretical and method-
ological belief provided by a paradigm is what gives researchers 
the confidence that their work will find acceptance. With re-
spect to the situation faced by new PhDs in accounting in the 
1960s, a research paradigm was needed to provide confidence 
that their research would "pay off", that it would lead to success 
and recognition in the form of tenure. 
This sort of consideration is a major reason that "normal 
science . . . [is] firmly based upon one or more past scientific 
achievements, achievements that some part icular scientific 
community acknowledges for a time as supplying the founda-
tion for its further practice" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 10]. More pre-
cisely, "When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for 
granted, he need no longer, in his major works, attempts to 
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build his field anew, starting from first principles and justifying 
the use of each concept introduced" [Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 19-20]. 
An accepted paradigm ends "the constant reiteration of funda-
mentals" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 18]; it provides "confidence that they 
[are] on the right track . . . [and encourages] scientists to under-
take more precise, esoteric, and consuming sorts of work" 
[Kuhn, 1970a, p. 18]. 
According to the AAA's SATTA, the normative apriorists of 
the 1960s were not operating from any generally accepted para-
digm. Various theoretical perspectives were put forth by indi-
vidual researchers, but no single perspective found widespread 
acceptance. The most notable proposals tended to disagree on 
one or more fundamental issues. The situation is stated quite 
succinctly by Mattessich in his personal account of the "golden 
age" of a priori research: "It is characteristic of my approach 
that in contrast to others (e.g. to Alexander who used present 
values, Edwards and Bell who stressed replacement values, 
Chambers who championed exit market values, Ijiri who de-
fended acquisition cost values), I introduced a general valuation 
assumption, thus tolerating all specific valuation hypotheses . .." 
[Mattessich, 1984, p. 34]. 
Mutual criticism among the leading apriorists was also 
highly visible. Perhaps the most notable example was the ex-
change between Chambers and Mattessich. Chambers published 
a critical review of Mattessich's Accounting and Analytical Meth-
ods (AAM) in the Journal of Accounting Research [1966b] sug-
gesting, according to Gaffikin, that "the work suffers from being 
'forced' to fit methodological requirements at the expense of 
more fundamental, substantive analysis" [Gaffikin, 1988, p. 21]. 
Mattessich has subsequently referred to Chambers' review as a 
"wholesale rejection" of his work [Mattessich, 1984, p. 32]. With 
respect to Chambers' Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Be-
havior, Mattessich has asserted that, "Chambers started from a 
preconceived, and to my mind, dogmatic objective" [Mattessich, 
1984, p. 33]. 
Mattessich was also involved in another notable exchange, 
this one with Sterling. Mattessich had published a critical re-
view of Sterling's The Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise 
Income in Abacus in 1971. Sterling's reply, the following year, 
concluded that Mattessich had criticized his (Sterling's) book 
for: 
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1. not taking an approach (teleological) that it in fact 
took; 
2. not considering three users (creditors and stockhold-
ers, taxing authorities, and managers) that it in fact 
considered; 
3. not drawing a conclusion (different-incomes-for-dif-
ferent-purposes) that was identical to its statement 
of the problem; 
4. placing boundaries (to serve only stockholders) on 
the theory of accounting that it did not place; 
5. drawing a conclusion (exclusive market values) that 
it did not draw; and 
6. not being a general theory of accounting when it 
was explicitly stated to be (and entitled) a theory of 
income measurement. [Sterling, 1972, p . 101] 
Sterling closed his reply with the assertion that Mattessich's cri-
tique was "amorphous" and "without foundation" [p. 101]. 
In such an environment, in which even the theoretical lead-
ers cannot seem to gain any substantial degree of acceptance, 
and at times display open contempt for each other's work, is it 
any wonder that young new PhDs under pressure to publish 
would tend to look for a safer, more promising research per-
spective? Mattessich at tr ibutes the "reorientation of many 
young scholars, away from the a priori approach, towards em-
pirical research" [1984, p. 36] to a "reaction of the dialectical 
process of academic fashion . . ." [1984, p. 35]. From a Kuhnian 
perspective, however, a different explanation is compelling. 
That explanation is that many young accounting academics 
tended to gravitate toward a budding new research paradigm 
which provided clear-cut research problems and examples of 
acceptable research methods. Many young new PhDs tended to 
gravitate toward a new accounting research paradigm which 
can be considered to be a sub-paradigm of economics. 
THE ECONOMICS PARADIGM AND THE RISE OF 
MARKET-BASED ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
In contrast to the debates which dominate pre-science, the 
practice of normal science is characterized by the lack of debate 
over fundamentals. In fact, normal science is what Kuhn terms 
paradigm-based research, where the term paradigm, in the 
broad sense "stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, val-
ues, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given 
51
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1993, Vol. 20, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1993
42 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993 
community" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 175]. According to Kuhn, the ac-
cepted framework provided by a paradigm serves as a founda-
tion for the articulation of problems that must be solved if the 
range of explanatory power is to be extended: " . . . normal-
scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phe-
nomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies" 
[1970a, p. 24]. As indicated earlier, ". . . in the absence of at 
least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and method-
ological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism 
. . . it must be supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysic, by 
another science, or by personal and historical accident" [Kuhn, 
1970a, pp. 16-17]. This provides a major clue to the success of 
the informational perspective in financial reporting theory. 
Three related theoretical developments in the 1950s and 
1960s — the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), the capital 
assets pricing model (CAPM), and modern portfolio theory 
(MPT) — had served to transform business finance into finan-
cial economics [Whitley, 1986]; they all three extended the "ra-
tionality assumption" and the "basic maximizing model" of eco-
nomics to securities price research. These developments, in con-
junction with the theoretical framework of information eco-
nomics, created the opportunity for accounting researchers who 
were trained in economics to import the constructs and meth-
ods of economics into financial accounting research. 
The spectacular "scientific" developments in finance in the 
1960s were followed closely by academic accountants (espe-
cially at the University of Chicago) who were anxious to find a 
theoretical foundation for the development of "scientific" re-
search in accounting. The University of Chicago began its an-
nual Conference on Empirical Accounting Research in 1966 
with the leadership and participation of academics trained in 
the theory and methodology of financial economics. 
In 1967, Ball and Brown presented their paper ("An Empiri-
cal Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers") at the confer-
ence; a paper that would later be recognized as having a forma-
tive influence on the emerging new research paradigm. Brown, 
in his recently published reflections on the paper, attributes 
their (Ball and Brown's) success to their Chicago-style training 
in economics and finance. Brown notes that he had already 
studied the accounting classics at the University of New South 
Wales before going to Chicago for graduate study in 1963. "So 
on my arrival at Chicago I was exempted from all accounting 
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courses other than the doctoral seminar . . . I was, however, 
programmed into a full complement of courses in Chicago-style 
economics and finance" [p. 203]. The strong empirical impetus 
in finance research at Chicago was supported by the data base 
made available by the University's Center of Research into Secu-
rity Prices, and scholars such as Merton Miller and Eugene 
Fama provided the intellectual leadership. "It did not take long", 
Brown notes, "for me to be completely seduced by the sheer 
vitality of the Chicago finance group which, at that time, was 
rapidly developing lines of research fundamentally at odds with 
much of the accounting literature to which I had been exposed" 
[Brown, p. 203], Developments in finance, however, were 
closely related to the spirit of Chicago economics which, as 
Brown implies, provided the theoretical underpinning of the en-
tire financial economics paradigm. 
The second part to this 'formative' story is the role of 
Chicago's Economics Department. I and many of my 
doctoral program classmates chose Economics as our 
basic discipline . . . We then trotted off to the Econom-
ics Department where we inevitably were schooled in 
applied microeconomics and given a heavy dose of so-
called positive economics, often taught by Milton 
Friedman himself. The empirical mindset was so domi-
nant in the 1960s that it influenced almost all of the 
doctoral students' choices of research topics for a gen-
eration or more. [Brown, p. 203] 
In any case, the publication of Ball and Brown's article in 
1968 provided the real breakthrough for the aspiring new ac-
counting research movement. Watts and Zimmerman [1986, p. 
5] cite this article as the one having the biggest impact on the 
evolution of securities price research in accounting. This was 
borne out by an earlier report by Dyckman and Zeff of an infor-
mal survey of their research-oriented colleagues regarding the 
most important contributions to accounting literature between 
1960 and 1980. Their survey resulted in 56 votes for articles 
published in The Journal of Accounting Research (JAR) versus 44 
for articles published in the Accounting Review, but fully one-
half of the votes for JAR were votes for the 1968 Ball and Brown 
article [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 254]. It was an article that "stirred 
widespread interest in efficient markets research in accounting" 
[Dyckman and Zeff, p. 242]. 
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The Ball and Brown study was essentially an extension of 
the financial economics paradigm. Using the CAPM as a tool for 
relating accounting numbers to securities prices, they investi-
gated the relationship between unexpected earnings and abnor-
mal rates of return for 261 New York Stock Exchange firms 
during the nine years from 1957 to 1965. The results, inter-
preted in light of the efficient markets hypothesis, indicated that 
stock price changes do reflect earnings changes, but that most 
of the change in stock prices occurs prior to the report of an-
nual earnings. 
The Ball and Brown article was so different from tradi-
tional accounting literature that "it was rejected [by the Ac-
counting Review] on the reviewer's contention that 'it was not an 
Accounting manuscript '" [Dyckman and Zeff, p . 242]. From a 
Kuhnian perspective, it is not surprising that a study that was 
so radically different from the traditional approach to account-
ing research should become the exemplary study for future re-
search. The "scientific achievements" that become the exem-
plars for a new paradigm must be "sufficiently unprecedented 
to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing 
modes of scientific activity" [Kuhn, 1970a, p . 10]. From a 
Kuhnian perspective, the Ball and Brown study can be seen as a 
demonstration of how accounting researchers could harness the 
productive potential of the financial economics paradigm. For 
the growing number of young accounting academics who were 
under pressure to publish "scientific" research, the prospect of 
having an intellectual foundation (a paradigm) with established 
respectability must have been quite compelling; especially when 
compared with the tumultuous pre-paradigm debate among the 
normative apriorists. 
This consideration (the pressure to publish) leads to Kuhn's 
second characteristic of exemplary "scientific achievements" — 
they must be "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of prob-
lems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve" [Kuhn, 
1970a, p. 10]. If there was nothing left to be done, no unsolved 
problems or nagging questions, researchers would have to look 
for different areas in which to practice their skills of inquiry. 
The "success of a paradigm", Kuhn points out, ". . . is at the 
start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and 
still incomplete examples" [1970a, pp. 23-24]. When paradigms 
cease to be problematic (as very few have), they cease "to yield 
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research problems at all and . . . become tools for engineering" 
[Kuhn, 1970a, p. 79]. 
The Ball and Brown [1968] article was a success in the 
sense suggested by Kuhn. It held the promise of successfully 
extending the financial economics paradigm to accounting. Ball 
and Brown established that, within the financial economics 
paradigm, accounting earnings are empirically related to stock 
prices, but they studied only a limited set of accounting earn-
ings (annual) and established only a gross relationship between 
earnings and stock prices. Left unanswered were such questions 
as the following. Could their results be duplicated for other sets 
of accounting earnings (such as quarterly earnings)? To what 
extent does the market anticipate changes in earnings? To what 
extent do accounting earnings announcements convey informa-
tion to market participants? Are investors misled by earnings 
changes that result solely from changes in accounting proce-
dures? The Ball and Brown article stimulated a number of stud-
ies a i m e d at a n s w e r i n g such q u e s t i o n s . As Wat t s a n d 
Zimmerman pointed out, "A reasonable characterization of the 
objective of the economics-based empirical l i terature tha t 
evolved in the 10 years following Ball and Brown (1968) . . . is 
that it sought to investigate the implications of the EMH and 
the CAPM for the role of accounting numbers in supplying in-
formation to the capital markets for valuation purposes" [pp. 
15-16]. 
MARKET-BASED ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
AS NORMAL SCIENCE 
Most of the empirical work stimulated by Ball and Brown 
fits Kuhn's characterization of normal science; it was work 
aimed at articulating and fleshing out the financial economics 
paradigm with respect to accounting numbers. It consisted 
mainly of "mopping-up operations" which could be classified 
into Kuhn's three categories of normal scientific problems — 
"determinat ion of significant fact, matching of facts with 
theory, and articulation of theory . . ." [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 34]. 
By demonstrating that a certain class of facts is "particu-
larly revealing of the nature of things . . . the paradigm has 
made them worth determining both with more precision and in 
a larger variety of situations" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 25]. Much nor-
mal scientific research, accordingly, aims at more clearly delin-
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eating the boundaries of this "class of facts". Such work can be 
demonstrated quite clearly with respect to the extension of the 
financial economics paradigm to financial reporting theory. 
Whereas Ball and Brown had demonstrated the relationship be-
tween annual earnings and stock prices for NYSE firms, an ob-
vious approach for further research was to determine whether 
the same relationship existed for other securities. As Watts and 
Zimmerman note, "The Ball and Brown study has been repli-
cated for annual earnings announcements by firms traded in 
U.S. markets other than the NYSE . . . It also has been repli-
cated for annual earnings announcements for firms traded in 
other countries" [p. 47]. Other "mopping-up" work by research-
ers in the new accounting paradigm established that the class of 
significant facts included the relationship between interim earn-
ings and securities prices. 
A second category of normal scientific problems arises as a 
result of difficulties involved in matching theory with factual 
observations. "Improving that agreement or finding new areas 
in which agreement can be demonstrated at all presents a con-
stant challenge to the skill and imagination of the experimental-
ist and observer" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 26]. In the natural sciences, 
for instance, special equipment must be developed to measure 
results that are not observable to the naked eye, and the use of 
such special equipment usually requires theoretical justification 
and adaptation. This type of problem was very pointed for re-
searchers in the new accounting paradigm. The underlying 
theory of financial economics specified a certain relationship 
between expected future cash flows and securities prices. Ac-
counting researchers, on the other hand, were primarily con-
cerned with the relationship between earnings and securities 
prices; and in any case, expectations about the future are not 
directly observable. The development of the new accounting 
paradigm, therefore, left much scope for work regarding the fit 
between fact and theory. 
Ball and Brown assumed that accounting earnings could be 
used as a surrogate for cash flows, thus allowing them to use 
the CAPM to make predictions about the response of securities 
prices to earnings announcements. Due to the fact that expecta-
tions are not directly observable, Ball and Brown chose to pro-
ceed as follows: " . . . we construct two alternative models of 
what the market expects income to be and then investigate the 
market 's reactions when its expectations prove false" [p. 161]. 
56
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
Mouck: The "Revolution" in Financial Reporting Theory 47 
They further used market models to differentiate the market 
response in terms of normal versus abnormal rates of return. In 
short, the actually observed data was compared with theoretical 
models which were, in turn, (theoretically) linked with the un-
derlying theories of financial economics. Such investigative pro-
cedures obviously left considerable scope for further mopping-
up work aimed at improving the fit between fact and theory. 
And indeed, many of the studies stimulated by Ball and Brown 
experimented with alternative models for measuring market ex-
pectations and abnormal returns. 
Finally, the third type of normal scientific problem noted by 
Kuhn can be illustrated with respect to the new accounting 
paradigm; that is, "work undertaken to articulate the paradigm 
theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permit-
ting the solution of problems to which it had previously only 
drawn attention" [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 27]. As noted earlier, the Ball 
and Brown study established that securities price changes are 
related to accounting earnings changes, but it also found that 
much of the price changes occur prior to the annual earnings 
announcements. This gave rise to what was perhaps the most 
interesting question for subsequent researchers seeking further 
articulation of the basic theory — how much information con-
tent do accounting earnings actually convey? Ball and Brown 
concluded that annual earnings announcements do contain use-
ful information, but that only 10-15 percent of the potential 
information is conveyed in the month of announcement. The 
limitations of their study raised a number of questions about 
the validity of their conclusions with respect to information 
content of earnings announcements, and especially with respect 
to the role played by interim announcements. Many subsequent 
studies which addressed these issues can be viewed as attempts 
to refine and further articulate the paradigm theory. 
Using Kuhn's terminology, then, much of the accounting 
research stimulated by Ball and Brown can be aptly character-
ized as Kuhnian "puzzle-solving". The paradigm both generates 
(acceptable) research problems and supplies criteria for accept-
able solutions, in much the same way that game-type puzzles 
specify problems and stipulate the rules for solving them. Thus, 
when engaged with a normal research problem, the sci-
entist must premise current theory as the rules of his 
game. His object is to solve a puzzle . . . and current 
theory is required to define that puzzle and to guaran-
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tee that, given sufficient brilliance, it can be solved. 
[Kuhn, 1970b, pp. 4-5] 
Kuhn employs the puzzle metaphor to emphasize that normal 
science research is not carried out as a test of the paradigm 
theory. Quite the contrary, it is the skill of the researcher that is 
at risk: "I use the term 'puzzle' in order to emphasize that the 
difficulties which ordinarily confront even the very best scien-
tists are, like crossword puzzles or chess puzzles, challenges 
only to his ingenuity. He is in difficulty, not current theory" 
[Kuhn, 1970b, p. 5, n. 1]. 
The upshot of this is that the puzzle-solving activity of the 
normal science researcher is frequently aimed at establishing 
predictable or unsurprising results. Consider, for instance, the 
studies which applied Ball and Brown's methods to stock mar-
kets other than the NYSE. It surely was no surprise to find, as 
Watts and Zimmerman note, that "The replications suggest that 
the results are not unique to the NYSE" [p. 47]. Or consider the 
research on interim earnings, when Ball and Brown provided 
evidence that most of the price adjustments related to earnings 
changes took place prior to the month of annual earnings an-
nouncements, the obvious explanation was that most of the in-
formation reported was not new. It had previously been re-
ported in interim announcements. So, it was no surprise when 
Foster [1977] reported a study using quarterly earnings which 
found evidence "consistent with the hypothesis that quarterly 
earnings convey information to the capital markets" [Watts and 
Zimmerman, p. 51]. Such examples are consistent with Kuhn's 
contention that normal science does not "aim to produce major 
novelties" [1970a, p. 35]. 
This raises questions about why so much accounting re-
search effort and so much journal space has been devoted to 
issues that are merely "mopping-up" or "puzzle-solving" issues. 
The answers Kuhn suggests are as follows. In a general sense, 
such studies increase the paradigm's claim to legitimacy by in-
creasing the scope and precision of its application [Kuhn, 
1970a, p. 36]. As for the motivation of the individual researcher, 
personal satisfaction and professional recognition are associ-
ated with demonstrations of ingenuity in "puzzle-solving." 
Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is 
achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires 
the solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, con-
ceptual and mathematical puzzles. The man who suc-
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ceeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver, and the 
challenge of the puzzle is an important part of what 
drives him on. [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 36] 
ANOMALY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
The foregoing discussion is not intended to imply that nor-
mal science proceeds in a perfectly straight line with no unex-
pected turns or new directions. "Normal science does not aim at 
novelties of fact or theory . . . New and unsuspected phenomena 
are . . . repeatedly uncovered by scientific research, and radical 
new theories have again and again been invented by scientists" 
[Kuhn, 1970a, p. 52]. Indeed, anomalies — findings that seem 
contradictory to the paradigm theory — are ever present. They 
provide many of the puzzles that drive the normal scientific 
researcher. If solutions prove to be too elusive the paradigm 
theory may be adjusted to incorporate the anomaly. One of the 
most visible extensions of the dominant financial reporting 
paradigm can be attributed to the process of dealing with 
anomalous observations, such as the development of positive 
accounting theory. 
Watts and Zimmerman note that "by the mid-1970s ac-
counting researchers had observed . . . whole industries chang-
ing from one method of accounting to another at one point in 
time (e.g., the switch by the steel industry from accelerated de-
preciation to straight line in 1968)" [p. 6]. Such observations 
seemed consistent with the view that the stock market can be 
misled by earnings changes that result solely from changes in 
accounting procedures; a view that was widely held in the 
1960s. However, as Watts and Zimmerman point out, this view 
contradicts the EMH which implies that the stock market will 
not be misled by such changes [p. 108]. From the perspective of 
financial economics, these observations represented anomalies. 
These anomalous observations were dealt with by positive 
accounting theorists by adjusting the paradigm theory. Early 
research within the paradigm had applied the EMH with the 
assumption of no information or transaction costs. The anoma-
lous observations of entire industries making costly changes in 
accounting procedures "led some researchers to drop the zero 
information and transaction assumptions . . . " [Watts and 
Zimmerman, pp. 109-110]. This created an opening for intro-
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ducing the contracting theory that had developed from the 
"property rights" version of economic theory. With the addition 
of sophisticated contracting models the paradigm theory was 
modified to provide answers to the following question: "If an 
accounting change that does not affect taxes is costly and has 
no other effect on firm value, why do managers make those 
changes?" [Watts and Zimmerman, p. 173]. A very simplified 
version of the answer proposed by positive accounting theorists 
can be gleaned from the following examples. 
For firm's with restrictive debt contracts that tie dividend 
payments to the level of reported earnings, a change in account-
ing procedures that causes an increase in earnings can cause a 
change in the cash flows to various contracting parties. This led 
to the formulation of the "debt/equity hypothesis" which Watts 
and Zimmerman state as follows: "Ceteris paribus, the larger a 
firm's debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm's manager is to 
select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from 
future periods to the current period" [p. 216]. Similarly, for 
firm's with contracts that tie management compensation to the 
level of reported earnings, management may have some incen-
tive to change accounting procedures. Consideration of various 
compensation contracts thus led to the formulation of the "bo-
nus plan hypothesis" which Watts and Zimmerman formulate 
as follows: "Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with bonus plans 
are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift re-
ported earnings from future periods to the current period" [p. 
208]. Finally, for firms concerned about attracting regulatory 
attention with the reporting of large earnings, there may be an 
incentive to change accounting methods to reduce reported 
earnings. This consideration led to the formulation of another 
testable hypothesis that has been dubbed the "size hypothesis" 
— "Ceteris paribus, the larger the firm, the more likely the man-
ager is to choose accounting procedures that defer reported 
earnings from current to future periods" [Watts and Zimmer-
man, p. 235]. 
In summary, the anomalies encountered by the economics-
based empirical research paradigm were dealt with by adopting 
various changes in the theoretical framework. What emerged 
was a dramatic new extension of the informational view of fi-
nancial reporting theory; an extension that explains previously 
anomalous changes in accounting procedures by attributing 
them to the existence of contracting, information, and political 
costs. 
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ANOMALY AND CRISIS: IS THE INFORMATIONAL 
PARADIGM IN DANGER? 
Anomaly, on the other hand, can generate a crisis. If solu-
tions prove to be elusive and the theory cannot be adjusted — 
because the contradiction is too destructive of the paradigm 
theory — then the paradigm may be thrown into a "crisis" 
which, in the extreme case, may make it susceptible to a scien-
tific "revolution" and replacement by an alternative paradigm. 
To generate a crisis, an anomaly must be seen as "more than 
just another puzzle of normal science . . ." [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 82]. 
This could be the case for an anomaly that "clearly califs] into 
question explicit and fundamental generalizations of the para-
digm . . ." [Kuhn, 1970a, p. 82]. The informational paradigm has 
encountered two types of anomalous findings that clearly hold 
the potential for generating a crisis — findings that call into 
question the validity of the EMH and the CAPM. The crisis po-
tential of such anomalies can be gleaned from a brief overview 
of the paradigm. 
The informational paradigm can be described as a coherent 
program for financial accounting research which seeks to de-
scribe the role of accounting information in the operation of 
capital markets. Capital markets are presumed to provide for 
the efficient allocation of resources. Modern portfolio theory is 
presumed to describe the way rational investors make decisions 
which optimize lifetime consumption possibilities. The CAPM is 
presumed to describe the efficient allocation of risk in capital 
asset pricing. The EMH presumes that securities markets func-
tion to eliminate economic profits with respect to information. 
Within this theoretical context, the linkage between accounting 
information and capital market theories has been succinctly de-
scribed by Lev and Ohlson [1982] as follows: 
The link provided by capital market theories connects 
the accounting information system to its function in 
capital markets. Information has a dual role in these 
markets. First, it aids in establishing a set of equilib-
rium security prices that affects the allocation of 'real' 
resources and the productive decisions implemented by 
firms. Second, it enables individuals to exchange claims 
to present and future consumption across different 
states, thereby attaining both preferred patterns of life-
time consumption and the sharing of societal risks. 
This explicit conceptualization of the role of informa-
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tion in capital markets appears to provide the elusive 
operational framework for the systematic analysis of 
alternative accounting information systems. The out-
come of the economic system, as a function of the in-
formation system, can now be analyzed. [p. 252] 
In short, the EMH and the CAPM provide linkages between 
information, securities prices, and expected utility in a way that 
allows for a coherent financial reporting theory that is an inte-
gral part of a broader theory of market economics. "Such inte-
gration pointed to a well-specified and operational agenda for 
financial accounting research" [Lev and Ohlson, p. 252]. If the 
validity of the EMH and/or the CAPM is rejected, then the inte-
gral relationship between financial reporting theory and the 
theory of market economics is called into question. From this 
perspective, there is good reason to suspect that the informa-
tional perspective may be entering a state of crisis. 
With respect to the EMH, researchers have long been aware 
of anomalous findings. In 1978, the Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics published a special issue dealing with findings anoma-
lous to the EMH. In an editorial introduction to that issue, 
Jensen states succinctly the need for special consideration of the 
anomalous findings. 
I believe there is no other proposition in economics 
which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it 
than the Efficient Market Hypothesis . . . Yet, in a man-
ner remarkably similar to that described by Thomas 
Kuhn in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions, we seem to be entering a stage where widely scat-
tered and as yet incohesive evidence is arising which 
seems to be inconsistent with the theory. As better data 
become available (e.g., daily stock price data) and as 
our econometric sophistication increases, we are begin-
ning to find inconsistencies that our cruder data and 
techniques missed in the past. It is evidence which we 
will not be able to ignore. [Jensen, p. 95] 
Jensen expressed optimism that future research would ex-
plain the anomalies without sacrificing the underlying theory of 
market efficiency [p. 100]. Over a decade later, however, Brown 
commented with respect to market efficiency that, "There are so 
many 'anomalies' around nowadays that I sometimes wonder if 
there are more anomalies than instances of efficiency" [p. 215]. 
Nevertheless, Brown asserts his allegiance to market efficiency 
in no uncertain terms: " . . . I am afraid my Chicago training has 
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left me too skeptical to believe that competitive capital markets 
could remain so obviously inefficient for so long" [p. 216]. 
The increasingly widespread awareness of findings anoma-
lous to the EMH, however, are not being ignored or pushed 
aside with mere reiterations of belief in market efficiency. A 
recent issue of The Accounting Review, for example, published a 
series of articles dealing with the functional fixation hypothesis 
(FFH) which is directly contradictory to the EMH. Whereas the 
EMH assumes that investors are sophisticated enough to sort 
out the effects of reported accounting numbers and rationally 
assess future cash flow potentials, the FFH assumes that inves-
tors are fixated on accounting numbers "and, therefore, fail to 
unscramble the true cash flow implications of accounting data" 
[Hand, p. 740]. The article by Hand (which was one of two 
articles awarded the AAA's Competitive Manuscript Award for 
1989), reported evidence which was inconsistent with the EMH, 
but consistent with a modified version of the FFH. In another 
study, Harris and Ohlson reported results (based on the applica-
tion of trading rules to oil and gas firms) which supported nei-
ther the EMH nor the FFH. In a discussion of these papers, 
Tinic concluded that, "The studies by Hand and Harris and 
Ohlson are useful first steps in developing alternative testable 
hypotheses to the EMH. They offer thought-provoking illustra-
tions of the type of problems that should be included in the 
agenda for future research" [p. 795]. 
Functional fixation clearly represents an anomaly with re-
spect to the informational paradigm; an anomaly that calls into 
question one of the cornerstones of the informational perspec-
tive (the EMH). If enough researchers become convinced that 
investors are functionally fixated, it could generate a crisis for 
the paradigm. 
When . . . an anomaly comes to seem more than just 
another puzzle of normal science, the transition to cri-
sis and to ex t raord inary science has begun . The 
anomaly itself now comes to be more generally recog-
nized as such by the profession. More and more atten-
tion is devoted to it by more and more of the field's 
most eminent men. [Kuhn, 1970a p. 82] 
While there is no indication that the FFH is widely accepted at 
this time, the prominent display of a series of FFH articles in 
one of the leading academic accounting journals indicates how 
seriously functional fixation is taken by some highly respected 
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academics. If the concern increases, it will trigger more and 
more research that is characteristic of extraordinary science 
rather than normal science. 
As indicated above, anomalous findings with respect to the 
CAPM also have the potential to generate crisis for the informa-
tional paradigm. In 1982, Lev and Ohlson noted that, "Disen-
chantment with the CAPM is widespread on both conceptual 
and empirical grounds" [p. 287]. The grounds for disenchant-
ment continued to grow during the 1980s. In a new study of the 
CAPM, Fama and French [1992] discuss several studies pub-
lished in the 1980s which reported evidence that average re-
turns on stocks may be related to market size, leverage, book-to-
market equity, and/or earnings-price ratios. Since the CAPM 
purports to explain the variability of returns solely on the basis 
of market beta's, the evidence reported by these various studies 
is clearly anomalous with respect to the CAPM. 
The new study by Fama and French, however, appears to be 
much more damaging to the validity of the CAPM than the pre-
vious studies. They (Fama and French) sought to evaluate the 
joint roles of the above mentioned variables (including beta) 
with respect to average returns. Their study included non-finan-
cial stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and cov-
ered the years 1963-1990. Their abstract conveys the results suc-
cinctly: 
Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-mar-
ket equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional 
variation in average stock returns associated with mar-
ket [beta], size, leverage, book-to-market equity and 
earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow 
for variation in [beta] that is unrelated to size, the rela-
tion between market [beta] and average return is flat, 
even when [beta] is the only explanatory variable. 
[Fama and French, 1992, p. 427] 
In short, market beta's, according Fama and French, are not 
related to average returns; market beta's have no explanatory 
power with respect to systematic risk. 
So, what are the implications of these findings for the infor-
mational paradigm of financial reporting theory? First, as noted 
above, the CAPM has served the role of connecting accounting 
information to the efficient functioning of a market economy. A 
quote from Markowitz will highlight the importance of the 
CAPM in this regard: "My work on portfolio theory considers 
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how an optimizing investor would behave, whereas the work by 
Sharpe and Lintner on the Capital Asset Pricing Model . . . is 
concerned with economic equilibrium assuming all investors 
optimize in the particular manner I proposed" [1991, p. 469]. In 
short, if the CAPM is not valid, then the rationality of capital 
asset pricing may be in doubt. At the very least, if the CAPM is 
rejected, then another theory of rational asset pricing is called 
for, and a new theory of asset pricing opens space for paradigm 
debate. 
Second, if the findings of Fama and French gain wide-
spread acceptance, then the validity of many of the classic ar-
ticles in the informational paradigm are placed in doubt be-
cause of the widespread reliance, directly or indirectly, on the 
CAPM in estimating abnormal returns or in controlling for sys-
tematic risk. In any case, the Fama and French study holds the 
potential for a very substantial blurring of the paradigm, and in 
Kuhn's words, "All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm 
and the consequent loosening of the rules for normal research" 
[1970a, p . 84]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The decade of the 1960s has been widely recognized as a 
watershed decade in accounting thought. Most notably, it was 
the decade which initiated the transition from the "economic 
income perspective" to the "informational perspective" in finan-
cial reporting theory. Kuhnian analysis yields some unique in-
sights into both the transition itself and the subsequent develop-
ment of the informational perspective. 
One of the major conclusions of the present study is that 
the informational perspective predominated precisely because it 
provided the support of a widely accepted paradigm, while the 
proponents of the "economic income perspective" could not of-
fer paradigm support. The informational perspective, as an ex-
tension of the financial economics paradigm, provided research-
ers with well-defined normal science problems together with 
exemplars that served as guides regarding acceptable research 
methods, while the economic income theorists (the so-called 
normative apriorists) could offer neither a generally accepted 
theoretical perspective, nor exemplars for the pursuit of re-
search problems. 
As with the development of any scientific paradigm, the 
informational paradigm has encountered anomalous evidence, 
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most of which could be ignored, explained away, or incorpo-
rated into the paradigm by theoretical adjustments. The infor-
mational paradigm has also encountered more troublesome 
anomalies that hold the potential of throwing the paradigm into 
a Kuhnian-type crisis. Perhaps the most notable anomalous 
findings are those reported in a dramatic new study by Fama 
and French; a study which flatly contradicts the validity of the 
CAPM and the explanatory power of market beta's. Because the 
EMH and the CAPM have served as cornerstones for so many of 
the classic studies in the informational paradigm, the spreading 
awareness of challenges to their validity are prompting more 
and more attention. There is reason to believe that increasingly 
widespread attention to the persistence of such fundamental 
anomalies is beginning to blur the paradigm and loosen the 
rules for normal science research, thus creating intellectual 
space for the consideration of alternative paradigms. 
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EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTS OF 
MINORITY INTEREST 
Abstract: The FASB is currently addressing issues related to account-
ing for minority interest as a part of the "entity project". Decisions 
regarding the measurement and financial statement presentation de-
pend upon the determination of the fundamental nature of minority 
interest. Alternative views describing the nature of minority interest 
rely upon alternative equity theories of consolidation. This paper 
traces the evolution of concepts of minority interest from the early 
1900s to the present. The evolution is placed in perspective vis-a-vis 
the development of relevant corporate theories of equity. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is cur-
rently evaluating consolidation accounting methods under the 
agenda project — Consolidations and Related Matters [FASB, 
Highlights, 1991]. The first phase is completed and resulted in 
the issuance of SFAS No. 94, Consolidation of All Majority-owned 
Subsidiaries. The second phase is under way; and on September 
10, 1991, the FASB issued a discussion memorandum (DM), An 
Analysis of Issues Related to Consolidation Policy and Procedures, 
which "is intended to cover all aspects of accounting for affilia-
tions between entities . . ." [FASB, 1991, par. 4]. 
The DM addresses a number of procedural and theoretical 
issues wherein a parent company has a controlling interest in a 
subsidiary entity. In those cases where there is less than 100 
percent ownership, the appropriateness of a particular account-
ing approach (e.g., the measurement of goodwill or the treat-
ment of unrealized profit arising from intercompany transac-
tions) hinges upon the nature of noncontrolling "minority" in-
terest, which in turn relies upon the nature of the reporting 
entity.1 Thus, a concept of minority interest is important to the 
1The DM and authors in the literature refer to the two prominent theories of 
equity — parent company theory and entity theory (discussed later in the paper) 
— to support positions taken on the nature of minority interest and to relate 
those positions to various accounting procedures and policies. The following 
example illustrates the importance of a concept of minority interest to consoli-
dation principles and procedures. When published financial statements are pre-
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development and implementation of consolidation policies and 
procedures. 
Minority interest has not received a great deal of attention 
in the accounting literature. The question of the fundamental 
nature of minority interest has been linked to the question of 
whether the appropriate basis of accounting should rely upon 
the entity concept or the parent company concept. That is, the 
two prominent equity theories of consolidation — entity theory2 
and parent company theory — typically appear as a basis of 
support for discussions pertaining to minority interest. Under 
the entity theory, corporate assets are independent of capital 
structure, and majority and minority stockholders provide alter-
native sources of corporate resources. Parent company theorists 
perceive parent company investors as the primary benefactors 
of the consolidated group, and minority stockholdings as out-
side interests. 
There is little official guidance on how to account for mi-
nority interest or how to handle matters which rely upon a con-
cept of minority interest. "ARB No. 51, Consolidated Financial 
Statements and FASB Statement No. 94 . . . are the prevailing 
authoritative literature on accounting and reporting standards 
for consolidated financial statements" [FASB, 1991, par. 14]. 
Neither pronouncement offers a definition of minority interest 
nor prescribes how to treat or measure minority interest in pub-
lished financial statements.3 Minority interest has appeared as a 
liability, between liabilities and stockholders' equity, and in 
stockholders' equity. Before accountants can determine how to 
measure and present minority interest, a consensus on the na-
ture of minority interest is needed. Is it debt or equity, or per-
haps neither? 
pared from the perspective of the parent company, minority interest is consid-
ered an outside interest. Under this view, when an interest in a subsidiary is 
purchased, goodwill is equal to cost minus the fair value of the proportion of 
identifiable net assets acquired. Conversely, when the business entity is consid-
ered to be independent of its capital providers (entity theory), minority stock-
holders are viewed as having an equity interest. In this case, goodwill would be 
recorded at its total fair value, imputed from the cost of the acquisition to the 
parent. 
2In the DM, the FASB referred to entity theory as the "economic unit" theory. 
3ARB No. 51 does not expressly define a concept of reporting entity, a 
concept of consolidated financial statements, or a concept of minority interest 
[See for example FASB, 1991, par 20]. According to the DM, ARB No. 51 ex-
pressed some preferences, but set forth few hard and fast rules. 
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This paper traces the evolution of concepts of minority in-
terest from the early 1900s to the present. The developments are 
placed in perspective relative to the evolution of the entity and 
parent company theories. The nature of minority interest, but 
not its measurement, is discussed. No attempt is made to criti-
cally evaluate the theoretical merits of minority interest con-
cepts or related consolidation theories. 
EARLY VIEWS OF MINORITY INTEREST 
Minority interest has been referred to as a liability, equity, 
or neither. References describing the placement of minority in-
terest in corporate balance sheets began appearing in text books 
and journal articles in the early 1900s.4 Differences of opinion 
were evident from the start. Newlowe [1948] examined 150 jour-
nal articles and books from 1908 through 1945. He determined 
that 84 references proposed that minority interest be listed, but 
either preferred no classification or did not mention where mi-
nority interest should be placed. Four authors preferred that 
minority interest be placed among liabilities, and 28 preferred 
to classify minority interest as an element of stockholders' eq-
uity. The other 34 sources cited did not address the nature of 
minority interest. 
Early references proffered their views of what minority in-
terest is but did not offer theoretical defenses for particular po-
sitions taken. Moreover, proponents of one view did not typi-
cally refer to alternative accounting treatments. For example, 
when referring to matters " . . . appertaining to minority share-
holders . . . ," Dickinson [1918] stated 
The proper practice is to take up as a liability the par 
value of the outstanding stock, together with its relative 
share of surplus, but when the amount involved is 
4The earliest reference is a presentation made by William M. Lybrand at the 
annual meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants in October 
1908 which was published in two parts in The Journal of Accountancy in Novem-
ber 1908 and December 1908. Lybrand depicted "Common Stock of Subsidiary 
Companies Not Owned by the Holding Corp." under a general heading of "Li-
abilities," following "Common Stock of the Holding Corp." [November 1908, p. 
40]. In Part II, Lybrand stated that "Under capital stocks will be included the 
stock issues of the holding company and separately stated, such part of the 
stocks of the subsidiary companies as are not owned by the holding company" 
[December 1908, p. 120]. 
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small, the proportion of surplus is not always set aside 
[1918, p. 183]. 
Finney described minority interest as a "capital liability to out-
siders", stating 
If there is a minority interest, it would be wrong to 
eliminate the capital stock and surplus or deficit ac-
counts of the subsidiary entirely, because they repre-
sent two things: (1) The capital liability to the holding 
company, which is an inter-company relation and is 
therefore eliminated; and (2) the capital liability to the 
minority stockholders, which is an outside relation and 
must therefore be shown in the consolidated balance 
sheet [1922, p. 20]. 
Newlowe referred to minority interest as "proprietors," noting 
From the point of view of the majority interests, the 
algebraic sum of the capital stock, surplus, deficit, and 
proprietorship reserves belonging to minority interests 
is a liability. However, the minority stockholders rank 
as proprietors rather than creditors. The minority inter-
est, therefore should be shown on the consolidated bal-
ance sheet as a special net worth account [1926, p . 6]. 
And, Rorem wrote 
In cases where the parent company owns most, but not 
all, of the stock of the subsidiary, the interest of minor-
ity stockholders should be shown separately as a spe-
cial proprietary item on the consolidated balance sheet 
[1928, p. 440]. 
In all four cases, no more was said about the nature of minority 
interest. 
During the 1940s, authors began to offer theoretical argu-
ments to support a favored position. For example, Sunley and 
Carter argued 
This interest of the minority is thus somewhat similar 
to the interest of a creditor. The creditor hopes for the 
prosperity of his customer so that he may receive some 
share in that property; but, on the other hand, the 
creditor does not wish his customer's prosperity to be 
made at the expense of the creditor's own profits [1944, 
p. 361]. 
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In addition, the pros and cons of alternative accounting treat-
ments for minority interest began to be compared and con-
trasted. Childs wrote 
It would seem that a minority interest should not be 
looked upon as a liability unless it represents recalci-
trant stockholders whom the majority is trying to buy 
out or a capital consumed by losses which, neverthe-
less, has a "nuisance" value. It does not have a lien on 
any assets; it does have a proprietary equity in certain 
assets and is a part of the capital of the enterprise. To 
deny a minority interest co-ordinate status with the 
majority because it does not represent an equity in the 
assets of more than one legal entity is no more logical 
than to deny a liability a co-ordinate position with 
other consolidated liabilities for the same reason [1949, 
p. 55]. 
Minority Interest As a Liability — AAA 
The initial position of the American Accounting Association 
(AAA) was that minority stockholdings are outside interests. 
Kohler presented a paper at the 1929 annual meeting of the 
AAA which was later published in The Accounting Review. The 
paper represented "the main opinion" of the Executive Commit-
tee regarding the topic of consolidated reports [Kohler, 1938, p. 
63]. The Committee determined that "outside stockholders" pos-
sess attributes of creditors because "their interests do not paral-
lel those of the controlling entity" [Kohler, 1938, p. 67]. Consis-
tent with others writing on the topic of minority interest during 
this period, no theoretical support was given for this statement. 
In 1955, the AAA Committee on Concepts and Standards 
issued Supplementary Statement No. 7, "Consolidated Financial 
Statements." Consistent with the 1929 Executive Committee's 
position, minority interest was referred to as an "outside finan-
cial interest" along with preferred stock and debt instruments 
[AAA, 1955, p. 194]. However, the 1955 Committee did not men-
tion where minority interest should be shown in published fi-
nancial statements, nor did the Committee offer a definition of 
what minority interest is. 
The thrust of the 1955 Statement was to set forth basic 
principles of consolidated financial statements. One of those 
principles was that: "In so far as practicable, the consolidated 
data should reflect the underlying assumption that they repre-
72
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
64 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993 
sent the operations, resources, and equities of a single entity" 
[AAA, 1955, p. 194]. A subsequent Statement, "Accounting and 
Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial Statements: 1957 Re-
vision, " expanded and clarified the principle of the consolidated 
entity, but again was silent on the subject of the nature of mi-
nority interest [AAA, 1957]. 
Proponents of the entity concept argue that classifying mi-
nority interest as a liability is inconsistent with the view that 
consolidated financial statements are prepared for a single en-
tity. Thus, the 1957 AAA Committee's silence on this point may 
be interpreted as indicating a shift from the 1929 Executive 
Committee's position as described by Kohler. 
Minority Interest As Equity 
The view which holds that minority interest is an equity 
interest is rooted in the development of the entity theory. Paton 
described the essence of the entity theory. Paton [1922] pro-
posed that the accounting equation is properly depicted as "As-
sets = Equities". Equities were described as " . . . a marvelous 
diffusion of all aspects of ownership — control, income, risk, 
etc. — among a host of investors" [Paton, 1922, p. 73]. Accord-
ingly, all types of corporate securities represent equity in corpo-
rate assets. Paton argued that a mere change in the source of 
corporate capital does not affect the cost of factors of produc-
tion. It follows that the corporate entity is independent of its 
capital structure. Assets are corporate assets, and income is cor-
porate income until distributed as returns to the various capital 
providers.5 Under this scenario, consolidated financial state-
ments would be prepared for the entity, rather than being exten-
sions of the separate financial statements of the parent com-
pany. 
Moonitz [1942] pointed out that because there was no gen-
erally accepted theory of consolidation, a number of confusing 
alternative and sometimes contradictory practices coexisted. He 
extended the discussion of the entity theory to consolidated fi-
nancial statements and argued that the entity concept provides 
an appropriate theoretical base. Moonitz viewed the consoli-
dated balance sheet as a depiction of assets and liabilities asso-
5In his theory book Paton did not describe minority interest nor did he 
address any consolidation issues vis-a-vis the entity theory. His ideas were ex-
tended to consolidation policies by Moonitz [1942]. 
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ciated with an affiliated group as though they belonged to a 
single operating unit. Following Paton's argument, Moonitz 
stated 
In accordance with our fundamental premise, a con-
solidated balance sheet contains a list of the assets and 
liabilities assignable to an affiliated group treated as a 
single operating unit. The net worth or capital is there-
fore the net worth or capital of the whole group [1942, 
pp. 241-2]. 
That is, the minority interest, like the controlling interest, pro-
vides net worth which is utilized to carry on the operating ac-
tivities of the consolidated group. According to Moonitz, "mi-
nority interest serves as a reminder that complete community of 
interest in the affiliated companies does not exist, and the diver-
gence of interest must be recognized" [1942, p. 241]. Thus, net 
worth should be divided between controlling and minority inter-
est in order not to exaggerate the extent of the equity of the 
controlling interest. 
Position of the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
Although the AICPA has not taken an official stand on the 
nature of minority interest, ARB 43 [1953] does provide support 
for the entity concept. In Chapter 7, the following statement is 
made: "The income of the corporation is determined as that of a 
separate entity without regard to the equity of the respective 
shareholders in such income" [Section B, par. 6]. This state-
ment is consistent with the entity theory position taken by 
Paton and Littleton in 1940. Specifically, the corporation can be 
viewed as "an institution separate and distinct from the parties 
who furnish funds" [Paton and Littleton, 1940, p. 8]. 
On the other hand, ARB 51 states 
The purpose of consolidated statements is to present, pri-
marily for the benefit of the shareholders and creditors of 
the parent company, the results of operations and the 
financial position of a parent company and its subsidiar-
ies essentially as if the group were a single company with 
one or more branches or divisions" [par. 1]. 
No mention is made of where to place outside interests on the 
balance sheet, but the above statement could provide support 
for the "parent company" theory of equity which has been uti-
lized to justify placement of minority interest outside of owners' 
equity. If consolidated financial statements are prepared to ben-
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efit parent company capital providers, then the consolidation 
process merely sets forth the details of parent company invest-
ments. From the parent company perspective, consolidations 
transform parent company financial statements and do not pro-
vide information which is relevant for minority interest deci-
sion-making. 
The Origin of Parent Company Theory 
The parent company theory has evolved from the propri-
etary theory of equity, which in the corporate context has been 
referred to as an association, or representative viewpoint. Hus-
band described the corporation as " . . . a group of individuals 
associated for the purpose of business enterprise, so organized 
that its affairs are conducted through representatives" [1938, p. 
242]. He argued that although stockholders do not have legal 
title to corporate assets, they are proprietors because their eq-
uity changes in response to the incurrence of corporate income. 
Consequently, stockholders are proprietors. They possess title in 
equity. In a later paper, Husband expanded his arguments and 
referred to the corporation as an agency organization which 
operates for the benefit of the common stockholder entrepre-
neur [Husband, 1954]. Although Husband referred to his theory 
as an association, or representative viewpoint, it is consistent 
with the proprietary theory of equity in which the corporation is 
seen as an association of entrepreneurs [Li, 1960, p. 258]. 
Husband did not address the issue of the nature of minority 
interest. Although he referred to consolidated statements, no 
attempt was made to link the development of the proprietary 
theory to the early propositions that minority interest is not 
appropriately considered a part of owners' equity. As a result, 
the early concepts of "outside interests" and the proprietary 
theory were developed independently of each other. Conversely, 
early concepts of minority interest as owners' equity were linked 
to the entity concept and arguments of proponents have relied 
upon the development of and implications inherent in the entity 
concept. 
POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE 1960s 
Those Based on the Entity Theory 
During the 1960s, the entity concept was expanded upon, 
but little new was said about implications for minority interest. 
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Moonitz continued to defend the entity concept and argued that 
minority interest clearly reflects proprietary ownership because 
there is no obligation to pay anything to minority shareholders 
[1960, p. 46]. Sapienza [1960] agreed and proposed that minor-
ity interest be presented in the balance sheet as a special class 
of stockholders. 
In 1964, an AAA Committee was charged to explore the 
depth and significance of the entity concept. The ensuing AAA 
report concluded that the role of the entity concept should be to 
serve as a guide for determining what information should be 
reported to users [AAA, 1965, p. 358]. The report stated that 
consolidated financial statements are prepared primarily for 
parent company stockholders (a position which is consistent 
with that taken by the AICPA in ARB 51). Those stockholders 
are interested in information about investments in subsidiary 
companies. However, because the essence of the reporting en-
tity is that its existence is separable from any view on how to 
report, "the concept does not dictate solutions to the valuation 
and disclosure problems arising from business combinations" 
[AAA, 1965, p . 367]. 
On the surface, the 1965 AAA report appeared to support 
the entity concept, but narrowed it from that envisioned by 
Moonitz and Paton and Littleton. Instead of the economic unit 
being regarded as the corporation itself, the emphasis that con-
solidated statements are prepared primarily for the parent 
company's stockholders appeared to redefine the entity concept 
in terms of the primary user of published financial statements. 
In essence, this new definition could be seen as a relabeling of 
Husband's proprietary theory, and as such could be interpreted 
as providing support for the 1938 AAA "outside interests" posi-
tion. However, like its predecessor committees, the 1965 AAA 
committee report did not specifically address minority interest. 
Minority Interest, As a Separate and Distinct Equity 
Writing prior to the 1965 AAA report, Smolinski [1963] de-
scribed minority interest as a "unique" interest. He said that it is 
neither a liability nor an item of owners' equity. Rather, minor-
ity interest "is an interest in only one unit of the consolidated 
entity, and any rights which it has, are rights to the net assets of 
this unit" [Smolinski, 1963, p. 167]. In other words, majority 
stockholders, not minority stockholders have a claim to the total 
consolidated net assets. This view has apparently been shared 
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by a large number of consolidated entities, because historically, 
a majority of companies have reported minority interest be-
tween debt and stockholders' equity [See for example, 
Campbell, 1962, p. 99 and FASB, 1991, p. 21]. 
POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE 1970s 
Expansion of the Entity Concept 
Hendriksen [1970] favored a return of the entity concept to 
encompass like consideration of all equity providers as envi-
sioned by Paton and Littleton and Moonitz. He pointed out that 
the stated objective of ARB 51 was to view the reporting enter-
prise as a single economic unit, but at the same time empha-
sized the interests of the parent company's shareholders. 
Hendriksen stated 
If the entire enterprise is really one economic unit, all 
interested parties should be given equal consideration, 
as in the enterprise theory; or the entity theory should 
be expanded to include the entire economic entity 
rather than merely the legal entity of the parent corpo-
ration [1970, p. 515]. 
Stated differently, Hendriksen felt that the entity concept as 
described in official pronouncements was too narrowly defined 
to encompass the true nature of economic entity. Limiting the 
reporting entity to the parent company has resulted in treating 
minority shareholders as outsiders, in the same manner as li-
abilities. Nevertheless, both majority and minority stockholders 
provide equity capital to the entire enterprise. Hence, minority 
interest should be accorded treatment similar to that of the par-
ent company's stockholders. 
International Accounting Standards 
In 1972, the Accountants International Study Group, which 
was associated with the AICPA and similar bodies in other 
countries, reported on the results of a study regarding the na-
ture of consolidated financial statements. The report favored the 
"parent company" concept which it described as one which 
views consolidated financial statements as an extension of the 
parent company statements. As such, the consolidation process 
simply replaces the parent company's investment account with 
the individual assets and liabilities underlying that investment. 
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When this occurs, minority shareholders are considered an out-
side group. 
The study group report stated that the predominant prac-
tice in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom is to 
show the minority interest as a separate item outside stockhold-
ers' equity. The report concluded that this practice is appropri-
ate. It did not state whether minority interest should be re-
ported as a liability or be placed in a separate category between 
liabilities and stockholders' equity. However, to state that it 
should be reported as a separate item could be interpreted as 
supporting the latter position. The subsequent pronouncement 
(International Accounting Standard No. 3) officially affirmed the 
position taken by the study group. That is, minority interest is 
not an element of stockholders' equity and should be shown as a 
separate item. 
Minority Interest As a Standing Source of Capital 
Scott [1979] was critical of placing minority interest in a 
separate category. He described placement of items such as mi-
nority interest between liabilities and stockholders' equity as 
"items, seemingly adrift in a 'no man's land '" [Scott, 1979, p. 
758]. 
Instead, Scott proposed that the classification of equities 
should depend on whether or not they provide permanent 
sources of capital. He argued that the going concern assump-
tion negates the relevance of dividing equities between liabilities 
and owners' equity. Accordingly, such a division is based upon 
legal claims which are not resorted to under normal circum-
stances [Scott, 1979, p. 759]. Scott stated that sources of capital 
should be divided between transitory sources and standing 
sources. Because contributions of majority and minority stock-
holders are relatively permanent, both should be classified as 
standing sources of capital. 
RECENT VIEWS 
No Reporting of Minority Interest 
A recent argument holds that because there is no consensus 
on the nature of minority interest, parent company stockholders 
would be better served if no minority interest was reported at 
all. Rosenfield and Rubin [1985] commented that minority in-
terest does not fit neatly into any balance sheet category. Pro-
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portional consolidation, in which the parent company reports 
only its proportionate share of the items reported by a subsid-
iary , was descr ibed as having appea l ing cha rac te r i s t i c s 
[Rosenfield and Rubin, 1985, p. 95]. Although both authors ap-
pear to believe that minority interest should not be reported in 
consolidated financial statements, their 1986 article presented 
opposing views on how not to do so. 
According to Rosenfield, a new view of equity is needed. He 
argued that consolidated financial statements should continue 
to reflect the total assets and liabilities of the parent and subsid-
iary. But, the residual represents the combined interest of ma-
jority and minority stockholders in the consolidated reporting 
entity itself and is therefore, the entity's equity in its own assets. 
The implication is that consolidated entities should report only 
one amount — the residual [Rosenfield and Rubin, 1986, p . 84]. 
This view is consistent with Husband's description of the entity 
concept as providing a rationale for disclosing stockholder 
claims as equity [1954, p. 556]. Another name given to the 
Rosenfield view is contemporary theory (see Beams below). 
Rubin countered, stating that Rosenfield's approach would 
still include minority interest in stockholders' equity. Hence it 
would still be disclosed, but camouflaged. He proposed that "the 
only sound way to exclude amounts that relate to minority 
stockholdings from the numbers column is to exclude all such 
amounts, and the only way to do that is through proportional 
consolidation" [Rosenfield and Rubin, 1986, p. 88]. The conten-
tion is that when a subsidiary's voting stock is acquired, the 
parent obtains the right to receive a pro-rata share of dividends, 
w h e n declared. This pro-rata claim implies tha t only the 
parent's pro-rata share of the subsidiary's assets and liabilities is 
relevant information to parent company stockholders. Hence, 
proportional consolidation provides relevant information to the 
primary users of consolidated statements, present and prospec-
tive parent company investors. 
The FASB's View 
Like its predecessors, the Committee on Accounting Proce-
dure and the Accounting Principles Board, the FASB has yet to 
take an official stand on the nature of minority interest. Never-
theless, the Board has described minority interest as an example 
of a financial statement item which fits the definition of equi-
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ties, rather than liabilities. Reflecting the view of Moonitz, SFAC 
No. 6 [1985] states 
Minority interests in net assets of consolidated subsid-
iaries do not represent present obligations of the enter-
prise to pay cash or distribute other assets to minority 
stockholders. Rather, these stockholders have owner-
ship or residual interests in a consolidated enterprise 
[par. 254]. 
In the recent Discussion Memorandum, Distinguishing be-
tween Liability and Equity Instruments and Accounting for In-
struments with Characteristics of Both, the FASB reiterated the 
position that minority interest does not meet current definitions 
of liabilities and thus must be an equity interest [FASB, 1990, 
par. 16]. The Board acknowledged that "Advocates of the parent 
company concept, however, generally take the position that a 
minority interest is a liability or perhaps that it is neither a 
liability nor equity" [FASB, 1990, par. 16]. The Discussion 
Memorandum went on to say that the issue of the nature of 
minority interest is being addressed as a part of the entity 
project. 
SFAS No. 94 determined that, unless control was clearly 
lacking, all majority owned subsidiaries should be consolidated. 
The standard amends ARB 51, but does not change the stated 
objective of consolidated financial statements. When discussing 
the basis for its conclusions, the Board stated that "Those who 
invest in the parent company of an affiliated group of corpora-
tions invest in the whole group, which constitutes the enterprise 
that is a potential source of cash flows to them as a result of 
their investment" [SFAS No. 94, Appendix B, 1987, par. 34]. 
This means that consolidated financial statements provide rel-
evant information to parent company investors in accordance 
with the objectives of financial reporting as outlined in SFAC 
No. I [SFAS No. 94, Appendix B, 1987, par. 35]. At the same 
time, the reference to investing in "the whole group" could be 
interpreted as implying that parent company stockholders pro-
vide capital for the economic entity, an entity concept perspec-
tive. 
The FASB's 1991 consolidation procedures DM presented 
and discussed the pros and cons of alternative views of consoli-
dation theory and the nature of minority interest. Based on 
paragraph 1 of ARB 51, the Board defined consolidated finan-
cial statements as 
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A set of financial statements that presents, primarily 
for the benefit of the shareholders and creditors of the 
parent company, the combined assets, liabilities, rev-
enues, expenses, gains, losses, and cash flows of a par-
ent and those of its subsidiaries that satisfy the criteria 
established for consolidation [1991, par. 61]. 
The wording of the definition retains the parent company focus 
of ARB 51 while allowing the flexibility to include alternative 
consolidation criteria. The Board acknowledged that issues be-
ing addressed and those to be addressed in subsequent FASB 
releases may result in redefinitions or even new categories of 
the elements of financial statements. Hence, it is unclear just 
what position, if any, will emerge. 
Legal Claims 
According to SFAC No. 6, "liabilities and equities are mutu-
ally exclusive claims to or interests in the enterprise's assets by 
entities other than the enterprise, and liabilities take precedence 
over ownership interests" [1985, par. 54]. This statement im-
plies that the classification of minority interest should be unam-
biguous. Minority interest is either an equity or a liability inter-
est. Classification between liabilities and stockholders' equity 
does not qualify as an element of financial statements. 
The FASB determined that equity is an "ownership interest" 
which is "enhanced or burdened by increases and decreases in 
net assets from nonowner sources as well as investments by 
owners and distributions to owners" [SFAC No. 6, 1985, par 62]. 
Assets and liabilities can be independently defined and mea-
sured [Hendriksen, 1970, p. 495]. But, the value of equity is 
affected by operations and the income of the enterprise. Unlike 
liabilities, "no class of equity carries an unconditional right to 
receive future transfers of assets from the enterprise except in 
liquidation, and then only after liabilities have been satisfied" 
[SFAC No. 6, 1985, par. 62]. 
There is no question that majority stockholdings fit the 
definition of equity. A strong case can be made that minority 
stockholdings do also. Minority interest is affected by invest-
ments, dividends and earnings of the subsidiary entity. Their 
only claim to corporate assets is residual in nature. Like the 
majority, minority interest does not represent a present obliga-
tion to distribute corporate resources. Future receipt of corpo-
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rate assets is contingent upon the declaration of dividends or 
liquidation. 
Nevertheless, while majority stockholders control and have 
an ownership interest in the combined entity, the minority 
interest 's residual claim is limited to the net assets of the 
subsidiary's segment of the combined entity. Moreover, their 
segment of the consolidated group is controlled by the parent 
company. They may participate in policy decisions of the sub-
sidiary, but cannot control them. Hence, from the minority 
stockholders' perspective, a noncontrolling interest in the con-
solidated entity is unlike that of the majority. 
Positions Taken in Recent Text Books 
The inability of official bodies to decide what to do with 
minority interest is reflected in current advanced accounting 
text books. Like their early counterparts, some textbooks clas-
sify minority interest as a liability, some as a part of stockhold-
ers ' equity, and some as neither. Others present alternative 
views but express no preference.6 
Fischer, Taylor and Leer [1990] stress entity theory. They 
define and measure minority interest as an equity interest and 
include it in stockholders' equity. Heufner and Largay concur, 
stating 
We believe that the minority interest problem is one of 
disclosure of the fact that not all of S's shares are held 
internally. Since the resources controlled by the con-
solidated entity relate to both the majority and minor-
ity stockholders, in consolidation both sets of interests 
must be treated consistently. In our view, minority 
shareholders may be viewed as shareholders in the con-
solidated entity even though their interest is limited to 
part of the consolidated entity. Therefore it is our view 
tha t the amount assigned to the minori ty interest 
should be included as a separate item within consoli-
dated stockholders' equity [1992, p. 181]. 
Larsen [1991] takes the opposite view. He argues that mi-
nority shareholders are a special class of creditors. This position 
6For example, Hoyle [1991] and Griffin, Williams, Boatsman, and Vickrey, 
[1991] do not express a preference for a particular consolidation approach, nor 
do they appear to prefer any one method of presenting minority interest in 
consolidated financial statements. 
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is buttressed by the argument that minority shareholders typi-
cally do not exercise ownership control whatsoever. 
Pahler and Mori [1991] assert that the consolidation pro-
cess has no impact upon the reporting entity. Therefore, " . . . 
consolidated financial statements are usually of no benefit 
whatsoever to the minority shareholders" [Pahler and Mori, 
1991, p. 212], and minority interest should not be a part of 
stockholders' equity. At the same time, reporting minority inter-
est as a liability has little or no theoretical support. Rather, 
minority interest ". . . is an equity interest, but not of the parent 
company, which is the reporting entity" [Pahler and Mori, 1991, 
p. 211]. Pahler and Mori conclude that reporting minority inter-
est between liabilities and stockholders ' equity reflects its 
unique nature. 
Beams [1991] states that neither entity theory nor parent 
company theory are consistently followed in practice. He de-
scribes a third theory which he calls contemporary theory [pp. 
437-439]. Contemporary theory is described as a merging of the 
two equity theories. Like parent company theory, contemporary 
theory identifies the primary user as common stockholders of 
the parent company. At the same time, the financial statements 
present the financial position and results of operations of a 
single business entity. Minority interest is reported as a part of 
stockholders' equity but is not reported as a separate amount. 
Contemporary theory is consistent with the position taken by 
Rosenfield [Rosenfield and Rubin, 1986]; with the 1965 AAA 
Committee's definition of the entity concept; and with the pur-
pose of consolidated financial statements set forth in ARB 51 
(which was reaffirmed in the appendix to SFAS No. 94). 
Current Accounting Practice 
Lack of agreement on a theory of consolidation and a con-
sistent treatment of the nature of minority interest is reflected 
in current accounting practice. A sample of 100 industrial com-
panies which reported minority interest in their balance sheets 
in 1990 was drawn from Compustat. Company balance sheets 
on Compustat Corporate Text were scanned for the placement 
of minority interest. Of the 100 companies, only 11 reported 
minority interest as an element of stockholders' equity. Twenty-
one companies added minority interest to liabilities. Twenty-five 
companies placed minority interest between stockholders' eq-
uity and a subtotal for liabilities. The remaining 43 companies 
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listed minority interest above stockholders' equity, but did not 
subtotal the preceding liabilities. In this context, minority inter-
est appears to be indistinguishable from liabilities. It appears 
that the preparer is content to allow the user to decide whether 
to include minority interest with liabilities when conducting fi-
nancial statement analyses. It is clear that practice has not con-
formed to the FASB's definition of minority interest in SFAC 
No. 6. However, it is not clear whether practitioners view mi-
nority interest as a liability or a separate unclassified item. 
SUMMARY 
This paper traced the development and discussion of con-
cepts regarding the nature of minority interest from the views 
which appeared in the literature during the early 1900s through 
1991. Current views which have appeared in recent journal ar-
ticles and text books and in current accounting practice were 
also examined. 
Concepts of minority interest are tied directly to the evolu-
tion of theories of corporate equity. The review has shown that 
entity theorists originally perceived corporate reporting as re-
flecting the legal entity of the corporate enterprise. It follows 
that all claims to corporate assets should receive the same treat-
ment. Under this concept, minority interests would be treated in 
a manner similar to majority stockholdings. 
As the entity theory evolved, its definition was narrowed to 
take a user oriented approach which is consistent with the con-
temporary theory as described by Beams. Accordingly, consoli-
dated financial statements are prepared primarily for the parent 
company's stockholders, but because they report the consoli-
dated companies as a single economic entity, the residual equity 
includes both minority and majority interest in the consolidated 
net assets. 
The parent company concept evolved from the representa-
tive viewpoint proposed by Husband. The parent company con-
cept is consistent with the proprietary theory of equity which 
holds that a corporation's primary responsibility is to provide a 
return to its common stockholders — the corporate entrepre-
neurs. For the consolidated entity, corporate entrepreneurs are 
the paren t company's common stockholders, not minori ty 
stockholders. Hence, minority interest is an outside interest and 
should not be reported as an element of stockholders' equity. 
Proponents have used this theory to argue that minority interest 
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is a liability, and that it should be presented in its own special 
category, even for proportional reporting wherein no minority 
interest is reported at all. 
The evolution has led to no conclusion on the issue of the 
nature of minority interest. The FASB has taken no stand. Nor 
is there any consensus in the literature on the appropriateness 
of any one position. 
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INTERNAL CONTROL: HOW IT 
EVOLVED IN FOUR ENGLISH-
SPEAKING COUNTRIES 
Abstract: The concept of internal control, as embodied in auditing 
standards and other statements by professional accounting bodies, 
has varied over time and geographically. There are, however, a num-
ber of similarities in the events that shaped professional statements 
concerned with internal control in the United States, United King-
dom, Australia and New Zealand. 
The evolution of internal control has been influenced by increasing 
public expectations of auditing standards. Another influence was a 
trend in the evolution of management control concepts towards rec-
ognizing a broader range of influences on the control of organiza-
tions: These trends have been opposed by auditors, who wished to 
avoid increasing their responsibilities. 
Recent discussions of internal control in accounting and 
management literature have concerned aspects of control that 
go beyond simple checking procedures. For example, Thompson 
[1967], Ouchi and Maguire [1975], Ouchi [1977, 1979, 1980, 
1981], Boland and Pondy [1983], Mintzberg [1983], and Macin-
tosh [1985] discuss complex models of control that consider 
human factors. The history of the changes in models of control 
was described by Parker [1986a, 1986b, 1986c]. A similar trend 
towards recognizing a wider view of control has also developed 
in auditing. This trend is reflected in professional auditing stan-
dards, for example, in the development of terms such as "con-
trol environment". 
This paper presents the results of a study that examines and 
compares the evolution of internal control in statements by pro-
fessional accountancy bodies in the United States, United King-
dom, Australia and New Zealand. Internal control, as embodied 
in auditing standards and other statements by professional ac-
An earlier version of part of this paper was presented at the conference of 
Accounting Association of Australia and New Zealand, Perth, Western Australia, 
in 1990. The author appreciated the direction and support given by Roger 
Juchau and the professional guidance of Dave Goodwin. 
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counting bodies, has varied from country to country, and has 
been modified at different times, but has resulted in profes-
sional statements that are all quite similar. This study looks at 
why changes in the professional promulgations concerning in-
ternal control occurred. The origin of these professional state-
ments, and the causes of changes to them are examined by re-
ferring to professional journals and other materials published at 
the time these changes took place. 
The statements about internal control by professional bod-
ies are of particular relevance now, since further changes are 
being considered, particularly in the United States. Following a 
recommendation by the Treadway Commission, the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Commission is examining 
the issue of internal control and developing new definitions 
[COSO, 1991]. It is likely that these new standards will influence 
those adopted in other English-speaking countries, as U.S. au-
diting pronouncements have previously influenced the develop-
ments in other countries. That influence is discussed later in the 
paper. 
The professional statements of the American Institute of 
Accountants and its successor, the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants, are examined in this study, because the 
accounting profession in the United States was influential in the 
evolution of internal control. The United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand are also included in this study because the 
auditing profession is well-established there. These countries 
adopted auditing statements concerning internal control later 
than in the U.S. In addition, influence of statements by the In-
ternational Auditing Practices Committee of the International 
Federation of Accountants, and the status of internal control in 
other select countries are examined briefly in this study. 
Internal control was first included in professional state-
ments in the 1920s and 1930s, but most of the developments 
have taken place in the 1950s and later. As a result, the paper 
examines the period from 1949 (when the American Institute of 
Accountants issued its definition of internal control) to 1988, 
when the 1949 definition was superseded. However, earlier 
sources are considered where appropriate. 
The research question, "how did internal control evolve?" is 
applied to auditing promulgations in each country by analyzing 
it into the following sub-points: 
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How was internal control defined in professional state-
ments? 
How did it change during the period [1949-1988]? 
What influences on the professional statements about inter-
nal control were reported? 
Information about each sub-point is examined with respect 
to the major changes in professional statements concerning in-
ternal control for each country. Used in this study are the pro-
fessional accounting journals of each country along with other 
sources, such as auditing textbooks, which have been used by 
previous studies of auditing history [e.g. Brown, 1962; Hackett 
and Mobley, 1976; Myers, 1985]. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Previous studies of the history of internal control include 
Hackett and Mobley [1976] and Bintinger [1986]. These studies 
were concerned with developments within the United States. 
They concentrated on developments following the promulgation 
of the definition set out in 1949 [AIA, 1949], and the subsequent 
"clarification of the previous definition" which divided internal 
control into accounting controls and administrative controls. 
Trends identified by previous studies of auditing history in 
general are also relevant. Dirsmith and McAllister [1982, p. 218] 
noted that changes in published auditing doctrines were fre-
quently related to action external to the profession, which in 
turn reflected changes in society's expectations concerning the 
profession. The history of auditing was depicted by Lee [1988, 
p. xxiii] as taking place against a background of constant resis-
tance by audit practitioners to expanding the auditor's duty of 
care and skill. A long-standing trend for auditors to reduce em-
phasis on fraud detection, established since the 1890s, was also 
identified by Lee [1988, p . xxvi], and Moyer [1951, p . 7]. Myers 
[1985] perceived that audit procedures developed in a pattern 
which he called "spiralling upwards". He suggested that there is 
a general trend whereby auditing procedures apparently repeat 
earlier stages of their development. This pattern does not, how-
ever, represent a simple reversal of earlier changes, since at 
each stage of the cycle a more sophisticated approach is taken. 
Changes in management theories of control have also indi-
rectly influenced the evolution of internal control. The broad 
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definition of internal control discussed below [AIA, 1949] was 
consistent with the classical model of management control that 
was then current. In 1949, the authoritative literature on man-
agement principles was largely based on "scientific manage-
ment" and the work of Fayol [1916] and Taylor [1916] (accord-
ing to Parker [1986a, p. 77]). Parker [1986a] noted that the con-
trol models of Taylor and Fayol "have little regard to the human 
dimension of control". As a reaction to scientific management 
and the classical model, the "behavioral model" developed 
[Parker, 1986a]. The recent definition of "internal control struc-
ture" appears to reflect the view that other factors (such as man-
agement philosophy) influence the control of an organization, 
in addition to management's system of authority. This is in ac-
cordance with the behavioral model of management control 
[e.g. Ouchi, 1980; Mintzberg, 1983; Macintosh, 1985]. 
THE UNITED STATES 
The United States was the first country to introduce profes-
sional guidance on internal control. Internal control started to 
become significant to auditors in the United States early in the 
twentieth century [Staub, 1904, p. 98; Vincent, 1952, p. 3; 
Brown, 1962, p . 699; Myers, 1985, p. 69]. Its importance was 
associated with American audit procedures, which were begin-
ning to develop independently from those used by the British 
profession. In particular, procedures became oriented to finan-
cial reporting rather than to fraud detection [Moyer, 1951, p. 7; 
Brown, 1962]. 
In 1936, the American Institute of Accountants defined "in-
ternal check and control" as: 
Those measures and methods adopted within the orga-
nization itself to safeguard the cash and other assets of 
the company as well as to check the clerical aspects of 
the book-keeping [AIA, 1951]. 
The statement which included this definition was a formu-
lation of what was generally accepted in 1936, and was not an 
attempt to change existing procedures, according to the expert 
witnesses in the SEC's hearings into the McKesson and Robbins 
case [Edwards, 1960, p. 165]. 
The Institute subsequently published more authoritative au-
diting standards, partly as a result of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's report into the McKesson and Robbins 
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case [AIA, 1951, p . 4; Berryman, 1960, p . 76; Hackett and 
Mobley, 1976, p. 4]. These were published as a tentative state-
ment in 1947 and "lost their tentative status" after a vote of 
Institute members in 1948. The standards included a require-
ment for a "proper study and evaluation of internal control" 
[AIA, 1947, p . 16]. 
This requirement in the standards was then supplemented 
by a definition from the AIA's Committee on Auditing Proce-
dure. The Committee's definition of internal control, (which 
stood for another 39 years) was: 
Internal control comprises the plan of organization and 
all of the co-ordinate methods and measures adopted 
within a business to safeguard its assets, check the ac-
curacy and reliability of its accounting data, promote 
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to pre-
scribed managerial policies [AIA, 1949, p. 6]. 
The 1949 definition extended internal control to include the 
objectives concerned with operational efficiency and with pre-
scribed managerial policies. It represented a concept of control 
which was considerably broader than the previous professional 
statement. 
The 1949 statement coincided with an upsurge in accoun-
tants ' interest in internal control which resulted from both eco-
nomic developments and changes in audit techniques. Previous 
studies of the history of auditing reported that internal control 
had become important as a result of failures and flaws in audit-
ing procedures which were revealed by the McKesson and 
Robbins case [Berryman, 1960; Hackett and Mobley, 1976]. A 
much wider range of other causes was indicated by a review of 
contemporary sources. Internal control was described as a 
means of assisting auditors [AIA, 1949, p. 6; Jennings, 1953, p. 
38; Bevis, 1955, p. 46]. It was recognized that the "detailed au-
dit" — a test of all transactions — was no longer cost-effective 
[Cranstoun, 1948, p. 274; Sprague, 1956, p. 55]. Reliance on 
internal control was now possible because systems of internal 
control were now generally more effective [Jennings, 1953, p. 
38] because business organizations had recently become larger 
[Jennings, 1950, p. 192] and more complex [Cobb, 1952, p. 341]. 
Bevis [1955, p. 46] attributed the increased concern with inter-
nal control to the change in the objective of auditing from de-
tection of fraud and error to reporting on the overall reliability 
of the financial statements. World War II was also an influence, 
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since it led to a shortage of audit personnel to do detailed test-
ing [AIA, 1942, p. 119]. 
The internal control definition published in 1949 was criti-
cized later by Byrne [1957] and Levy [1957] who suggested that 
it caused misunderstanding about the extent of auditor respon-
sibility and that it could increase the legal liability of auditors. 
Grady [1957], (chairman of the Committee on Auditing Proce-
dure when the statement Internal Control was published in 
1949), responded in support of the definition. In 1958, the defi-
nition was narrowed; another statement divided internal control 
into two parts: accounting controls and administrative controls. 
The Committee on Auditing Procedure went on to state that an 
auditor is primarily concerned with accounting controls, "be-
cause they bear directly on the reliability of the financial data," 
[AICPA, 1958, p. 67]. The objectives that had been added in 
1949 to the early definition ("to promote operational efficiency" 
and "to encourage adherence to prescribed managerial poli-
cies") were reclassified as administrative controls, which were 
not seen as part of an auditor's primary responsibility. 
The "clarification" was a reaction to the new, broad defini-
tion published in 1949. When AIA members had adopted audit-
ing standards in 1948, and included a requirement for a "proper 
study and evaluation of internal control," internal control was 
narrowly defined. When the later broad definition was added in 
1949, the standard resulted in an expansion of auditors' duties. 
The 1958 clarification restored the status quo. It also appears 
that evaluation of internal control in accordance with the broad 
definition had not been applied in practice (according to a sur-
vey of auditing firms [Vincent, 1952]). 
The definition was modified again in 1973. The AICPA re-
vised the distinction between accounting control and adminis-
trative control (singular, not "controls" as in the earlier version). 
One objective of internal control, the "safeguarding of assets," 
was narrowed to "the procedures and records that are con-
cerned with safeguarding assets". Mautz and Winjum [1981, pp. 
9-11] suggested that the AICPA's main intention was to reduce 
further the scope of internal control. Other authorities empha-
sized the new definition's broadening effects. Loebbecke [1975, 
p. 83] suggested that all controls need to be examined to deter-
mine whether they have an impact on the financial statements. 
In 1977, a requirement for corporations to comply with the 
AICPA's [1973] definition of internal accounting control was 
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passed into law. There had been a public outcry over findings 
(first identified by the Watergate special prosecutor's office) that 
more than 400 companies had made questionable or illegal pay-
ments totalling more than $300 million. The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was intended to use accepted accounting terminol-
ogy in a requirement that would prevent "off-the-books slush 
funds and bribes" [SEC, 1979, p. 610]. 
This development was followed by a report, from an advi-
sory committee of the AICPA, which revived the broader con-
cept of internal control. The report of the Special Advisory Com-
mittee on Internal Accounting Control used the term "internal 
accounting control environment" [AICPA, 1979, p. 2]. This in-
cluded factors such as organizational structure and leadership 
from top management, both believed to lead to appropriate 
"control consciousness" [AICPA, 1979, p. 2, Cook and Kelley 
1979, p . 62]. 
The 1980s led to further changes in the AICPA's require-
ments for internal control evaluation, including explicit broad-
ening of the definition of internal control. The changes were, 
again, partly due to public concern about auditing standards. 
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
(Treadway Commission) was set up in 1985 by the AICPA and 
other accounting organizations. The Commission commented 
that some instances of fraudulent financial reporting involved 
transactions "under management's direct control and not part 
of the system of internal accounting controls" [National Com-
mission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, pp. 29-30]. 
In 1988, the AICPA replaced the definition of internal con-
trol with a new, broader description of "internal control struc-
ture." This was defined (in Statement on Auditing Standards 55) 
as "the policies and procedures established to provide reason-
able assurance that specific entity objectives will be achieved." 
[AICPA, 1988, p . 4]. 
The statement also changed the generally accepted auditing 
standard concerning internal control. The previous requirement 
for "a proper study and evaluation" of internal control was re-
placed with "a sufficient understanding of the internal control 
structure" [AICPA, 1988, p. 3]. 
The change from using the expression "a proper study and 
evaluation" to "a sufficient understanding" was not intended to 
imply that a reduced scope was now required. The rationale for 
the changes was explained by AICPA office-holders as "to 
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broaden the auditor's responsibility to consider internal control 
when planning" [Guy and Sullivan, 1988, p. 38], and as "ex-
panding the auditor's responsibility for determining how inter-
nal control works" [Temkin and Winters, 1988, p. 86]. 
Developments are still taking place. The accounting institu-
tions which sponsored the Treadway report recently issued a 
draft report that provides "integrated guidance" on internal con-
trol [Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, 1991; Journal of 
Accountancy 1991]. 
To summarize, the United States was the first country in 
which the audit profession developed a definition of internal 
control and a standard regarding auditors' examination of it. 
Developments in the United States were distinctive because 
more statements concerned with internal control were issued, 
and there were more changes of approach. Initially, in 1936, a 
narrow definition of internal control, consistent with existing 
practice, was adopted. It was replaced by a broad definition, in 
1949, that was more consistent with a management definition of 
"control". After resistance by the profession, the scope of inter-
nal control as it concerned auditors was narrowed again in 
1958. A revision in 1973 is regarded somewhat equivocally. 
More recent pronouncements, including the changes to the au-
diting standards in 1988 and the continuing work of the Com-
mittee of Sponsoring Organizations, are seen by AICPA officials 
as broadening the definition of internal control once more. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Auditing procedures evolved differently in the United King-
dom from the developments in the United States. Under the 
companies legislation in the United Kingdom, auditors did not 
report on the profit and loss account until 1948 [Chastney, 
1975, p . 12; Briston and Perks, 1977, p. 59]. As a result, there 
appears to have been less concern with internal control [Lee, 
1988, p . xix]. 
References to internal control in British professional jour-
nals were relatively infrequent before the 1960s, and were not 
based on binding professional standards. Lawson [1951] and 
Taylor [1954], however, indicated that some British auditors did 
rely on internal control. In 1953, the Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published a state-
ment discussing internal audit, which included references to in-
ternal control and internal check [ICAEW, 1953]. It included a 
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broad definition of internal control, which was later developed 
further by the British profession: 
Internal control is best regarded as including the whole 
system of controls, financial and otherwise, established 
by the management in the conduct of the business, in-
cluding internal audit, internal check and other forms 
of control. 
Although the terminology used was different from the AIA 
[1949] definition, it was a broad definition with a similar mean-
ing. There was still no binding audit standard requiring audit 
examination of internal control. 
In 1961, the ICAEW issued a more general Statement on 
Auditing [ICAEW, 1961]. This statement was issued "for guid-
ance" and did not claim to be an authoritative auditing stan-
dard. The statement recommended that auditors "make a criti-
cal review of the system of book-keeping, accounting and inter-
nal control." The definition of internal control appeared to be a 
combination of the previous ICAEW definition and the Ameri-
can Institute's [ 1949] definition: 
By "internal control" is meant not only internal check 
and internal audit but the whole system of controls, 
financial and otherwise, established by the manage-
ment in order to carry on the business of the company 
in an orderly manner, safeguard its assets and secure as 
far as possible the accuracy and reliability of its records 
[ICAEW, 1961, p. 242]. 
Internal control was an innovation for some British audi-
tors. Waldron [1961, p. 718] suggested that some practitioners 
"may be regretfully shaking their heads" because the statement's 
advice on audit procedures was not appropriate for them. 
In 1964, the ICAEW issued a further Statement on Auditing 
[ICAEW, 1965] which dealt specifically with internal control. It 
repeated the earlier [ICAEW, 1961] definition of internal con-
trol. The statement was described as primarily concerned with 
financial and accounting control: 
That is, those matters which relate to the custody and 
control of the company's assets and the recording of its 
transactions [ICAEW, 1965, p. 234]. 
This concept of control approximated that covered by "ac-
counting controls" in the AICPA's [1958] clarification of the 
definition. 
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The subsequent adoption of auditing standards in the UK 
was preceded by public concern about auditing procedures. In 
1976 and 1977, there was severe criticism of auditors and audit 
procedures in news reports and Parliamentary proceedings, fol-
lowing company failures such as the collapse of London and 
County Securities Limited in 1976 [Hay Davison, 1977, p. 84; 
Briston and Perks, 1977, p. 59]. As Hay Davison put it, the UK 
was "the last among the great accounting countries of the world 
to introduce auditing standards." [Hay Davison, 1977, p. 91]. (A 
par tner in a major audit firm advised Stamp and Moonitz 
[1978, p . 67] that the international accounting firms already 
sought to follow the auditing standards of the AICPA.) 
Subsequently, the Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies (CCAB) published a set of auditing standards, after ex-
tensive consultation [The Accountant, 1980, p. 592]. The CCAB 
included the three Institutes of Chartered Accountants in En-
gland and Wales, Scotland and Ireland, together with other bod-
ies such as the Association of Certified Accountants. 
The draft of the standard included a requirement for the 
auditor to "ascertain, evaluate and test the operation of any 
internal control on which he wishes to place reliance". Accord-
ing to Woolf [1980, p. 63], this paragraph caused problems for 
practicing auditors. He suggested that its tone and position in 
the standards indicated to auditors that internal control was 
being given more emphasis than audit evidence, and that "sys-
tems-based auditing" was to be a requirement. After submis-
sions by audi t pract i t ioners , the s tandards were modified 
slightly to imply a less demanding requirement: 
If the auditor wishes to place any reliance on internal 
controls, he should ascertain and evaluate those con-
trols and perform compliance tests on their operation 
[CCAB, 1980, p . 3.101]. 
Detailed auditing guidelines were published at the same 
time as the auditing standards. The guidelines included a defini-
tion of an internal control system and internal controls: 
An internal control system is defined as being the 
whole system of controls, financial and otherwise, es-
tablished by the management in order to carry on the 
business of the enterprise in an orderly and efficient 
manner , ensure adherence to management policies, 
safeguard the assets and secure as far as possible the 
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completeness and accuracy of the records [CCAB, 1980, 
p. 3.204]. 
This definition was similar to the ICAEW's 1961 definition. 
It was no longer considered necessary to include a reference to 
"internal check and internal audit" being included as part of 
internal control. The remaining objective, efficiency, was added 
after being used in the American standard [AIA, 1949]. 
Although the United Kingdom developed its own definition 
of in ternal control, this became increasingly close to the 
AICPA's 1949 definition. Auditing standards were not adopted 
until later than in the other three countries. When standards 
were adopted, the standard concerned with internal control was 
modified after the original proposal was criticized. The new re-
quirement implied that less emphasis on evaluation of internal 
control was required. This change appears to have allowed the 
British profession to avoid the pressure to narrow the definition 
of internal control that was present in the United States. 
AUSTRALIA 
Australia was the second of the four countries to issue a 
professional promulgation requiring evaluation of internal con-
trol. However, the recommendation was, according to its au-
thor, based on practice in the United Kingdom, not on the 
American auditing promulgations; yet, it did not follow any 
British professional statement, and was to some extent at least 
an indigenous development. Australia subsequently turned to 
following the United States as its model. 
The Australian Institute's first recommendation on auditing 
practice was issued in 1951, and revised in 1954 and 1969 
[Robertson, 1974, p. 4]. Gibson and Arnold [1981, pp. 53-60] 
reported that professional auditing statements in Australia were 
initially influenced by one person, Mr. F. E. Trigg (a partner in 
Price Waterhouse). In 1942, the Institute of Chartered Accoun-
tants in Australia asked him to prepare a paper including rec-
ommendations on auditing standards and practices. The recom-
mendations in Trigg's paper eventually were adopted as stan-
dards by the Institute [ICAA, 1951]. The recommendation was 
based on Trigg's understanding of English auditing procedures 
(which had not yet been documented by the British professional 
accountancy bodies). Trigg advised Gibson and Arnold [1981] 
that the recommendation was "in no way" influenced by Ameri-
can auditing. 
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The recommendation, published in 1951, required that "ap-
praisal of the soundness of the accounting methods employed 
and the effectiveness of the system of internal control" was an 
essential duty, "which the auditor cannot escape" [ICAA, 1951, 
p. 10]. No definition of internal control was provided; a narrow 
approach was implied by references to internal control as the 
"internal checking system." In addition, the purpose of internal 
control was described as detecting fraud. 
In 1954, a revised "Statement on General Professional Au-
diting Practice" was published [ICAA, 1954]. The requirements 
concerned with internal control contained minor changes. The 
statement now required that appraisal of internal control was 
"essential to enable the auditor effectively to plan his work" 
[ICAA, 1954, p. 10]. The reference to "the internal checking sys-
tem" was replaced by "the system of internal control" [ICAA, 
1954, p. 10], and there was still no definition of internal control. 
At that time, the broader concept of internal control was 
not shared by managers and practicing accountants. A study 
conducted in 1953 [Savage, 1955, p. 363-4] found that Austra-
lian managers and accountants held a narrow view of internal 
control. They associated it with checking of records, not with 
the AIA's broad definition. The narrow view was consistent with 
the ICAA's statements. 
In 1969, a statement with only minor changes, again pre-
pared by Trigg, was published [ICAA, 1969]. It was soon re-
placed, in 1974, by a completely new set of standards, this time 
based on the AICPA's statements. Gibson and Arnold [1981] ex-
plained that this change from following a British to an Ameri-
can model was due to changes in trade and investment. The 
United States had become a more important influence on the 
Australian economy. In addition, existing standards of audit 
practice had been criticized by the judge in the Pacific Accep-
tance case in 1969 [Chartered Accountant in Australia, 1974; 
Robertson, 1974, p. 4]. Kenley [1975], however, described the 
Australian statement as promulgating standards that already ex-
isted but which had not been codified. 
The standards included a requirement for auditors to evalu-
ate internal control: 
An auditor must systematically evaluate the nature of 
the client's business and system of internal control to 
determine the nature, scope and timing of audit proce-
dures to be used [ICAA, 1974, p. 5]. 
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The statement also made a distinction between accounting 
controls and administrat ive controls, quoting the AICPA's 
[1973] SAP 54. 
The Australian Auditing Standards Committee, a joint body 
supported by the Australian Society of Accountants as well as 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, reviewed 
auditing standards again. This was done to satisfy the judge's 
comments in the Pacific Acceptance case [Gibson and Arnold, 
1981, p. 60], and because the public had higher, and increasing, 
expectations of auditors [Kenley, 1977, p. 35]. The new stan-
dards [ICAA/ASA, 1977] again included a standard requiring 
evaluation of internal control. 
Subsequently, new standards were adopted based on inter-
national guidelines. Australian Auditing Standards now require 
that: 
Auditors shall gain an understanding of the accounting 
system and related internal controls and shall study 
and evaluate the operation of those internal controls 
upon which they wish to rely in determining the na-
ture, timing and extent of other audit procedures [Au-
dit ing Standards Board/Australian Accounting Re-
search Foundation, 1983, p. 2012]. 
This standard resembles previous Australian statements in 
its requirement that auditors must examine internal control; its 
restriction to "the accounting system and related internal con-
trols" provided a limitation to this requirement. 
NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand, like Australia, based its internal control pro-
mulgations on oversea models. Again, the British profession 
was initially the source of the professional pronouncements; 
subsequently, United States promulgations were drawn on. The 
influence from the United Kingdom was more direct than it had 
been in Australia. Instead of describing English practice, 
ICAEW statements were adapted. Later, AICPA auditing stan-
dards served as the model in New Zealand. 
Evaluation of internal control and reliance on it, together 
with a number of other modern developments in auditing prac-
tice, were recommended to New Zealand auditors at the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants convention by Chapman [1950]. 
Comments from New Zealand auditors recorded with his pub-
lished paper indicated that, at that time, some auditors did not 
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accept that reliance on internal control would be feasible in the 
smaller businesses found in New Zealand. Subsequent refer-
ences to evaluation of internal control as a recommendation for 
aud i to r s became increasingly frequent in the 1950s [e.g. 
Perkins, 1950; Dixon, 1950; Parry, 1952; NZSA, 1953; Stewart, 
1954; Perkins, 1956; McCaw, 1958; Gilkison, 1959]. 
New Zealand auditing in the 1950s and 1960s followed the 
approach that had been taken in the United Kingdom, both in 
the statutory requirements for auditing, and professional rec-
ommendations. A requirement to audit the profit and loss ac-
count was not introduced until the Companies Act 1955 (mod-
elled on the 1948 British Act) [Gilkison, 1962]. In 1962, the 
ICAEW [1961] Statement on Auditing was reprinted in the Ac-
countants' Journal, and this was followed by the publication of a 
New Zealand Society of Accountants "Tentative Statement on 
Auditing Practice" [NZSA, 1964]. The statement, "General Prin-
ciples of Auditing", was based on the previous English state-
ment, and included an identical definition of internal control. 
In the 1960s, internal control seemed to be accepted by 
some New Zealand auditors [e.g. Gilkison, 1962]. However, 
Martin [1963, p. 218] noted that internal control questionnaires, 
and other methods of documenting controls, were not yet 
widely used in New Zealand. Titter [1967a, p. 311] identified a 
need for auditing standards to be codified because there was an 
inconsistent pat tern of auditing procedures. He also asked 
"How many auditors today do not make an annual systematic 
review and evaluation of internal control?" [Titter, 1967b, p. 
350]. Titter implied that there were still many auditors who did 
not conduct these procedures. 
Subsequently, New Zealand auditing was influenced by its 
American counterpart . Auditing Standards were adopted in 
1973 [New Zealand Society of Accountants, 1973]; upon issuing 
the standards, the Society expressed appreciation to the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants for assistance that 
had been provided by SAP 33 (a codification of AICPA State-
ments on Auditing Procedure). New Zealand Auditing Standards 
required that: 
There must be a proper study and evaluation of the 
existing internal control procedures as a basis for deter-
mining the extent of tests to which auditing procedures 
are to be restricted [NZSA, 1973, p . 354]. 
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This standard was a shortened version of the AIA [1947] 
standard used in the United States. The standard [NZSA, 1973, 
p. 356] also included a definition which was identical with the 
American definition adopted in 1949 [AIA, 1949]. The distinc-
tion between "accounting controls" and "administrative con-
trols" that had been added to the U.S. definition in 1958 
[AICPA, 1958] was not included in the New Zealand standard. 
In 1974, the Society issued a Tentative Recommendation on 
Auditing Practice dealing specifically with internal control. The 
recommendation [NZSA, 1974] acknowledged American, Cana-
dian and British statements, but it included terms not included 
in the professional promulgations of the other countries dis-
cussed previously. For example, it distinguished between two 
levels of internal control. "First level" controls included authori-
zation and personnel quality; "second level" controls included 
the plan of organization and managerial supervision. These in-
novations never made it into the final pronouncement by the 
Society. Statement RAP-7, Internal Control and the Nature and 
Extent of Audit Tests was issued in December 1977 [NZSA, 
1977]. The new recommendation was, again, based closely on 
an overseas auditing statement: it repeated the American [AIA, 
1949] definition of internal control. 
Another set of New Zealand auditing standards was intro-
duced as an exposure draft in 1984, and adopted in 1986. The 
requirement concerning internal control [NZSA, 1986a, p. 22] 
was drawn from International Auditing Guideline No. 3 [IAPC, 
1980]. No definition of internal control was included in the 
Standard, and concurrently the Society withdrew the previous 
statement [NZSA, 1977], which had contained a definition. A 
commentary [NZSA, 1986b] advised that a new guideline to re-
place the material on the nature of internal control in general 
would be issued. This guideline has not yet been issued, and the 
definition included in International Auditing Guideline No. 6 has 
not yet been adopted by the NZSA either. 
The New Zealand profession appears to have developed its 
auditing standards (including its requirement regarding internal 
control) out of a desire to ensure consistency with auditors else-
where in the world. Chapman [1950] suggested that New 
Zealand auditors should follow generally accepted auditing 
standards based on overseas standards. Martin [1963] com-
mented that speedier communications and the spread of inter-
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national groups of companies had caused an awareness among 
New Zealand auditors that the New Zealand standards for au-
diting must be equal those of the United States, Great Britain 
and Australia. 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
Although the four countries selected have had variations in 
their auditing histories, they have a common language and 
somewhat similar accounting professions. What of other coun-
tries? Information from other countries does not indicate that 
the evolution of internal control has been substantially differ-
ent. In non English-speaking countries, the AICPA (and later the 
IAPC) has been the predominant influence on the development 
of auditing standards and other professional pronouncements 
[Stamp and Moonitz, 1978; Creamer, 1987]. In Canada, the re-
maining country with a large and influential auditing profes-
sion, the professional body's auditing statements are similar to 
those in the countries examined above [CICA, 1979, p. 5200.05; 
Etherington and Gordon, 1985]. 
According to Stamp and Moonitz [1978], the international 
accounting firms were also influential in encouraging the use of 
AICPA s tandards in other countr ies . They noted that the 
AICPA's statements (or a literal translation of them) were in use 
in Brazil as well as most other Latin American countries, and in 
Israel and the Philippines; in addition, the international ac-
counting firms in Japan practiced in accordance with U.S. stan-
dards [Stamp and Moonitz, 1978, p. 110]. 
International Auditing Guidelines were introduced in 1979, 
after Stamp and Moonitz [1978, p. 145] had previously recom-
mended the adoption of a set of international auditing stan-
dards under the auspices of the International Federation of Ac-
countants (IFAC). IFAC announced that the guidelines were to 
be promulgated by the International Auditing Practices Com-
mittee. The statement concerned with internal control, Interna-
tional Auditing Guideline No. 3, Basic Principles Governing an 
Audit [IAPC, 1980], included similar material to the AICPA's 
auditing standards. As discussed above, it has directly influ-
enced audi t ing statements in Australia and New Zealand. 
Creamer [1987, p. 92] reported that International Auditing 
Guidelines had now been adopted by most other countries. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This analysis showed that, during the period 1947 to 1980, 
auditing standards were established in each of the four coun-
tries selected; and, in each case, a standard concerning internal 
control was included. Definitions of internal control were pub-
lished before and after the relevant standards. The evolution of 
internal control followed a distinctive pattern in each country; 
but there were also extensive similarities. 
Similarities among the four countries included develop-
ments in the evolution of internal control that were preceded by 
public criticism of existing auditing procedures, resistance by 
the members of the profession to expansion of their duties con-
cerned with internal control, and the increasing similarity of the 
definitions. These similarities are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The first similarity was the association between public criti-
cism and change. The adoption of a standard concerning the 
examination of internal control, or a change in its definition, 
was frequently preceded by public criticism of auditing proce-
dures. Developments in standards and definitions concerned 
with internal control often took place after there had been pub-
lic criticism of audit procedures and concern about corporate 
management. This was the case in the United States in 1949 and 
1988, the United Kingdom in 1980 and Australia in 1974. The 
pattern was consistent with other studies of auditing history, 
including Dirsmith and McAllister [1982] and Lee [1988]. 
Second, in three of the countries, the breadth of the defini-
tion was important. The profession appears to have resisted ex-
panding its duties. Whether internal control should be defined 
narrowly or broadly was an important issue when changes to 
the American definition took place in 1949, 1957 and 1988. A 
broad definition was promulgated in 1949; this was narrowed in 
1957 as a result of concern about increased liability for practi-
tioners. Subsequently, a broad definition was introduced in 
1988 as one of a number of measures to make auditing more 
effective. The issue of broad or narrow internal control has been 
dealt with in different ways outside the United States. Practitio-
ners in the United Kingdom ensured that they adopted auditing 
standards which avoided implying a requirement for auditors to 
examine internal control [Woolf, 1980, p. 62]. Thus, a broad 
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definition of internal control was not a problem for them. Aus-
tralian auditing statements since 1951 suggested that evaluation 
was necessary, yet the statements did not have the status of 
auditing standards, and internal control was not defined. Later, 
when an auditing standard requiring internal control evaluation 
was introduced, this requirement was moderated by adding the 
AICPA's narrow definition. This issue does not appear to have 
been important in New Zealand. 
This recurring issue indicates that a strict requirement to 
evaluate internal control, together with a broad definition of 
internal control, is associated with resistance by auditors. This 
can be addressed either by narrowing the definition (as was 
done in the United States and later in Australia) or by reducing 
the emphasis of the auditing standard concerned with evalua-
tion (as in the United Kingdom, and in Australia during the 
early period of professional guidance on auditing). 
The third similarity is in the terminology used. Standards 
and definitions in each of the countries resemble each other. 
The similarities have increased over the period examined. This 
is partly because professional bodies used statements that apply 
in other countries as precedents. Because the AICPA was the 
first organization to establish auditing standards, the U.S. pro-
fession has been the most influential. While the accounting pro-
fessions in each of the three other countries all developed at 
least one statement that was indigenous, the AICPA's pro-
nouncements have become increasingly dominant. American in-
fluence on the economies of other countries and the spread of 
the international audit firms have also been cited as reasons for 
this trend. 
The frequent changes to the definition of internal control, 
and to auditing standards concerned with it, reflect the presence 
of conflicting pressures. On the one hand, the definition of 
"control" in other literature is a broad one, and becoming in-
creasingly so. In addition, when auditing procedures are criti-
cized due to apparent faults, then changes that broaden the 
definition of internal control frequently take place. On the other 
hand, auditors are concerned to minimize the extent of their 
duties, and of their liability. As a result, they favor a narrow 
definition. 
The changes in internal control also reflect the changing 
emphasis of auditing, away from the objective of detecting 
fraud. The AIA's 1936 definition described "internal check and 
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control" as concerned first with safeguarding cash and other 
assets. Since then, the changes in the definitions of internal 
control, (including the recent AICPA statement [1988]) have 
continually reduced the emphasis given to safeguarding assets, 
and indicated that the auditor's prime concern is the reliability 
of the data used to prepare the financial statements. 
The evolution of internal control was consistent with the 
models of auditing history presented by Dirsmith and McAllister 
[1982] and Lee [1988]. External events (such as economic devel-
opments and the McKesson and Robbins case in the U.S., and 
other cases involving auditors in the UK and Australia) pre-
ceded the adoption of auditing standards requiring examination 
of internal control. Internal pressures (partly in response to an 
external influence, the increasing legal liability of auditors) were 
responded to by a narrowing of the definition in the U.S., and 
by a rephrasing of the proposed standard for evaluation of inter-
nal control in the UK. Subsequently, further external events in 
the U.S. (such as scandals about corrupt practices by corpora-
tions) led to a broader definition of internal control. 
Earlier in this paper, the research question was identified 
as "how did internal control evolve?" This question was then 
analyzed into three sub-questions, each of which has been dis-
cussed above. In brief, the definition of internal control has 
become broader and closer to a definition of management con-
trol in all the countries examined. This change has been in re-
sponse to external pressures, sometimes with resistance from 
auditors. 
In general, the evolution of internal control demonstrates 
the influence of a number of trends in auditing history. These 
include the internationalization of auditing, and the extent to 
which developments in the United States have become impor-
tant; the pressure from external sources for the area of auditors' 
responsibility to be increased; and the resistance by auditors to 
such an increase in their duties. The general trend in each of the 
four countries has been towards a "broader" view of internal 
control, a trend consistent with other control literature. 
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David Solomons has brought a kind of sanity to the ac-
counting literature and to policy deliberations. 
While always faithful to his principles, which he expounds 
with admirable clarity and persuasiveness, he has consistently 
had regard for their operational feasibility. 
The historical evolution of ideas, policies and practices has 
always occupied an important place in David's writings. More-
over, few authors can match the ease with which he draws out 
the essence of ideas and experiences from different national cul-
tures. 
He is a master craftsman of the English language, with a 
penchant for argument by metaphor. "Accounting is financial 
map-making" has been his metaphor of choice. 
David provides the reader with a broad perspective for 
whatever he is discussing, and the reader is invited to follow his 
inexorable logic in full knowledge of all that he considers rel-
evant to the debate. In his writings, he is, above all, a scholar 
and a teacher. Even if one does not accept his conclusions and 
recommendations, he/she nonetheless acquires a precious in-
sight into the issues, the arguments, and the forces driving the 
controversy. There is always wisdom in what David writes. 
David's academic career has been at three universities: the 
London School of Economics (LSE), from 1946 to 1955; the 
University of Bristol, from 1955 to 1959; and the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania from 1959 to his retire-
ment in 1983. 
His earliest work dealt with management accounting, ac-
counting theory, and accounting education. He was much influ-
112
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/9
104 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993 
enced by Ronald S. Edwards, a LSE industrial economist who 
had a large interest in accounting. In the late 1930s, Edwards 
had written a series of memorable articles in The Accountant, in 
which he dealt with costing history and, in a 13-part article 
written in 1938, produced perhaps the first treatise on asset 
valuation and income determination in the British literature, in 
which he defended the increased-net-worth concept of income, 
taking into account Bonbright's notion of "value to the owner." 
David has called Edwards "one of my principal mentors during 
my LSE period." 
David's first major article, in 1953, was a pioneering essay 
on costing history, and during the 1950s he revised Sidney 
Alexander's famous tract, "Income Measurement in a Dynamic 
Economy," which, like Edwards's work, was an argument for 
the increased-net-worth concept of income. However, David's 
pivotal works, in my view, came after his move to the U.S. in 
1959. 
In 1961, David concluded, ruefully, that it was not opera-
tionally feasible to isolate changes in expectations from 
Alexander's "economic income," thus rendering it of little use as 
a satisfactory measure of enterprise performance. He thereupon 
issued his famous prediction that "so far as the history of ac-
counting is concerned, the next twenty-five years may subse-
quently be seen to have been the twilight of income measure-
ment." Twenty-five years later, he acknowledged that his predic-
tion had not been fulfilled, and that perhaps his forte was not as 
a seer, In 1966, he published a major paper on Bonbright's 
"value to the owner" formulation for valuing property, and gave 
it impetus in the debates over current value accounting by re-
stating it in an inequality notation. David's paper, which was 
published in the second edition of Morton Backer's Modern Ac-
counting Theory, directly or indirectly influenced the Sandilands 
Committee, the FASB, and the standard-setting bodies in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, all of which, in one form or another, 
embraced "value to the owner" (also known as "value to the 
business" or "deprival value") in their dicta on current cost ac-
counting issued during the 1970s. 
In 1965, at the request of the Financial Executives Research 
Foundation, David wrote his first book, Divisional Performance: 
Measurement and Control, in which he reported on a survey of 
25 major companies and presented his own recommendations 
on how best to evaluate and control decentralized operations. It 
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was a path-breaking study, and it earned him the AICPA's No-
table Contribution to Accounting Literature Award. 
On accounting education, David argued in his inaugural ad-
dress at the University of Bristol, in 1955, that all entrants into 
the accounting profession should be required to take three years 
of university study in accounting, economics and law—a radical 
view in an era when most entrants came straight into the pro-
fession from high school, and took evening courses in corre-
spondence schools! He has always championed a large role for 
universities in the preparation of entrants into the profession. 
When, in 1961, the Parker Committee on Education and Train-
ing reported to the English Institute that the status quo, with 
only minor changes, should be preserved in preparing prospec-
tive Chartered Accountants, he wrote a scathing criticism of the 
report in the Institute's journal, which the late Eddie Stamp has 
called "one of the most critical [articles] ever to appear in the 
literature of the British profession". 
However, in the 1970s, David emerged from the academic 
literature to become an architect of change. In the waning days 
of the Accounting Principles Board, during the fractious debate 
over business combinations and intangibles, AAA President Don 
Edwards invited David to chair a blue-ribbon committee to rec-
ommend whether a change in the standard-setting system was 
needed, and if so, how to go about it. The very existence of such 
a committee caused consternation within the AICPA, which saw 
itself as the sole guardian of accounting principles, and once 
David's committee had reported, Don was asked to nominate an 
AAA representative on the newly formed Wheat Study, which 
had been charged by the Institute to conduct a full-scale enquiry 
into standard setting. Don nominated David, and David eventu-
ally became an influential member of the Wheat Study and, in 
fact, was given the task of writing the first draft of its report. As 
we know, that report led to the establishment of the FASB. 
Then, in 1978, he was a consultant to the special Institute com-
mittee looking into a restructuring of the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee, which led to the formation of the Audit-
ing Standards Board. 
As is well known, David was the principal draftsman of the 
FASB's Concepts Statement No. 2 on qualitative characteristics, 
which was adopted or adapted by standard setters in Canada 
(both the CICA and the CGA), the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand in the formulation of their own conceptual frame-
works. 
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In 1986, David wrote his valedictory on standard setting 
and the conceptual framework, a 261-page book entitled Making 
Accounting Policy: The Quest for Credibility in Financial Report-
ing, which is a model of thoroughness, careful scholarship, and 
persuasive writing in a field that has been marked by intemper-
ate advocacy and bombast. He argued in favor of Current Cost 
Constant Purchasing Power Accounting with financial capital 
maintenance. Finally, in 1989, at the request of the Research 
Board of the English Institute, he drafted a concise conceptual 
framework for consideration by the UK's Accounting Standards 
Committee. 
In accounting education, David was invited by the six ac-
countancy bodies in the British Isles to do a major long-range 
study of accounting education and training, which he com-
pleted in 1974. That some of its far-reaching recommendations 
are only now seeming to find favor in the UK has given "long-
range" a new meaning. In the 1970s and 1980s, he also advised 
the Canadians on their Uniform Final Examination for account-
ing entrants. 
In sum, David has left a large and salutary mark on the 
literature, but he has been equally active as a highly sought-
after consultant to policy makers. Few academics can be said to 
have played both roles so well. 
115
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1993, Vol. 20, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1993
1992 Accounting Hall of Fame Induction 107 
INDUCTION CITATION 
by 
Thomas J. Burns 
Professor and Chairman, 
Committee on Accounting Hall of Fame, 
College of Business, The Ohio State University 
An exemplary model of a global professor, he has published 
and taught in numerous countries, and has former students ev-
erywhere. His research and writing have had a major impact on 
the profession in several countries. Truly one of a kind, he is an 
international professor of accounting. 
His career can be dichotomized into two stages, one En-
glish and the other American. Born to a man who ran a London 
pub, he was one of four children in a family that never was 
poor, perhaps because his father was something of an entrepre-
neur—later running a bus company and still later a dirt track 
(for motorcycle races). The son attended a boy's school, Hack-
ney Downs, for eight years, and at age 16 he received advanced 
placement at the London School of Economics. Taking an op-
tional extra year, he received a University degree, the only one 
of his family to do so. Following graduation, he was articled to a 
Dickensian firm (to which his father paid a fee of three hundred 
guineas) in order to become a Chartered Accountant, a three 
year ordeal which he barely survived. 
He became a CA (1936) and practiced in a firm until the 
War started (1939). He immediately enlisted in the Royal Army 
Service Corps as a private, and was commissioned the following 
year. He served in the North Africa campaign. At the fall of 
Tobruk (in June 1942), he was taken prisoner together with 
30,000 other Allied soldiers, and was interned first in Italy and 
then in Germany. To relieve the monotony of camp, he began to 
teach accounting and economics to his fellow prisoners. Finally 
liberated (1945), he left the Army as a Captain and returned to 
his London firm, and the following year he became a part-time 
lecturer at his alma mater, the London School of Economics 
(where he subsequently earned his doctorate). Thanks to his 
experience during almost three years as a POW, he had become 
an academic. At the London School, he was assigned to assist 
the only full-time accounting faculty member, who suddenly 
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took ill and died at the beginning of the fall term,1 leaving his 
assistant as the only accounting teacher at the school for the 
rest of his first year (1946-47). (In 1946, there were no full-time 
professors in accounting in all of the British Isles). In 1949, he 
was promoted to reader, two years after W. T. Baxter was ap-
pointed professor of accounting at the LSE. In 1955, he left to 
become the inaugural professor of accounting at the University 
of Bristol, becoming the third full-time accounting professor in 
all of Britain.2 
Love conquered him at the first dance he attended. In six 
weeks he was engaged, and he was married six weeks later. 
Now, nearly fifty years later, he and his wife, Miriam, still like 
to dance. They have a son and daughter and three grandchil-
dren. Fond of Mozart, opera, theatre and films, he once rowed 
for the Thames Rowing Club, but never at Henley. His favorite 
quotation is from a comedian, Sam Levenson, a one-time high 
school teacher. "It was on my fifth birthday," Levenson said, 
"that my father put his hand on my shoulder and said, 'Remem-
ber, my son, if you ever need a helping hand, you'll find one at 
the end of your arm.' " 
He is the only professor ever to have headed the two leading 
academic accounting organizations on both sides of the Atlan-
tic, the one in the U.K. and the one in the U.S. He served as 
chairman of the Association of University Teachers of Account-
ing between 1955 and 1958, the forerunner of the British Ac-
counting Association. He crossed the Atlantic in 1959 to accept 
a professorship at the Wharton School, and he was designated 
as the Arthur Young Professor in 1974. He became an American 
citizen in 1976, and the next year he served as president of The 
American Accounting Association.3 
A frequent author of professional books and articles, he is 
widely known for his classic Divisional Performance: Measure-
ment and Control.4 He also was the principal draftsman of the 
Wheat Report which proposed the establishment of the Finan-
1Stanley Rowlands was a partner and F.C.A. with Sellars, Dicksee & Co. 
who died in 1946. For many years, a lecturer in accounting at the London 
School, he was the author or editor of ten textbooks. 
2Donald Cousins at Birmingham was the second. 
3He had been Director of Research for the AAA in 1968-70. He was presi-
dent in 1977-78. He was also the AUTA's secretary from its inception in 1947 
until 1950. 
4He received the AICPA's Notable Contribution to the Accounting Literature 
Award for this book in 1969. 
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cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and of the FASB's 
Concepts Statement No. 2 on the qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information. 
He has been a consultant to the FASB, the SEC, the IASC, 
the CICA, the AICPA, numerous companies and the accoun-
tancy bodies in the U.K.5 His visiting university appointments 
have been extensive (fourteen in ten countries).6 He holds two 
honorary doctorates, the AAA chose him as an Outstanding Ac-
counting Educator (1980), and the Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants in England and Wales gave him its International 
Award (1989). 
A world leader of accounting research and education, he is 
the 52nd Accounting Hall of Fame inductee, DAVID 
SOLOMONS. 
5In the UK, he directed the "Long Range Enquiry into Education and Train-
ing for the Accountancy Profession" in 1972-74. 
6Including service as the Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Visitor in Singapore 
in 1986. 
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Ernst & Young Professor Emeritus 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
1992 Accounting Hall of Fame Inductee 
As those who have preceded me into the Accounting Hall of 
Fame in recent years will know, one's first intimation of the 
conferment of this high honor comes in the form of a telephone 
call from Tom Burns. As I have told him, I rank that call with 
only two others in my professional career. The first was a tele-
phone call from Bob Anthony early in 1963, inviting me to 
spend the year 1963-64 in Switzerland with my family, teaching 
at IMEDE. It turned out to be a fabulous year. The other was a 
call from Charlie Zlatkovich in 1976, saying that I had been 
nominated as president-elect of the American Accounting Asso-
ciation. Other nice things have happened over the years by mail, 
or by cable (as in the case of the invitation in 1959 to join the 
Wharton faculty). But by telephone, these are the three occa-
sions I shall remember. 
First, let me acknowledge some debts. It is true, as Chuck 
Horngren recognized two years ago on a similar occasion, that 
in naming specific individuals one runs the risk of omitting 
some deserving names. But I am going to accept that risk. 
My greatest debt, of course, is to my wife, Miriam. She has 
been by my side now for almost 50 years, and no other influ-
ence can compare with hers. 
However, there have been other influences. One was a cer-
tain teacher of English in my London secondary school, so 
many years ago, who almost brutally instilled some rules that 
have helped me to write better English than I might otherwise 
have done. He had a number of "forbidden words," the use of 
which automatically earned you a zero for an essay. His forbid-
den words included "very," "extremely," "former" and "latter"; 
and there were others. During the intervening 65 years, I have 
often broken his rules, but always to the detriment of my writ-
ing. 
Another debt of the same kind that I acknowledge is to 
Reed Storey, whose editing of my drafts when we were working 
together on the FASB's Concepts Statement No. 2 on Qualitative 
Characteristics greatly improved that document and my writing 
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generally. I am much more sensitive to dangling participles, the 
common misuse of "this" when one means "that," the misuse of 
"which" instead of "that," and other linguistic blunders than I 
was previously. 
My main debt, of an academic nature, is undoubtedly to the 
faculty of the London School of Economics, both in the class-
room when I was a student, and later as colleagues when I went 
back to teach there for almost a decade after World War II. To 
have rubbed shoulders with men like Arnold Plant and Ronnie 
Edwards (both later knighted), Lionel Robbins (later Lord 
Robbins), my immediate colleagues William Baxter and Harold 
Edey, Basil Yamey (that fine accounting historian for whom I 
accepted the Hourglass award here on Sunday evening), and no 
fewer than four Nobel prize winners in economics (John Hicks, 
James Meade, Friedrick Hayek, and Ronald Coase), was a rare 
privilege. This must sound like name-dropping; but these men 
really have exerted a lasting influence on me. Life at LSE during 
my years there was life in an intellectual powerhouse. 
Most American academics start their careers by writing a 
dissertation for their Ph.D., mining one or two papers out of it, 
and then going on from there. My start was different, and I was 
reminded of it recently when my wife and I were in London, 
riding down Oxford Street in a bus, past D. H. Evans, a depart-
ment store. D. H. Evans, in 1947 or thereabouts, gave me the 
idea for my first serious paper. I was having lunch there one day 
and I noticed that the dining room was divided into two sec-
tions by moveable screens. On one side of the screens, the space 
was devoted to a self-service cafeteria, while the other side was 
devoted to waitress service. This led me to think how I would 
position the screens if I were the restaurant manager. Cost allo-
cation was clearly not the answer. Cost allocation would have to 
follow the space allocation decision, not precede it. The result 
was a paper entitled "Cost Accounting and the Use of Space and 
Equipment," which gave me my start. Of course, I had not 
heard of linear programming in those days. 
Perhaps it was the heady atmosphere of LSE that gave me a 
somewhat lofty view of the nature of accounting, but also kept 
my estimate of its importance within reasonable bounds. Dur-
ing my year as president of the American Accounting Associa-
tion, a committee of the Association produced a report that was 
published, entitled Accounting Education and the Third World. I 
was asked to write a forward to that report, and I should like to 
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quote from it here, because it expresses my assessment of ac-
counting as well as I know how, and it is as relevant now as it 
was in 1978. 
In any ranking of the needs of the developing countries 
of the world to help them improve the quality of life of 
their peoples, there are undoubtedly some that would 
rank ahead of improved accounting and accounting 
education. The eradication of disease, the elimination 
of hunger . . ., improved standards of literacy, the 
spread of political freedom and the rule of law—these 
are the foremost advances that must be made before 
the distinction between "developing" and "developed" 
nations can be discarded. 
The report that I am introducing does not deal with 
these great themes. Accounting itself cannot feed the 
hungry or cure the sick or bring enlightenment to the 
illiterate. Yet, it has a part to play in all these advances. 
Wherever scarce resources need to be economized, 
there is work for the accountant to do; and the scarcer 
the resources are, the more important it is that they 
should not be misdirected or misappropriated. 
Accountants can take a good deal of satisfaction in the role 
that they play in making our free enterprise system work. But 
we have no reason to be complacent. As I look back over more 
than 50 years in the profession and compare the progress we 
have made with the progress made in fields like medicine, elec-
tronics, physics and chemistry, transportation, and even eco-
nomics, our showing is not impressive. Bob Elliott, of KPMG 
Peat Marwick, had something of interest to say on this subject 
in a paper recently. He first quotes the complaint of a CEO of a 
successful software company, who told him that: 
trying to run my organization with the output of our 
accounting department is like trying to fly an airplane 
that has only one dial—a dial that shows the sum of 
airspeed and altitude. If it's low, I'm in trouble, but I 
don't even know why.1 
Then turning later to financial reporting, Elliott says: 
One of the few th ings tha t f inancia l s t a t e m e n t 
preparers agree upon is that the scoring rules should 
1Robert K. Elliott, "The Third Wave Breaks on the Shores of Accounting," 
Accounting Horizons (June, 1992): 69. 
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not be changed in the middle of the game. Thus, there 
is a powerful constituency in favor of the status quo. 
Add the attesters—who are dissuaded from change by 
unknown, but probably unbearable, legal liabilities— 
and you have an implacably conservative environment. 
The same managements that complain that they can't 
run the business with today's accounting information 
are the ones who make pilgrimages to Norwalk to 
lobby against changes.2 
I do not find Elliott's "implacably conservative environ-
ment" at all congenial. It is not peculiar to the United States. 
One finds it throughout the English-speaking world and beyond. 
I wish that I could have been more persuasive in my own writ-
ing and more successful in helping to change that environment. 
It is a task that my generation must leave to our successors. 
2Ibid, p. 75. 
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THE ACCOUNTING HALL OF FAME MEMBERSHIP 
Year Member 
1950 George Oliver May* 
Robert Hiester Montgomery* 
William Andrew Paton* 
1951 Arthur Lowes Dickinson* 
Henry Rand Hatfield* 
1952 Elijah Watt Sells* 
Victor Hermann Stempf* 
1953 Arthur Edward Andersen* 
Thomas Coleman Andrews* 
Charles Ezra Sprague* 
Joseph Edmund Sterett* 
1954 Carman George Blough* 
Samuel John Broad* 
Thomas Henry Sanders* 
Hiram Thompson Scovill* 
1955 Percival Flack Brundage* 
1956 Ananias Charles Littleton* 
1957 Roy Bernard Kester* 
Hermann Clinton Miller* 
1958 Harry Anson Finney* 
Arthur Bevins Foye* 
Donald Putman Perry* 
1959 Marquis George Eaton* 
1960 Maurice Hubert Stans 
1961 Eric Louis Kohler* 
1963 Andrew Barr 
Lloyd Morey* 
1964 Paul Franklin Grady* 
Perry Empey Mason* 
1965 James Loring Peirce 
1968 George Davis Bailey* 
John Lansing Carey* 
William Welling Werntz* 
1974 Robert Martin Trueblood* 
1975 Leonard Paul Spacek 
1976 John William Queenan* 
1977 Howard Irwin Ross* 
*Deceased 
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Marshall Smith Armstrong 
Elmer Boyd Staats 
Herbert Elmer Miller 
Sidney Davidson 
Henry Alexander Benson 
Oscar Strand Gellein 
Robert Newton Anthony 
Philip Leroy Defliese 
Norton Moore Bedford 
Yuri Ijiri 
Charles Thomas Horngren 
Raymond John Chambers 
David Solomons 
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REVIEWS 
PATH A. MILLS, EDITOR 
Indiana State University 
REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
Peter Boys and John Freear (Eds.), Accounting History 1976-
1986: An Anthology (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992, 
402 pp., $70). 
Reviewed by 
Sudarwan 
Case Western Reserve University 
This book is an anthology of papers from Accounting His-
tory, the former journal of the Accounting History Society of 
England and Wales, published during the years 1976-1986. Boys 
and Freear selected 26 of 56 articles published in the journal. 
The anthology covers several eras and topics in accounting his-
tory from the 15th century to the 20th century. It is divided into 
eight classifications: General, Methodology, Auditing, Firm/In-
dustry Studies, Corporate Accounting, Education, Bibliogra-
phies/Biographies, and Miscellaneous. 
Three articles in the "General" section emphasize the im-
portance of accounting history to the accounting profession and 
to the entire economic community. The subjects of this section 
are that: 1) accounting history ("was") has a relationship with 
the present ("is") and the future ("ought"); 2) present problems 
may be rooted in past solutions; 3) history provides parallels 
from which we can obtain lessons; and 4) the study of account-
ing history should be useful in solving current problems. 
The "Methodology" section discusses methods and tech-
niques available to researchers and provides a taxonomy for 
accounting history to satisfy requirements of historical re-
search, 1) factographic (what was), 2) explanatory (why was 
that so), and 3) theoretical (what follows from the study of the 
past). Readers are exposed to the relationship between the con-
cept of capitalism and the emergence of bookkeeping, and to 
the ways accounting history research establishes historical facts. 
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However, the discussion falls short of giving readers clues as to 
the circumstances in which a certain methodology is most ap-
propriate. There is also no discussion about the advantages and 
disadvantages of each method. There is only a vague suggestion 
that a combination of methods can be used in the study of 
accounting history. 
These first two sections seem to be intended to provide a 
basis for selecting from articles included in the next sections. 
One expects that the rest of the book will reveal a link between 
the past, present, and future development of accounting. On the 
contrary, most of the subsequent readings are confined to a 
description or discussion of accounting practice in specific peri-
ods. With the exception of the paper by Freear in the "Firm/ 
Industry Studies" section, there is little provided to relate his-
torical facts to current and future matters. 
The "Auditing" section analyzes audit practices in the rail-
way and marine insurance industries during 1840s-1860s. The 
matters considered include conflicts between managers, share-
holders, and government commissioners in the enactment of the 
1845 Companies Clause Consolidation Act and the 1867 Railways 
Companies Act as to who had the authority to appoint auditors 
for railway companies and what were appropriate auditor quali-
fications. 
The audit requirement for marine insurance companies was 
established under the provisions of the 1844 Joint Stock Compa-
nies Act and under the 1845 Act mentioned above. What is im-
portant to recall about this period is that an auditor was re-
quired to own at least one share in the audited company; that 
auditors were not necessarily public accountants; and that audit 
reports had various forms, but were stated as a "true and cor-
rect" balance sheet. 
The focus of the "Firm/Industry Studies" section is the rela-
tionship between cost accounting systems and pricing policy in 
a monopoly or free market system and the related profit mea-
surement systems implemented during the period from the 16th 
to 19th century. 
During this period both acquisition and repair of fixed as-
sets were considered expenses and charged as incurred; busi-
ness and personal expenses were not separated; accrued ex-
penses were embedded in reserve and provision accounts; in-
ventories were valued at current est imated price; income 
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smoothing was a common, practice; and accounting informa-
tion was available and used for managerial purposes. 
This section also gives examples of how cost accounting 
systems can be misused through the use and abuse of excessive 
profits from government contracts. The authors enrich the 
analysis by providing documents as examples of balance sheets 
and income statements of companies in the late 19th century. 
However, neither the illustrated financial statements nor the au-
thors ' analysis mentions "how" revenues were measured but 
only the measurement of expense. This omission prevents read-
ers from obtaining a complete picture of income determination 
as commonly practiced in the period. 
The remainder of the book indeed could be classified as 
"Miscellaneous". It contains historical facts and short descrip-
tions about the development of accounting thought, accounting 
education, profiles of notable individuals in the U.K. accounting 
profession, and other short analyses of early accounting prac-
tices. 
A crit ical paper about early 20th century account ing 
thought by Godfrey is the most interesting reading in this sec-
tion. He argues that accounting thought before 1960 was: 1) 
developed by a piecemeal approach rather than by development 
of a single theoretical framework; 2) sought apologetics rather 
than appraised; 3) classified rather than analyzed; 4) particular-
ized rather than synthesized. With the exception of Paton, Can-
ning, Sweeney, and McNeal, who were major accounting schol-
ars in this period, he argues, others reflected inherited deficien-
cies. However, Godfrey fails to elaborate on the impact of such 
alleged deficiencies on current problems or how such deficien-
cies might have been resolved. Further, he does not compare 
early accounting thought with current issues or assess relative 
advantages and disadvantages as such. 
In general, this book of readings falls short of fully explain-
ing selected elements in the development of accounting thought 
and practice. If explaining the progress is an essential part of 
historical study, this book does not fulfill one of its purposes. 
However, this book does supply reading material to discuss ac-
counting practice and problems in the past. Willing readers will 
find the historical description a good starting point for further 
analysis and for undertaking their own agenda. 
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Junichi Chiba, A History of British Financial Accounting [in 
Japanese] (Tokyo: Chuo Keizai, 1992, 407 pp., 7,000 Yen). 
Reviewed by 
Yozo Sakaguchi 
Case Western Reserve University 
When Japan reopened its commerce to the United States of 
America in 1854, its doors had been closed to foreign countries 
for more than two hundred years. Needless to say, at that time, 
there was no bookkeeping or accounting system in Japan that 
was similar to those used today. But during the Meiji era (1876-
1911), Japan's economy developed, expanded and encompassed 
almost every type of industry. Under these circumstances, Japa-
nese financial systems that were primarily influenced by British 
financial accounting followed a European-style commercial 
code. Thus, until the early 20th century, the British system was 
the major influence on Japanese accounting. 
This was the situation in Japan until after World War II, 
when a Japanese securities and exchange law was enacted 
which was strongly influenced by the U.S. Securities Acts. As a 
result, Japan's accounting system rapidly changed under the in-
fluence of the U.S. financial accounting system and the Securi-
ties Acts. Thus, two major external influences affected the basic 
framework of Japanese financial accounting. 
From these two influences, Professor Chiba considers is-
sues about social and historical problems in modern Japanese 
financial accounting, focusing on the influences of British fi-
nancial accounting, the need to earn public trust, and the im-
pact of political issues, which Chiba analyzes from a social sci-
ence approach. He focuses primarily on the important period 
from the beginning of the 19th century through the 20th century. 
The book contains ten sections. Sections 1 and 2 seek to 
define a basic structure for the British financial accounting ap-
proach using a social science methodology. The effects of pas-
sage of the modern Companies Act and of related accounts 
based on British processes is examined in sections 3 and 4; the 
"Lee Rule" is examined in sections 5 and 6. The accounting 
system under the British Companies Acts during a period of 
interventionism is the focus of sections 7, 8, and 9. Finally, the 
"true and fair" view is considered in the last section. Each of the 
sections is effectively related with others by the author's use of 
social science and economic historical perspectives. 
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Chiba's primary objective is to establish a basic structure of 
financial accounting by means of a social science methodology, 
relating the expected structure of a company's accounting to the 
Companies Act. He examines original documents, but he does 
not get distracted by legal form. Instead, he considers the social 
and economic functions of these acts. He uses the social science 
methodology of both Weber and Habermas to identify the pub-
lic sphere. 
This book identifies several contributions of the British fi-
nancial system. First, there is a study of the Compulsory System 
from 1844 to 1855. Second, the "true" meaning of the 1879 
Companies Act and its voluntary rule is considered. Third, the 
orthodoxy of a classified system of accounts defined by English 
rules is pointed out. Fourth, in judicial cases, both the doctrine 
of fiduciary trust and the duties of a corporate director as a 
"commercial trustee" are noted. Fifth, the social and historical 
meaning of the concept of a "true and fair view" is considered. 
Finally, the process of preparing a distinct form for both the 
"balance sheet" and the "profit and loss" statements is exam-
ined. 
The author employs the title A History of British Financial 
Accounting to a characterize this project, a major focus of his 
scholarly career. The book, which is the summary of his many 
studies about British financial accounting, took more than 
twelve years to complete. The use of original sources and refer-
ences such as accounts, judicial cases, British parliamentary pa-
pers, copies of the original acts, and related bibliographies in-
volved nearly five hundred sources. The author found most of 
them in Guildhall Library in London while studying at the Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science in 1985 and 
1986. 
The book is published in Japanese and is not otherwise 
available to readers of other languages. References listed in the 
book alone are worth the effort of any scholars who have an 
interest in the origins of financial accounting in Britain, as well 
as "the accounts" during the period from the middle of 19th 
century through the middle of the 20th century. 
As a side note, readers might also have an interest in Pro-
fessor Chiba's next project, which will extend his study about 
the history of British financial accounting to contemporary 
times. 
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Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of The Corporate 
Commonwealth, (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1988, 
286 pp., $19.95). 
Reviewed by 
Nandini Chandar 
Case Western Reserve University 
Galambos and Pratt provide an insightful and fast-paced 
account of the growth and development of the American corpo-
rate economy over the past century. At a time when American 
business is yet again in the midst of a crisis, the book is a timely 
reminder of the value of history in analyzing contemporary 
problems. Free enterprise and the government have had various 
relationships over the years: friendly, adversarial, and some-
times both. The authors present in their book a dynamic picture 
of U.S. business and public policy in the twentieth century, 
which portrays the flexibility of the American business system 
and its tradition of successfully adapting to change. 
The reader is led from the world of J. P. Morgan at the turn 
of the century, where a few powerful private investment bankers 
could control an economy dominated by the entrepreneurial 
firm to the world of Iacocca in the 1980s, where the power of 
any individual is subordinate to that of the government. The 
authors make effective use of these powerful symbols of the 
American way of doing business during their times. 
The framework for analyzing the development of institu-
tions over time is their ability to strike a balance between inno-
vations, efficiency, and environmental control. The authors also 
portray the changing role of the government in three major ar-
eas over the century: single industry regulation, cross-industry 
regulation, and government-directed activities. 
J. P. Morgan's era saw the rise of the combine from the 
entrepreneurial firm of the nineteenth century. The entrepre-
neurial firm, with its flexibility to innovate, played a vital role in 
the nation's rapid economic expansion during that period. Out 
of its inability to take advantage of economies of scale and its 
lack of capital, came the centralized corporate combine. The 
authors suggest that Morgan and investment bankers, because 
of their unique role of selling securities to finance the combines, 
became the chief architects of the system. The authors describe 
the outstanding record of technical and organizational change 
and economic growth that characterized the Morgan era on the 
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one hand, and the abuses of power and natural resources and 
growing tensions between the corporations and society on the 
other. 
The period 1901-1930 was characterized by an expanding 
public presence, generally intended to limit the power of private 
interests to manipulate the economy. The development of inde-
pendent regulatory commissions, the passage of the antitrust 
laws, and the creation of the Federal Reserve System marked 
significant turning points in business-government relations. The 
authors characterize the process of change in these relations as 
"piecemeal, uneven, and at times, haphazard." These measures 
were, the authors claim, "a curious innovation," and "a political 
and intellectual compromise." It was also a "distinctively Ameri-
can approach to balancing public and private interests," a way 
to have more government without more politics. The coming of 
the Federal Reserve signalled the demise of the world of J. P. 
Morgan. 
This was also an era when business consolidated its con-
trols. Managers had to learn to balance the firm's need for inno-
vation against the need for control of its environment, and the 
need to achieve high efficiency in mass production and distribu-
tion. Most of the large firms of this era were created through 
mergers of competitors. There was a need for administrative 
controls using more active and systematic forms of manage-
ment. The results were organizations structured along func-
tional lines, with increased specialization, a changed workplace 
in response to mechanization, more formalized labor relations, 
and vertical integration to achieve better control of the environ-
ment. The need for innovation and the great expansion of sci-
ence and engineering at the turn of the century saw the begin-
nings of research and development and the modern industrial 
laboratory. Companies took a long-term view. Small business 
still had its role, transferring/generating innovations, and pro-
viding services where economies of scale or system could not be 
achieved. A new type of political system evolved, where local 
influence was becoming less important than effective lobbying 
on the state and national levels. It was an era of "the associative 
state," where cooperative forms of capitalism were practiced by 
trade associations. The general prosperity of the firms and the 
growing weakness of the labor unions lent support to the idea 
that a new "corporate-liberal commonwealth" under business 
control was here to stay. 
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The first crisis of the new corporate commonwealth was the 
Great Depression. The SEC was set up to regulate the perfor-
mance of securities traders, and to provide for disclosure of 
financial information. Business was afraid that President 
Roosevelt was driving toward socialism. The authors feel, how-
ever, that "what evolved was a set of new public institutions that 
created a more stable capital economy and a more predictable 
and profitable environment for business." Banking reform mea-
sures were introduced under the New Deal in the from of the 
Banking Acts and the creation of the FDIC. One result of this 
was functional segmentation along commercial and investment 
banking lines. The authors state that no other nation chose this 
form of segmentation, but "no other nation's banking system 
had become so enmeshed in stock speculation." 
The National Recovery Administration, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and the Federal Jobs Program were at-
tempts to combat the effects of the Depression. The labor poli-
cies of the New Deal hastened the emergence of "Big Labor" in 
the U.S. As a result of the impact of the Great Depression and 
the New Deal, the life of the CEO changed dramatically: it was 
increasingly difficult to strike a balance between efficiency, in-
novation, and control. 
The American Era (1940-1969) saw "a process of reconcilia-
tion between business and American society." The war-induced 
prosperity eased political tensions and focused on the need for 
efficiency in mass production. The Federal Government's re-
sponsibility for the overall performance of the economy was 
recognized. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson embraced "new 
economics," which consisted of designing packages of monetary 
and fiscal policies capable of stabilizing and sustaining business 
growth while maintaining politically acceptable levels of unem-
ployment and inflation. 
Government spending for national security added to the po-
tent economic impact of war. The authors suggest that it was 
the war expenditure and not the New Deal that pulled the coun-
try out of recession. There was, however, concern over the 
growth of this "military-industrial complex." Defense took over 
significant portions of the nation's resources and creativity, and 
affected two other areas of government investments: highway 
building and space programs. The American Era also witnessed 
a spectacular growth in science and technology, largely as a 
result of federal support. 
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The performance of regulated industries in this era was 
generally favorable. There were lower pressures from cross-in-
dustry regulation. 
The American Era saw "the modern firm in triumph." To 
take advantage of favorable conditions, diversification, together 
with decentralization, became important. By the end of the 
1960s, there were large numbers of "conglomerates" and the 
rationale of "synergy" began to appear. Decentralization enabled 
quick postwar expansion into overseas markets with devastated 
economics. In this scenario, "strategy flowed out of structure." 
The multinational firm accompanied America's political involve-
ment abroad. "Business normally followed the flag." 
The authors suggest that this era saw "the corporate com-
monwealth at its peak." With federal and monetary policies sta-
bilizing aggregate demand, they felt that "by that time, America 
seemed to have discovered the proper way to harness corporate 
capitalism without seriously injuring the market-oriented pro-
cess at heart". 
By the late 1960s, there were increasing tensions at home 
and abroad, "as the fundamental conditions under the American 
Era started to shift." As the U.S. was preoccupied in containing 
Communism, new competition emerged from Europe and Ja-
pan. Governments of raw materials-producing nations asserted 
national interests. America and its competitors ignored growing 
evidence of the need for change and "were victims of their own 
success." Regulatory agencies became inflexible when the eco-
nomic setting began to change and when there was mounting 
inflation. 
U.S. business faced internal problems due to lack of creativ-
ity, taking a short-term view, being conservative about innova-
tions and overly concerned about stability. Government policies 
toward business did not work as well in the shifting interna-
tional economy. Not until international competition began to 
intensify in the 1970s did "the foundations of the corporate 
commonwealth visibility begin to crack." 
The authors suggest that the period 1970 to the present 
marks "the second crisis of the corporate commonwealth." The 
nation had grown accustomed to international economic suc-
cess and could not easily make adjustments. "The American Era 
was certain to end." Suggestions made in panic that America 
should borrow ideas from other nations to solve its problems, 
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"slighted the inherent strengths of the corporate commonwealth 
and ignored the barriers to rapid, basic change." 
There were "new misdirections in the public sector" as the 
government tried to grapple with the change. The problems of 
the weak domestic economy were compounded by rising energy 
prices. "Something was wrong, but the experts could not agree 
on the diagnosis or the cure." The government could not control 
spending for defense and welfare. New areas of government 
regulation provided added pressures on businesses' ability to 
compete. Expenditures for R&D dropped off sharply, as corpo-
rations began to take a short-term view. 
In this new era of international competition, reconstruction 
began. The authors state that the late 1970s saw "the beginning 
of a process of reconstruction that demonstrated convincingly 
the single most important strength of the U.S. corporate com-
monwealth: its responsiveness over the long-term to the forces 
of change." The authors claim that the most obvious shortcom-
ing of the corporate order "was the lack of effective integrative 
institutions that would enable the United States to recognize the 
interrelated nature of its problems and to implement intelligent, 
system-wide solutions." 
Strategies in the private sector to cope with this new era 
included de-conglomeration and scaling down, in an effort to 
improve efficiency and innovativeness in the markets they still 
served. There was a belief that small is innovative. New con-
cepts of labor relations emerged in response to the challenges 
posed by labor-management relations. Yet, according to the au-
thors, "in no area does the historian's search for useful prece-
dents in our past produce less evidence for optimism." There 
has been a strong surge in deregulation in the face of increased 
international competition. Deregulation fostered competition, 
and, to some degree, innovation. 
The Reagan programs attempted to reduce social security 
spending and cross-industry regulation "to give U.S. companies 
a breathing space in which to adapt to increased international 
competition." Reagan's supply-side economics did not produce 
"the miracle cure" and the budget deficit kept mounting. De-
regulation increased takeovers and the unanticipated results 
were crises in the financial and airline industries, accompanied 
by a rash of bankruptcies. 
The authors present their personal analysis of the current 
crisis and suggest measures for speeding up reconstruction. 
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Some of their suggestions include significant changes in the 
public sector, reducing the deficit through reduced defense 
spending, the judicious use of protectionist measures either 
through tariffs or quotas, and direct aid to strategic firms by 
setting up narrowly focused independent agencies. 
Galambos and Pratt have provided a well-researched, well-
written analytical perspective of the growth of American capital-
ism, and the interaction of American business and public policy. 
The book is invaluable to students and leaders in business, and 
those who wonder how and why "the American Century" lasted 
only 25 years. 
Yuji Ijiri and Rona A. Watts, (Eds.), Bill and Ruth Cooper and 
Their Friends (Pittsburg: Carnegie Mellon University Press, 1990, 
138 pp., Not Priced). 
Reviewed by 
Rodney K. Rogers 
Case Western Reserve University 
This book provides an introduction to the life of William W. 
(Bill) Cooper. Bill has served several disciplines as a prolific 
researcher, teacher and area administrator. He is a member of 
the Accounting Hall of Fame. This volume is a collection of 
speeches and essays in his honor written by former students 
and colleagues, expressing appreciation for Bill's professional 
and personal influence on them. As such, this volume does not 
provide a critical perspective as to the significance of Bill 
Cooper's contributions; it is clearly appreciative in tone. How-
ever, it does provide the reader with a personal insight into the 
career of Bill Cooper. 
The former students and colleagues who participated in this 
activity came from all eras of Bill Cooper's career including the 
undergraduate days at the University of Chicago, graduate 
school experiences at Columbia University, and faculty and ad-
ministrative positions at Carnegie Mellon, as well as his current 
faculty and administrative responsibilities at the University of 
Texas at Austin. Through these speeches and essays one begins 
to understand events that have shaped Bill Cooper's approach to 
problems. Herbert Simon discussed their time together at the 
University of Chicago. This was during the Great Depression 
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and such world events as the Spanish Civil War. These events 
caused people to question the status quo and discuss alterna-
tives. Simon posited that the "real education at Chicago was the 
education of revolution" [p. 10]. Many of the speeches and es-
says describe Bill Cooper as a "revolutionary" because he looked 
at problems in new and different ways. 
In Cooper's response to the various remarks, he provides an 
insight about those factors which influenced his approach to 
problem solving. He received his formal academic training prior 
to World War II in an era of "subject matter development." 
During this time, Freud, Einstein and Keynes were all proposing 
new theories. However, his academic career was after World 
War II, during an "age of great methodological change." Thus, 
he was forced to struggle with this new era and apply new 
methods and approaches to various problems. Cooper's continu-
ing interest in change is shown by his discussion of the need for 
research in the area of bureaucracies and how organizations 
deal with social problems. He proposes development of "flex-
ible" bureaucracies and the need to consider ways to "inject 
creativity and innovation into large bureaucratic organizations" 
[p.97]. 
On the personal side of the subject, the volume contains 
several "stories" regarding Cooper, such as his early career as a 
professional fighter. 
Several persons present aspects about Bill Cooper's years at 
Carnegie Mellon University. During this time he was extremely 
involved in the development of the Graduate School of Indus-
trial Administration and the creation of the School of Urban 
and Public Affairs. The approach that Cooper used in these ac-
tivities sheds light upon his creative approach in shaping and 
creating new organizations. 
Bill Cooper has had an impact upon the accounting profes-
sion and this book provides the reader with interesting back-
ground information regarding his life and career. One should 
read the book for what it is, a collection of speeches expressing 
appreciation of Bill Cooper. 
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R. H. Jones, The History of the Financial Control Function of 
Local Government Accounting in the United Kingdom (New York: 
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992, 187 pp., $62). 
Reviewed by 
Leon Hay 
University of Arkansas 
The author, Rowan Jones, notes that this book is a "slightly 
modified version of the author's Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the 
University of Lancaster in 1986" [p. 3]. In the "Preface to the 
Original Thesis" Jones wrote: 
We do not know what local government accounting is, 
or was: what has been written during its long history 
has the abiding characteristic of being atheoretical and 
ahistorical. It remains essentially a practice, borne out 
of past practice [p. 5]. 
Jones' thesis, of course, relates to local government accounting 
in the United Kingdom, but a similar comment could have been 
made in relation to state and local governmental accounting in 
the United States until the late 1970s. 
The main purpose of the book, according to the "Preface to 
the Original Thesis," is to answer the following questions: 
Why do local authorities account the way they do? Why 
is this accounting, in crucial respects, so different from 
commercial accounting (fund accounting, capital ac-
counting, budgetary accounting)? Why in other aspects 
is it so like it (double entry, accruals)? Why did these 
differences and similarities emerge [p. 7]? 
Jones' research led him to conclude that the answers to the 
above questions lie in the past; "indeed, they lie pre-1914" [p.7]. 
Evidence that the book is derived from Jones' Ph.D. thesis is 
given by the title of Chapter One: "What is Local Government 
Accounting? A review of the literature." The stated purpose of 
the chapter "is to discover what is already known about local 
government accounting and to explain why we need to know 
more" [p. 9]. Readers who are familiar with the structure of 
local government in the U.K., and the accounting model used by 
those local governments, may feel that the chapter accomplishes 
its stated purpose. Other readers are advised to skip Chapter 
One and read Chapters Two, Three, and Four, which present 
Jones ' synthesis of local government accounting from the 
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Middle Ages through the first decade of the twentieth century. 
Chapter Five, "Local Government Accounting as Statutory Fi-
nancial Control," follows logically after the three historical 
chapters. These four chapters provide the reader with the back-
ground needed to appreciate Chapter Six, "Implications for 
Theory and Policy Making." 
In Chapter Six, Jones discusses the following implications 
for accounting theory as it relates to local government account-
ing in the United Kingdom: (1) budgeting and finance are inex-
tricably bound up with local government accounting—therefore; 
the matching concept is irrelevant; (2) statistics of annual net 
expenditure drawn from the "revenue accounts" [revenue ac-
counts in Great Britain are apparently equivalent to governmen-
tal fund types in the United States] are not costs, so cannot be 
used as measures of economy or efficiency and are not useful 
for comparative financial analysis; (3) the present accounting 
model ignores holding gains and, also, ignores cost savings on 
debt outstanding resulting from liabilities being fixed in mon-
etary terms; (4) the recording of depreciation expense is irrel-
evant, and it would be inappropriate because it would affect the 
(tax) rates collected; and (5) fund accounting is important in 
distinguishing non-rate funds from rate funds (non-rate funds 
appear to be equivalent to proprietary fund types in the United 
States, and rate funds seem to be what Jones called revenue 
accounts in earlier pages and what are called governmental fund 
types in the United States). Jones' implications (1), (2), (4), and 
(5) are equally valid in regard to state and local government 
accounting in the United States; his implication (3) is also true 
in the U.S., but it is not clear how it relates to the other four 
implications for governmental accounting theory, or even to the 
rest of the book. 
Under the heading "Implications for Policy-making," Jones 
observes that "the only unequivocal, intended users of local gov-
ernment accounting we have identified are the auditors" [p. 
152]. In the United Kingdom, "the audit certificate has tradi-
tionally been a statement to the effect that the accounts are in 
conformance with the law" [p. 152]. The law, Jones indicates, is 
the financial control system established by the Treasury. 
The implications for policy-making drawn by Jones from 
his historical study of the financial control function of local 
government accounting in the United Kingdom contrast mark-
edly with the evaluation of governmental accounting in the 
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United States. Here, the objective of financial reporting is to 
enable governments to fulfill their duty to be publicly account-
able in a democratic society. The independent auditor's report 
attests to the conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles (defined as financial reporting standards set by the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board, a body in the pri-
vate sector). 
Richard Mattessich, (Ed.), Modern Accounting Research: History, 
Survey, and Guide (Vancouver: Canadian Certified General Ac-
countants ' Research Foundation, 1984, 487 pp., C$30.00) 
Reviewed by 
Stephen J. Young 
Case Western Reserve University 
The book, Modem Accounting Research: History, Survey and 
Guide, by Richard Mattessich, contains a broad survey of aca-
demic accounting literature. Thus, it provides a valuable collec-
tion of material for those wishing to review the development of 
recent accounting thought. 
The book is divided into six major parts. Each contains an 
introduction by Mattessich and several articles addressing a ma-
jor field of accounting research. The work also includes an in-
dex of the names of accounting academics. 
The first two sections of the book deal with the develop-
ment of theories and methodology in accounting research. The 
first part is a general introduction to the field of accounting 
research. It consists of an article discussing the "Scientific Ap-
proach to Accounting" written by Mattessich himself. 
The second section considers concepts of theory construc-
tion and the roots of accounting thought. It addresses the con-
cepts of Thomas Kuhn1 on scientific revolutions and the period 
in which his thought influenced social sciences, including ac-
countancy. The section also looks at the relationships of ac-
countancy to economics and finance, and the socioeconomic 
consequences of standard setting. 
After these Introductory sections, the last four sections each 
address a major field of continuing research in accountancy. 
1Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, International En-
cyclopedia of Unified Science, 2nd enlarged edition (University of Chicago 
Press), 1970. 
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The third section deals with the controversy between positive 
and normative research and contains several papers discussing 
or using the positive accounting methodology. The section is 
closed with two papers addressing public choice and economic 
interest in the standard-setting process. 
The fourth section deals with the subjects of agency and 
information economics. In order to assist the reader in under-
standing the influence of this literature, there are several sur-
vey-type papers that cover the fundamentals of this subject area. 
The fifth part of the book deals with the empirical/statistical 
literature in accounting. It is composed of four papers dealing 
with a broad array of topics ranging from market studies to 
behavioral accounting research. 
The final section deals with "other" issues. This omnibus 
section contains papers on managerial accounting, auditing, 
and non-business (e.g., a survey paper writ ten by William 
Vatter) accounting. 
Appended to the book is a comprehensive index of North 
American accounting academics (as of 1984). This is an invalu-
able, although somewhat dated, addition to the book. 
There are at least two principal concerns about the mono-
graph. First, one can argue that "depth" has been sacrificed for 
"breadth." The work does attempt to cover a wide range of re-
search topics at the cost of "depth." Many of the papers are 
surveys, and therefore brush over major contributions. For ex-
ample, seminal articles such as Jenson and Meckling [1976] in 
agency research and Ball and Brown [1969] in market studies 
are not included. Much of the spirit of subsequent research in 
these areas cannot be fully appreciated without reading such 
works. 
The second principal concern, not inherent in the work but 
caused by the timing of this review, is the date of the mono-
graph. A great deal of work has been done in academic account-
ing since 1984. Empirical studies have developed into two mas-
sive branches: market studies and behavioral research. These 
fields were far less developed eight years ago. Agency research 
and the application of information economics to accounting has 
also blossomed beyond any level conceived of in 1984. 
Fortunately, a second monograph by Mattessich, intended 
to be a supplement to this comprehensive 1984 effort, is now 
available [Mattessich, 1991]. 
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Tradeoffs in content are necessary, but no major issue in 
accountancy is unattended. Regarding the second criticism, all 
books become outdated. Time is never particularly kind to au-
thors, but the 1984 monograph has aged remarkably well. Many 
of its topics form the foundations of accounting research today, 
and therefore this work remains a useful item in a scholar's 
library. 
This publication's greatest value is as a "survey and guide" 
to contemporary academic accountancy research. It therefore 
meets its promised "mission". It also provides a base for further 
inquiry, and the index of authors is most helpful. I recommend 
the work both as a reader for an advanced accountancy theory 
course or for practitioners who want to understanding the aca-
demic side of accounting. 
REFERENCES 
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John T. S. Melzer, Bastion of Commerce in the City of Kings: The 
Consulado de Commercio de Lima 1593-1877 (Lima, Peru: Edito-
rial Concytec Peru, 1991, 208 pp., Not priced). 
Reviewed by 
Stephen F. Laribee 
Eastern Illinois University 
This book is a history of the Consulado de Lima, the mer-
cantile regulatory body for Spanish South America. It follows 
the course of events (1593-1877) for this institution and makes 
references to numerous Peruvian documents and other sources. 
The author states that very little has been written about this 
exceptionally powerful Crown institution that controlled trade 
from the City of Kings. For that reason, the book contains an 
English, German and Spanish version of the text. 
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The Spanish government had made use of the consulado 
several centuries before introducing it to Peru. In time, "the new 
consulado in Lima was to dominate the trade of the viceroyalty 
of Peru in much the same way as the Seville consulado domi-
nated that between Spain and the colonies" [p. 6]. This was 
because it was given royal jurisdiction for all of Spanish South 
America. The author includes a discussion of the role that the 
consulado played in terms of the Council of the Indies and the 
Casa de Contratación that preceded it. 
In addition to the history of the Consulado de Lima, Melzer 
describes the basic operation of the institution as a court and as 
a major financial contributor to the Crown. He also gives gen-
eral background information on the Spanish empire while nar-
rating how the consulado responded to various economic and 
political pressures. The Crown needed the Lima Consulado's ju-
dicial power and the taxes it collected for them. It was the tax 
collecting function that gave the consulado its major source of 
power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
During the mid and late eighteenth century, changes oc-
curred in the imperial bureaucracy that abolished the Casa de 
Contratación and took away the power of the Council of the 
Indies. By the nineteenth century "the institution's prime con-
cern was the financing of the vice royal government against the 
encroachment of the forces for Independence" [p. 34]. 
With the Republic of Peru winning independence, its sur-
vival was dependent on collecting taxes. To that end, a new 
constitution in 1828 reestablished the consulado in its full pre-
independence institutional form, except for some changes in the 
court structure. The consulado continued to serve as "the finan-
cial palace guard for the kingdom of Peru" [p. 37] until 1887 
when it was legislated out of existence. 
The consulado's existence was very important to the financ-
ing of the Crown and later to the Republic of Peru. Because 
detailed records of its collections have been maintained, it is 
now also important to historians. This information is valuable 
to researchers investigating the economic conditions that pre-
vailed during this period and the trade that took place in South 
America and overseas. 
Melzer is to be commended for his research on this little 
known, but important financial institution in the Spanish colo-
nization of South America. 
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Lee D. Parker and O. Finley Graves, (Eds.), Methodology and 
Method in History, A Bibliography (New York: Garland Publish-
ing, Inc., 1989, 247 pp., $75). 
Reviewed by 
Michael J. R. Gaffikin 
University of Wollongong, Australia 
It is difficult to know how to review a bibliography, but 
presumably it must be relevant (and useful) and complete. In 
the Introduction, it is stated that 
The objective of this bibliography is to provide the ac-
counting history research community with a compre-
hensive reference tool that will ultimately enhance their 
(sic) understanding of methodological issues and en-
able them to employ research methods appropriate to 
their subject of study [xiii]. 
It is tempting to ask whether this is an aim which is as 
noble and romantic as the setting for the origins of the project 
("a curbside cafe on a balmy summer's night in Pisa" [ix]). It is 
difficult to believe that merely presenting a list of titles will 
enhance the reader's awareness of methodological issues. The 
editors obviously are aware of this and have designed a taxo-
nomic grouping of the titles. It would seem that they have given 
this matter some considerable attention and there are thirteen 
such groups. Even so, they are not likely to please everyone and 
it would be easy to take issue with the rationale for the taxo-
nomic divisions. In selecting their categories, the editors have 
indicated their vision of history; for example, why are there 
separate groups for historiography, philosophy of history and 
the historical rationale? Can evidence and sources be separated 
from interpretation and social dimensions? The editors, it 
would seem, are not convinced of either: some titles included 
under one heading in one section of the book are included in a 
different group in the another section. 
The book is divided into four parts. The first introduces the 
taxonomic groups with summary reference lists. That is, the 
works, numbered for cross reference, are listed under a particu-
lar group. The next section forms the main part of the book, 
with the full reference (and numbered) citation being given. The 
third section contains an annotated selected bibliography. The 
final, very brief section lists accounting history review and 
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method papers. It is unfortunate that this last section is so brief 
and any charges of incompleteness may justifiably be laid here. 
The broader question concerns the extent to which readers 
can be made aware of the methodological issues in undertaking 
historical research: the editors have certainly led the horses to 
the water, but will (or can) they drink? If they do not, the edi-
tors cannot be blamed for they have made every effort to 
present the material in a manner they believe will help the 
would-be accounting history researcher come to terms with 
most of the types of historical research that have become ac-
cepted over the years. This is especially true of the annotated 
bibliography section, and the editors are to be applauded for the 
admirable way they have tackled this immense task. The ques-
tion, then, is do researchers learn from what others claim is the 
way to proceed with research, or is it better for them to see 
actual examples of (accounting) historical research and decide 
for themselves what is "good" and what is "bad" accounting 
history, what is an appropriate approach to their research and 
what not? That is, are there universal standards by which ac-
counting history can be judged? If so, who will do the judging -
accountants or historians? 
This work was conceived and completed before the recent 
debates on the "new accounting history." Thus, there is no sec-
tion that deals specifically with this issue. It can be claimed 
(unfairly) that the work, therefore, is incomplete. Those with a 
predilection for the so-called new accounting history are bound 
to find many sections unsatisfactory and even unnecessary, for 
example, the references to quantitative methods of historical 
research (cliometrics). However, this section would seem to be 
one of the most complete: and there are a substantial number of 
references for anyone interested in learning how to undertake 
research that warrants sophisticated statistical support. 
As stated earlier, it is difficult to review a bibliography and 
it is easy to find fault with various parts of it. In this work, the 
editors have set out to provide a list of references for those 
interested in knowing the sorts of standards by which works 
purporting to be historical are judged. If the readers of these 
historical works are also aware of these standards, accounting 
history can only become more rigorous and intellectually de-
manding. The editors wish to see works on accounting history 
become more than mere chronological descriptions, more than 
anecdotal curiosities. Thus, they have tried to present a tool for 
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accounting history researchers, and they have completed a work 
for which they can be proud; one that contains a wealth of 
material and which should be in every accounting historian's 
collection let alone every institutional library. 
Denise Schmandt-Besserat, Before Writing, Volume 1, From 
Counting to Cuneiform (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992, 




Before Writing is a fascinating book on the evolution of 
communication in the Near East between 8000-3000 B.C. Much 
more than that, it is a book on accounting history itself. It ar-
gues that, writing was not, as previously thought, a sudden and 
spontaneous invention; the alphabet was not of divine origin as 
was believed until 1700s; nor did scripts start with picture writ-
ing as was put forward during the enl ightenment period. 
Rather, writing emerged from manipulation of counting sym-
bols. 
Denise Schmandt-Besserat presents a unique hypothesis: 
Mesopottamian writing emerged from a counting device which 
existed at least two hundred years earlier than pictographics. 
She argues that tallies, tokens and pictographic tablets repre-
sent three distinct phases in the evolution of data processing [p. 
166]. The emergence of tallies and plain and complex tokens 
reflects the needs of different societies and their specific life-
styles, economics and social organizations. The development of 
these societies and their economies and social needs influenced 
each phase of prehistoric counting and accounting devices or 
reckoning technology. 
The first chapter of the book introduces us to previous 
theories and arguments about the evolution of writing as well as 
introducing its argument on the subject. The following chapters 
introduce the token system chronologically and geographically, 
tracing its evolution in prehistory. Two of these chapters distin-
guish between plain and complex tokens and depict their evolu-
tion with beautifully photographed illustrations. 
The fourth and fifth chapters provide insight into the do-
mestic and public uses of tokens, including their purpose and 
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storage as related to the economic and social changes occuring 
in the particular society under examination. The analysis estab-
lishes that storage of tokens created a need for marking signs on 
clay envelopes, which was a new trend in communication and 
an immediate step preceding writing itself. 
While Chapter Six introduces us to the routine documenta-
tion of the impressed tablets (classifying and making available 
knowledge as a procedure), the strengths of the book are to be 
found in the remaining chapters. Those chapters introduce us to 
the author's revolutionary findings and, in particular, the fasci-
nating interpretation of her findings on accounting. 
Chapter Seven presents the author's classification system of 
the tokens. In this chapter, the author shows that tokens were 
concept symbols and, as such, conveyed quantitative as well as 
qualitative information. There were various types of tokens each 
of which carried discrete meaning. For example, the cone repre-
sented a small measure of grain and the sphere represented a 
large measure of grain. On the other hand, the number of to-
kens represented quantitative information about the goods, like 
two spheres or three cones. However, they always represented 
economic data of some kind, whether agricultural or manufac-
tured goods. Even the repertory of shapes was systematized. 
Always cones signified a particular measure of grain. However, 
it should be stressed that this was an open classification system 
because new signs were added whenever needed. As well, it was 
flexible enough to manipulate economic information by facili-
tating the functions of addition and subtraction. The entire sys-
tem was based on one-to-one correspondence. 
In Chapter Eight, the author argues that the development of 
token systems and accounting was not commerce-related, but 
emerged as an outcome of the changes in the social structure 
and economies of respective societies. For example, in egalitar-
ian societies, individuals had an equal share of resources and 
tokens were used to measure and count units for farming and 
grain hoarding. Plain tokens satisfied these needs and basically 
represented products of the farm. Later the emergence of 
ranked societies fundamentally changed the relationship be-
tween tokens and the needs of particular social groups in the 
society. Suddenly, tokens became devices of rudimentary ac-
counting rather than counting, and complex tokens came to 
represent goods manufactured in the city. In ranked societies, 
temples acted as a sort of central location where individuals 
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made offerings and where collections were redistributed. At this 
stage, the function of writing served the purpose of keeping 
account of the resources collected at the temple or the palace 
and redistribution of this collection. Further, writing as a form 
of social control came into practice. Record keeping became 
imperat ive to provide information about the community 's 
pooled surpluses and their redistribution. Unquestionably, the 
temple needed to control both functions, and therefore used 
tablets to record receipts. Tablet records contained all the neces-
sary information of a receipt. The change from ranked society to 
the formation of the state brought about new social and economic 
needs. The state needed a system of continual resource collection 
(such as taxes) and needed to calculate the cost of the monuments 
which were built. Both kinds of tokens met those needs very well. 
After rationalizing the social and economic functions of to-
kens and the development of communication, the author ex-
plains three major phases in the evolution of counting: one-to-
one correspondence, concrete counting, and abstract counting. 
She postulates that writing was the direct outcome of abstract 
counting, and suggests that accountants of Uruk IVa themselves 
can be credited for devising the two types of signs: numerals 
(symbols encoding abstract numbers) and pictographs (express-
ing commodities) [p. 192]. 
The book concludes by showing how tokens and tablets il-
lustrated and proved the interconnections between social struc-
ture, cognitive skills, economy, technology, mathematics and 
communication during 8000-3000 B.C. 
Before Writing is indeed a very interesting and valuable 
book which makes a major contribution to the field and is of 
particular interest to those in the history of accounting. Before 
Writing deserves considerable success. 
Richard Vangermeersch, (Ed.), Relevance Rediscovered, Volume 
III (Montvale, New Jersey: Institute of Management Accoun-
tants, 1992, 351 pp., $29.95). 
Reviewed by 
Lamont F. Steedle 
Towson State University 
The third and last volume of Relevance Rediscovered, the 
anthology compiled by Richard Vangermeersch for the Institute 
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of Management Accountants (IMA), enlightens the reader with 
yet another sampling of the cost accounting writings of a par-
ticular decade in our past. At the same time, we are disap-
pointed knowing that this IMA Classic Series will end with its 
publication. It would have been interesting to learn about the 
ideas post-1949, a time which is still well before many current 
cost accounting academics and practitioners began their study 
of the discipline. Why this series was not extended another de-
cade is puzzling. 
The current volume, which focuses on the National Associa-
tion of Cost Accountants (NACA, original name of the IMA) 
bulletins and yearbooks from 1939-1949, does not disappoint 
the reader. While the initial volume covering the 1919-1929 de-
cade remains this writer's favorite, Volume III is a close second 
choice. Clearly choosing a favorite volume reflects more on the 
issues of the times rather than the individual choices of the 
editor. Professor Vangermeersch always seems to select a mix of 
25 significant articles that provide a broad area of topics, and 
he continues to provide stimulating and interesting introductory 
comments that relate the works to modern everyday problems. 
What is most significant, however, is that each of the vol-
umes in the trilogy contains a handful of gems among its 25 
collected works. In this volume, these articles are: (54) "The 
Nature of Cost and Its Uses" by Wyman P. Fiske, which reviews 
four different cost concepts and relates them to five different 
costing applications; (55) "Accounting for Materials and Related 
Procedures" by the Systems and Methods Study Group of the 
New York City Chapter of NACA, which is a summary of exist-
ing procedures and methods in use in accounting for materials; 
and, (57) "Accounting by Causes Vs. Accounting by Accounts" 
by Joseph B. Copper, which proposes a different approach to 
variance analysis that looks similar to some of the newer activ-
ity management systems being proposed today. 
When one first encounters the initial volume of this series, 
there is both anticipation and skepticism because of the claim 
that this volume will contain "the great accounting ideas of the 
past, to help you solve today's and tomorrow's problems." Not 
every work in the trilogy fulfilled this, but perhaps two out of 
every three did. Management accountants, academics and prac-
titioners alike, should avail themselves of this resource. The rea-
son to do so is well defined by Professor Vangermeersch: 
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Our profession has to be more concerned with past lit-
erature, especially in light of our national quest to be-
come competitive again and our reexamination of our 
m a n a g e m e n t accoun t ing roots b rough t abou t by 
today's completely automated factory. Let this past lit-
erature light our way to the future [Vol. III, p.7]. 
S. A. Zeff, F. VanderWel, and C. Camfferman, Company Finan-
cial Reporting: A Historical and Comparative Study of the Dutch 
Regulatory Process, (New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 
1992, 450 pp., $85). 
Reviewed by 
Kathleen E. Sinning 
Western Michigan University 
Although the Dutch have a keen awareness of developments 
in financial accounting outside their country, few non-Dutch 
accounting scholars know much about the evolution of Dutch 
financial reporting because little concerning it has been written 
in English. Company Financial Reporting: A Historical and Com-
parative Study of the Dutch Regulatory Process closes that gap. 
The authors have done a masterful job of analyzing the events 
leading to the current state of financial reporting in the Nether-
lands and providing the reader with a concise but thorough 
review of the economic, legal, political, and cultural environ-
ment in which the Dutch regulatory process has developed. 
In the first chapter, the organizations, individuals, attitudes, 
and traditions that have shaped the Dutch regulatory process 
are introduced. The Dutch capital markets, the principal em-
ployer and employee federations, company law, and the evolu-
tion of the auditing profession are also examined. 
Freedom in financial reporting has been a hallmark of 
Dutch accounting since the passage of the first company law. 
Over time, as changes occurred in the Dutch business climate, 
in the regulation of the Dutch auditing profession, and in the 
international accounting arena, attitudes toward financial re-
porting were modified. Chapters Two through Six of Company 
Financial Reporting analyze the events leading to the current 
state of financial reporting, in chronological order, beginning 
with the first attempts to regulate limited companies in the late 
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nineteenth century. The chapters are organized around major 
initiatives to improve financial accounting. 
Since there is very little literature on Dutch accounting his-
tory, the authors relied extensively on original source material 
including parliamentary proceedings, court decisions, confiden-
tial minutes of committee meetings, committee reports, com-
ment letters to exposure drafts, newspaper and magazine ar-
ticles and editorials, speeches, and 90 interviews with key 
people involved in the regulatory process. The chapters contain 
a wealth of detail including the names and backgrounds of com-
mittee members, contents of exposure drafts and final guide-
lines, and reactions by businesses, the financial press, and the 
auditing profession to proposals and reports. The result is a 
lively account that does not merely outline the events that oc-
curred, but reflects on the personalities, motives, and power 
struggles behind the actions. 
Despite more than a century of activity aimed at improving 
financial reporting, Dutch companies still enjoy great flexibility 
in accounting practice. Compliance with recommended stan-
dards beyond the legal requirements is still not enforced. In 
Chapter Seven, the regulatory process in the Netherlands is 
compared with that in the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Differences in the legal systems, national cultures, and 
capital markets are examined to help explain the differences in 
the development of financial reporting requirements in each 
country. 
The Netherlands is a country in which "progress is made 
through consensus and compromise" [p. 3]. The authors feel 
that an unfortunate consequence of the consensus approach in 
financial reporting regulation is that the guidance it produces is 
characterized by "ambivalence and the lack of clear direction" 
[p. 373]. In the final chapter of the book, they make specific 
recommendations for policy and procedural changes including 
strengthening the political process for promoting improvement 
in financial reporting and having the Dutch auditing profession 
and members of academe take a leadership role in setting 
norms of financial reporting. 
Although Company Financial Reporting is a richly detailed 
study of the efforts to advance and reform financial reporting in 
the Netherlands, its analysis of the factors influencing the regu-
latory process makes it a valuable resource for any accounting 
scholar interested in financial accounting. 
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